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Viewing cable 06BERN1280, IRAN: LARIJANI MEETS WITH SWISS FM CALMY-REY \

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BERN1280 2006-07-10 14:51 2011-03-14 06:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bern
Appears in these articles:
http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers
VZCZCXRO4324
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSW #1280/01 1911451
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101451Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
2006-07-10 14:51:00	06BERN1280	Embassy Bern	CONFIDENTIAL		VZCZCXRO4324\
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\
DE RUEHSW #1280/01 1911451\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 101451Z JUL 06\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY	C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 001280 \
 \
SIPDIS \
 \
SIPDIS \
 \
STATE FOR P - U/S BURNS \
STATE ALSO FOR EUR, ISA, NEA \
 \
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016 \
TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM ETTC SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: LARIJANI MEETS WITH SWISS FM CALMY-REY \
 \
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
 \
1.(C) Summary:  Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali Larijani met \
with Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey on July 8, as \
part of his ongoing European road show.  According to Swiss \
officials, Larijani tried to convince the Swiss that Iran was \
seriously looking at the latest P5 1 package but would not be \
kept to deadlines, such as the G8 Summit, merely to oblige \
other powers.  Calmy-Rey reiterated Swiss support for a \
diplomatic solution and urged the Iranians to fulfill their \
IAEA obligations, if they wished to have their NPT rights \
respected.  The Swiss viewed Larijani's European tour as an \
effort to lay the groundwork for future negotiations.  End \
summary. \
 \
2.(C) Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael \
Ambuehl, as part of his pledge to Under Secretary Burns to \
keep Washington apprised of developments with Iran, on July \
10 offered Charge a readout of the July 8 meeting between FM \
Calmy-Rey and visiting Iranian negotiator Larijani.  Swiss \
DFA disarmament specialist Jean-Daniel Praz and Poloff joined \
the meeting.  According to Ambuehl, the meeting was short -- \
one hour, with interpreters reducing by half the amount of \
time spent in actual exchange of views.  The Swiss chose not \
to hold a press conference afterward, while the Iranian \
Embassy gave two journalists a brief readout.  Delegation \
members were as follows: \
 \
Iran: \
---- \
Ali Larijani, Secretary, Supreme Council for National Security \
Javad Va'idi, Director for International Security, SCNS \
Sa'id Jalili, Dep. Foreign Minister for Euro-American Affairs \
Ibrahim Rahimpour, MFA Director General for Western Europe \
Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iranian Ambassador to Bern \
 \
Switzerland \
----------- \
Micheline Calmy-Rey, Foreign Minister \
Michael Ambuehl, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs \
Livia Leu, Director for Near East & Africa \
Jean-Daniel Praz, Deputy Director, Disarmament & Arms Control \
 \
3.(C) Starting out the meeting, Calmy-Rey explained that \
Swiss policy favored non-proliferation and disarmament, the \
peaceful use of nuclear energy, and a diplomatic solution to \
the dispute through existing multilateral organizations -- \
primarily the IAEA.  Calmy-Rey told Larijani that she saw \
three reasons for hope in the current situation: \
 \
-- The United States seemed ready to participate in \
negotiations; \
-- The P5 1 share a fairly homogeneous position; \
-- Initial reaction from Tehran has been measured. \
 \
(Unstated but implied in Calmy-Rey's discourse, Ambuehl \
suggested, was that Iran would not find it easy to divide the \
international community as long as the P5 1 could hold \
together.) \
 \
4.(C) Larijani told Calmy-Rey that Iran was examining the \
package seriously and would reply with its own proposals.  He \
added that there remained several "ambiguities" in the \
package that would need to be clarified.  Tehran could accept \
no preconditions.  Tehran would also not be bound by \
deadlines designed to serve such events as the coming G8 \
Summit in St. Petersburg.  Larijani told Calmy-Rey that a \
month or so either way should not matter, quipping "Iran \
can't build a bomb in a couple of weeks." \
 \
5.(C) Addressing continued IAEA dissatisfaction at Iranian \
cooperation, the Swiss delegation told the Iranians that, if \
they wished their rights respected, they needed to fulfill \
their obligations, particularly the need to clarify the \
pre-2003 situation.  Ambuehl said that Larijani responded in \
a typical manner that the IAEA maintained a double standard \
against Iran (as compared with Sweden, South Korea, Japan, \
and Argentina) and that, no matter how many questions Iran \
answers, the IAEA always has more questions. \
 \
Ambuehl's Take on the Meeting \
----------------------------- \
 \
6.(C) Ambuehl saw Larijani's motive for his European tour as \
wanting to lay the groundwork for negotiations.  He sensed no \
attempt to divide the Swiss from the P5 1.  Beyond this, our \
Swiss interlocutor did not think it necessary to look too \
deeply at Iranian intentions.  "They are really not so sly," \
Ambuehl observed.  The cancellation of Va'idi's scheduled \
 \
BERN 00001280  002 OF 002 \
 \
 \
visit in June he ascribed to normal Iranian disorganization. \
 \
7.(C) Surveying Iranian relations with the P5 1, Ambuehl \
mentioned that he saw a remarkable homogeneity among members. \
 He said that, during his recent visit to Beijing, Chinese \
officials had voiced concerns about Iran and he received the \
impression that China placed more weight on good relations \
with the United States than with Iran.  Iran seemed to view \
China as an important economic partner, but not completely \
reliable.  Ambuehl thought that Iran was less interested in \
Russian technology than Western.  Iran viewed France as an \
interested seller; Germany as the most flexible of the major \
powers; the UK as a close U.S. Ally, and the United States as \
the country with the most say. \
 \
8.(C) Asked why Larijani paid a visit to Bern, Ambuehl \
estimated that Iran respected Switzerland's neutrality, \
independence, and lack of an agenda.  Switzerland was non-EU \
and non-NATO but was technologically advanced and had an \
established nuclear energy sector supplying 40 percent of its \
own needs.  Ambuehl stressed that neither side mentioned \
Switzerland's role as protecting power for the United States \
in Tehran.  He further described as ridiculous a recently \
heard European concern that the USG was trying to bypass the \
EU-3 by opening up channels to Tehran via the Swiss. \
 \
9.(C) Finally, Ambuehl offered his thoughts on how to handle \
Iran.  He observed that the Iranians approach discussions \
with a chip on the shoulder, as if everyone believed them to \
be inferior.  The Iranians had a particularly acute need for \
respect.  Rather than push for an earlier response to Iran, \
Ambuehl suggested that the P5 1 merely call Iran on its own \
August 22 date.  Ambuehl also suggested that the five nuclear \
states be more mindful of the perceived "unfairness" of the \
NPT when dealing with non-nuclear states -- even such \
likeminded states as Switzerland and Ireland. \
URBAN \