Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2417, TFLE01: AOUN'S ADVISORS PROPOSE DIFFERENT PATHS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BEIRUT2417.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIRUT2417 2006-07-18 18:33 2011-03-15 18:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles:
not
yet
set
VZCZCXRO2418
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2417/01 1991833
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181833Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4694
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002417

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2016
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: TFLE01: AOUN'S ADVISORS PROPOSE DIFFERENT PATHS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
-------

1. (C) While Michel Aoun's close advisor Gebran Bassil
continues to defend Hizballah's actions (but with less energy
than before), Aoun's other influential advisors MP Farid
el-Khazen and MP Ibrahim Kanaan unambiguously stated to
poloff that Hizballah deliberately started the current cycle
of violence and will be held accountable by the people of
Lebanon. While Kanaan was more moderate in his condemnation
of Hizballah, el-Khazen pulled no punches. He said any
cease-fire would be worthless unless it was accompanied by a
commitment to disarm Hizballah of its heavy weapons and
rockets, extend LAF authority to the Blue Line, exchange both
Israeli and Lebanese prisoners, and return "the Lebanese
territory of Shebaa." Unexpectedly, el-Khazen said the
cease-fire should not be declared until Hizballah is weakened
to the point where "it can turn to its Iranian masters and
declare it had done all it could do." El-Khazen urged the US
to restrain Israel from attacking Lebanon's LAF, Sunni,
Christian and even Shia communities -- and to focus on
Hizballah's military wing. While Bassil said that FPM leader
Michel Aoun is most concerned with Israeli "aggression", both
Kanaan and el-Khazen said the Aoun is looking for a way to be
part of the solution, hopefully as part of a national unity
government. End summary.

GEBRAN BASSIL -- STILL DEFENDING
FPM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HIZBALLAH
---------------------------------

2. (C) Gebran Bassil, senior advisor (and son-in-law) to
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun, met with
poloff on July 17 to discuss a statement being released that
afternoon by FPM leadership. Despite some points which would
have been difficult to extract from FPM only a week ago --
most notably "support of the Government of Lebanon...and the
right of the Government to extend its authority over all its
territory" -- other provisions displayed a myopic view of the
hostilities.

3. (C) When asked whether FPM would sever its past working
relationship with Hizballah, Bassil bristled and commenced a
strong defense of the joint communique of February 6, which
in Aoun's view at the time, limited the ability of Hizballah
to initiate independent action in Lebanon. Even with the
obvious irony that the current crisis was started by
Hizballah crossing the Blue Line on July 12, Bassil argued
that if only the Siniora Government had followed the lead of
Aoun last February, the current situation might never have
developed. Bassil indicated that his thinking reflected
General Aoun's.

MP IBRAHIM KANAAN -- VOICE OF REASON
------------------------------------

4. (C) In a meeting on July 18, MP Ibrahim Kanaan, who said
he had drafted the FPM statement of the previous day, sought
to put the best possible spin on it. He said the
inflammatory language ("Israel is destroying a
country...burned land...destruction of vital areas") was a
political necessity, but urged Washington to concentrate on
the "breakthrough" language calling for the "government's
sovereignty over all Lebanese territory."

5. (C) Kanaan also emphasized the statement's call for the
parties to implement "all" UNSC resolutions. When questioned
why the statement didn't specifically mention UNSCR 1559,
Kanaan said such a citation would have severely undercut
popular support for the initiative at a time of extreme
tension.

A PLACE AT THE TABLE
--------------------

6. (C) Kanaan, who professed to have sufficient influence
with Michel Aoun to persuade him to steer a new course, said
the political strategy with the best chance of success would
be for Aoun, the dominant leader in Lebanon's Christian
community, and the Siniora Government to work together --
both in reaching a cease-fire acceptable to all parties, and
in the post-conflict political phase.

7. (C) Kanaan alluded to the influence of Gebran Bassil
when he said that Michel Aoun listens to certain advisors

BEIRUT 00002417 002 OF 002

more than others, but contended the General keeps an open
mind to the views of all the factions in FPM and understands
a radical change of direction is needed. Kanaan said he
stands by ready to assist in facilitating this change.

MP FARID EL-KHAZEN
------------------

8. (C) Late on the afternoon of July 18, MP Farid el-Khazen
lost no time in excoriating the "irresponsible and
duplicitous" nature of Hizballah's current course of action.
He said he had recommended a complete severance of FPM's
relationship with Hizballah. Like Kanaan, he recommended the
formation of a national unity government -- as soon as
possible -- to deal with the critical post-conflict phase.
He argued that unless the pro-reform forces (of which he
considers FPM to be a member) speak with one voice and demand
immediate and radical changes, the country's leadership, with
its propensity for delay and indecisiveness, will lose yet
another opportunity.

9. (C) El-Khazen argued that any cease-fire between Israel
and Hizballah had to be accompanied by a "roadmap" or it
would be worthless -- and inevitably lead to instability and
the eventual resumption of hostilities. He described four
elements as essential:
-- immediate exchange of Israeli and Lebanese prisoners
-- immediate deployment of the LAF to the Blue Line
-- immediate disarmament of Hizballah's heavy weaponry
(particularly rockets)
-- the "return" of Shebaa Farms to Lebanon

10. (C) He maintained that unless Shebaa Farms is returned
and the "two or three" Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails
are handed over, Hizballah would always be able to play the
resistance card. El-Khazen said that without this card,
Hizballah's leadership would be compelled to become a normal
political organization -- or openly declare its identity as a
Syrian/Iranian proxy.

11. (C) The most unexpected comment from this respected
parliamentarian was his view that Hizballah's military
capability must be "reduced" to a level where it could
declare to its Iranian paymasters that it had done all it
could do and must now accept the roadmap's provisions.

12. (C) MP El-Khazen, like his colleague Ibrahim Kanaan,
believed that Michel Aoun was ready to work with his
political adversary of the past year, MP Fouad Siniora.
El-Khazen noted that Aoun and Siniora never had the "personal
animosity" that characterized so many political relationships
in Lebanon. "They now speak every day," he remarked,
"nothing of real substance, of course, but the foundation is
there."

COMMENT
-------

13. (C) While some who were once infatuated with Hassan
Nasrallah now exhibit behavior similar to that of jilted
lovers, Gebran Bassil is in denial. Bassil's logic -- that
Siniora is to blame for the current conflict because he
didn't embrace the February 6 Aoun-Nasrallah understandings
-- is perverse. Even if Aoun's closest advisor (and
son-in-law) doesn't see that Hizballah alone provoked this
calamity, some of Aoun's other, more temperate advisors do,
as reflected in Kanaan and El-Khazen's comments. We suspect
that many of Aoun's supporters also realize that the General
was hoodwinked. Thus, we estimate that one of the losers in
this current conflict is certainly Aoun. It will be
interesting to see if his stupendous February 6
miscalculation causes him to evaporate as a political force
in Lebanon, or whether he tries to recharger his political
steam by building an alliance with Saad Hariri, Fouad
Siniora, and the rest of the March 14 crowd he has disdained
for so long. (The March 14 Christians, of course, are not so
eager to open the door.) For our part, we are maintaining
contact with his closest advisors, but letting the General
alone. Virtually no one is visiting him these days, and that
should give him plenty of time to think about the decisions
he has made and needs to make. End comment.
FELTMAN