Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06WELLINGTON488, NZ UPDATE ON E.TIMOR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06WELLINGTON488.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06WELLINGTON488 2006-06-27 04:21 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXRO1120
PP RUEHDT
DE RUEHWL #0488/01 1780421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270421Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2952
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 4464
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI PRIORITY 0017
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0142
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0044
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0058
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000488 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR D (FRITZ), EAP/FO, EAP/MTS, AND EAP/ANP 
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISD LIZ PHU 
PACOM FOR JO1E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ASEC KPKO MY AS TT NZ
SUBJECT: NZ UPDATE ON E.TIMOR 
 
REF: WELLINGTON 405 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William McCormick, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  On June 26, Prime Minister Clark and Police 
Minister Annette King announced that up to 25 New Zealand 
police officers would be sent to E. Timor for a three-month 
deployment.  The police will join the 167 NZ Defence Force 
personnel already in the country.  Meanwhile, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) officials say GNZ has no 
official position on the nature of future peacekeeping 
operations in E. Timor.  New Zealand's usual preference is to 
work through the UN, but the officials say that many 
questions remain about what such a mission would entail, 
including which countries would participate, whether a UN-led 
police mission would be effective, and how the force would be 
evacuated in case of a real crisis.  In her official 
statement regarding the police contingent even PM Clark has 
acknowledged that, "It's likely to take some time for the UN 
to work through the various issues surrounding its future 
operation in Timor Leste."  End Summary. 
 
3.  (C) The decision to send NZ police to E.Timor was made 
following the recommendations of a police assessment team 
sent to Dili about 3 weeks ago.  Matt Paterson, Policy 
Officer in MFAT's Security Policy Division, told Pol-Econ 
Couns that the PM's decision to send the police was made 
without prejudice to any future UN mission. 
 
4.  (C) Jeff Langley, Deputy Director of MFAT's South and 
Southeast Asia division, says that GNZ officials continue to 
be in contact with their Australian counterparts on the UN's 
possible role in E.Timor.  GNZ has also been taking part in 
the UN discussions on this issue, and have taken note of the 
fact that Portugal, Malaysia, and E. Timor all said during UN 
discussions late in the week of June 19 that they would 
prefer to see peacekeeping/police operations move to the UN. 
As of now, said Langley, the Australians do not appear to 
favor this. 
 
5.  (C) In contrast, Langley said, New Zealand has no 
position on the future of Australian-led multilateral vs. UN 
operations in E. Timor.  Working level officials are still 
working through the implications of the various options and 
have not yet made any recommendations to Ministers.  Langley 
said GNZ will develop its position as the UN discussions 
proceed on the best successor to UNITIL.  He also said that 
New Zealand's tradition of supporting multilateral diplomacy, 
its relations with Australia, and the needs of E. Timor would 
all affect New Zealand's decision on how to go forward. 
Despite GNZ hesitance to join formally Australia's current 
position, GNZ has no intention of breaking away from the 
Australian-led operation.  "Although we may not always agree, 
there will be no surprises" for Australia regarding New 
Zealand's actions, Paterson said, "We  continue to work 
closely with GOA officials." 
 
5.  (C) Paterson said that New Zealand could work either with 
the UN or in an arrangement similar to the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 
"Multilateral can mean different things," he said, "it's not 
just the UN."  Nevertheless, MFAT working level officials 
seem a bit uncomfortable with what they see as Australia's 
more negative attitude towards a greater UN role.  Langley 
said that New Zealand has historically prefered to work more 
in the UN and other multilateral arrangements than has 
Australia.  But he hastened to add that this preference had 
not prevented New Zealand from joining the Australian 
operation in E. Timor.  (NB: While this may be true, the 
Deputy Australian High Commissioner told DCM that Canberra 
had grown a bit impatient over the relatively long time it 
took for New Zealand Defense Forces to touch down in Dili. ) 
 
6.  (C) If the UN does take on the mission, GNZ believes a 
lot of questions would need to be answered.  These include 
issues of command and control as well as whether the troops 
would mostly be the mulitlateral troops already there or from 
 
WELLINGTON 00000488  002 OF 002 
 
 
a more representative mix of nations.  Meanwhile, GNZ has 
also been talking bilaterally with officials from other 
countries who might participate in peacekeeping operations, 
including Singapore's Prime Minister during his recent visit 
to Wellington.  John McKinnon, MFAT's Deputy Secretary, says 
Lee said that Singapore might participate as part of a UN-led 
mission, but he resisted GNZ's suggestion that ASEAN might 
want to get involved.  McKinnon believes that    Singapore is 
wary of offending Indonesia. 
 
7.  (C) GNZ officials also question how foreign police will 
operate in E.Timor.  Langley said that the Timorese had asked 
for 870 foreign police, but apparently only a minor share of 
these would engage in traditional police work.  Although NZ 
has now decided to send some police, questions still remain 
about their immediate role as well as in any future UN-led 
mission. Langley said GNZ believes a large number of cops on 
the beat will be essential to maintaining order.  A heavily 
armed rapid response team is not the answer, he said, as it 
is far better to prevent crises before they happen. 
 
8.  (C) No matter what the international police role is, 
Langley says that over the longer term, it will be essential 
to train E. Timor police properly.  If the UN gets involved 
it will need a robust mandate and effective leadership to 
withstand the less than favorable political environment, 
which will be less than clear and could change frequently. 
Langley said UNITIL failed in adequate training of Timorese 
police, having focused on specific tasks rather than capacity 
building. The training was offered by different countries, 
all with different approaches, Paterson said. 
 
9.  (C) Langley and Paterson said that one New Zealander 
remains in E. Timor as part of UNITIL.  If the UN takes on a 
new role there, GNZ will maintain at least one liaison in 
Dili.  They said it would be helpful to learn more about what 
USG officials believe would be acceptable elements of a 
stabilizing operation post-UNITIL.  They confessed that their 
NZ officials based in New York and Washington are giving 
different readouts on the US position, and some clarity from 
us would be helpful. 
 
10. (C) Comment: The Prime Minister's decision to send police 
to E.Timor showed some political courage.  The Australian 
Deputy High Commissioner told us the Kiwis were hesitant to 
send police to E.Timor because GNZ is far behind on its 
election pledge to hire more police for New Zealand's 
streets. 
McCormick