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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA1902, BEREKET SAYS HR 4423 COULD HURT BILATERAL RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA1902 2006-07-12 14:23 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXYZ0016
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #1902/01 1931423
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121423Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1517
UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 001902 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ET
SUBJECT: BEREKET SAYS HR 4423 COULD HURT BILATERAL RELATIONS 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Bereket Simon, public relations advisor to 
Ethiopia's Prime Minister with rank of Minister, told PAO 
that 
CUDP leaders' request to arrange a meeting with the jailed 
CUD 
leaders was a positive initiative, which he would support. 
After praising the way the Charge had conducted the 
bi-lateral 
relationship, he argued that HR4423 'was a thorn in the flesh 
of 
Ethiopia', and 'a development that could affect US-Ethiopia 
bilateral relationship' if not managed appropriately.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------- 
CUDP PRISON CONTACTS 
-------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The PAO explained to Bereket that the leaders of the 
CUDP had wanted the Mission to intercede in arranging a 
meeting including Temesgen Zewde and Ayele Chamiso, with the 
CUD leaders in prison.  The Charge had raised the issue 
towards the end of her last conversation with the Prime 
Minister, in the presence of A/S Jendayi Frazer.  He told 
Bereket that the purpose of the CUDP leaders' visit with the 
jailed CUD was to: ascertain whether they accepted the 
leadership of Ayele and Temesgen of the CUDP; determine 
whether the jailed CUD leaders were in agreement with the 
peaceful and democratic political change espoused by the 
CUDP; 
and determine whether those in jail would publicly disavow 
the 
radical agenda of the Diaspora Ethiopians, who were bent on 
the overthrow of the government. 
 
3. (SBU) The PAO offered the opinion that the CUDP, under the 
leadership of Temesgen and Ayele, was making an honest effort 
to build Ethiopian democracy as a loyal opposition party, but 
that they needed to strengthen their party.  Without the 
ability of the CUDP leaders to convince the incarcerated CUD 
leadership to join their cause, or to make a clean break with 
those in jail, and explain why to the electorate and the 
Diaspora, they would not be able to consolidate themselves as 
a genuine opposition party. 
 
4. (SBU) Bereket indicated that he thought it would be a good 
idea for the CUDP leaders to meet with the CUD leaders in 
prison, since their doing so in his view, would produce no 
harm, and could do some good.  He offered to suggest this to 
Prime Minister Meles when he returned from Banjul the 
following week.  The PAO reviewed with Bereket the four names 
of the incarcerated leaders to be visited (Hailu Shawel, Dr. 
Hailu Araya, Ingr. Gizachew, Yacob Hailemariam).  Bereket 
asked why the CUDP leaders did not want to meet with Berhanu 
Nega.  The PAO told him that he felt the CUDP leaders were 
convinced that Berhanu Nega would not be supportive of the 
conciliatory agenda they were pursuing, and that his actions 
in past months had indicated that he was vehemently opposed 
to 
any type of engagement with the government. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
YOU GIVE ME ONE ROSE, BUT MANY THORNS... 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Bereket said that he was very pleased with how the 
Ambassador had conducted the relationship between the two 
countries, but that the progress of the HR 4423 bill was 
viewed by the GOE  as 'a thorn in the flesh of Ethiopia'.  He 
expressed perplexity and disappointment about the U.S. 
government's promotion of the bill, and ended his 
observations 
with a veiled threat.  He was perplexed that "the American 
government had let the bill get so far in Congress".  This 
bill in his view, was in the interest of "hardliners". 
Someone, he said, had to find a way to tell Congress: "hands 
off Ethiopia". 
 
---------------- 
WHY I AM POUTING 
---------------- 
 
6. (SBU) He complained to the PAO that Ethiopia had always 
acted in concert with U.S. interests.  Bereket was 
disappointed that the U.S. had often let Ethiopia down when 
it 
came to receiving support on issues important to them. For 
example, the US he said, had not supported Ethiopia's five- 
point peace plan in the border dispute with Eritrea.  U.S. 
reluctance to take Ethiopia's side, in his view, had 
emboldened Eritrea's Isaias, and contributed to that 
country's 
ruler's intransigence on resolving the border issue.  Bereket 
complained that now, at a crucial time for Ethiopia, his 
country was being held to task by the U.S. for a variety of 
human rights violations.  He reported having followed Ana 
Gomes' testimony to the House Subcommittee on Africa, and had 
been dismayed by the warm reception she had gotten.  Bereket 
also cited the fact that USAID in some unspecified report, 
had 
depicted Ethiopia as a 'failed state', an appellation he felt 
particularly unfair, and inaccurate at best.  (Note:  USAID's 
2005 strategy for Ethiopia classified the country as a 
"fragile state." End Note)  Bereket said that the 
International Crisis Group had even maligned Ethiopia in the 
past for supporting the TFG in Somalia, while much of what 
Ethiopia had done, being with the full knowledge of, and in 
concert with the US. 
 
----------------------------- 
SHOW ME YOU LOVE ME...OR ELSE 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The above were illustrative of the types of actions 
by the U.S., Bereket told the PAO, that over time 
accumulated, 
and had led in the past to the Ethiopian government deciding 
to, for example, expel the Republican and Democratic election 
observer organizations during the May 2005 elections.  He 
reminded the PAO that Ethiopia is a strategic ally of the 
United States and that if the government were to collapse, 
then the whole region would fall to fundamentalists.  The 
issue of HR 4423 had to be addressed politically in his view, 
without the Ethiopian government being hauled in front of a 
committee.  Were this not done, Bereket said, "it could harm 
Ethiopia's bilateral relations with the U.S." At the end of 
the day, in Bereket's opinion, if Ethiopia felt "pushed into 
a 
corner, it would act to protect its interests". 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) Bereket's ready willingness to have the CUDP leaders 
visit the jailed CUD leaders, is indicative of the distance 
the regime feels it has come in consolidating its position 
and 
advancing its agenda. Its strategy has begun to pay off 
domestically. A number of editorials in the private media 
have 
congratulated the regime on its engagement and accommodation. 
However, silencing its detractors in the Diaspora has proved 
more difficult.  As Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia 
increases, the EPRDF leadership will most likely play the 
terrorism card often, at all levels, to solicit 
demonstrations 
from the US, that it is a constant and reliable partner in 
the 
'long war' on the Horn of Africa.  END COMMENT. 
HUDDLESTON