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Viewing cable 06TOKYO3620, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/29/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO3620 2006-06-29 08:03 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4377
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3620/01 1800803
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290803Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3813
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 9583
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6971
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0251
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 6874
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 8123
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3046
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9195
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0953
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 003620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/29/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Tokyo will not allow Pyongyang to bring abduction issue to close 
with family reunion between Japanese abductee Megumi Yokota's 
husband and his family; Japan stands firm in aiming to bring all 
abductees back to Japan 
 
(2) Prime Minister Koizumi makes Yasukuni a campaign issue in LDP 
presidential race 
 
(3) Post-Koizumi diplomatic strategy after end of honeymoon-like 
Japan-US relations (Part 3): US stands in way of Japan's diplomacy 
 
(4) I will do my utmost, says JA Zenchu Chairman Isamu Miyata 
 
(5) Japan-US alliance at crossroads 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Tokyo will not allow Pyongyang to bring abduction issue to close 
with family reunion between Japanese abductee Megumi Yokota's 
husband and his family; Japan stands firm in aiming to bring all 
abductees back to Japan 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
June 29, 2006 
 
By Ryuji Watanabe 
 
Speaking of the family reunion between South Korean abductee Kim 
Young Nam, who is believed to be the husband of Japanese abductee 
Megumi Yokota, and his family, the Japanese government yesterday 
noted, "We won't allow North Korea to bring the abduction issue to a 
close," according to an official concerned with Japan-North Korea 
negotiations. Japan steadfastly maintains the policy of aiming to 
bring all abductees back to Japan. 
 
At a press conference after the family reunion took place, Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe stressed: "It's good for the family to 
reunite, and we must connect this to resolving the abduction 
issue." 
 
Since North Korea announced a family reunion plan for the Kim 
family, the Japanese government has assumed, as a government source 
said: "Nobody in North Korea has freedom. So North Korea would aim 
to bring the abduction issue to a close by having Young Nam and his 
family say, 'Megumi is dead.'" "Whatever the other side may say, 
Japan won't be swayed and will do quietly what we should do. Our 
policy remains the same. We aim to resolve the abduction issue by 
bringing all Japanese abductees alive in North Korea back to Japan," 
this source added, indicating that this is the government's 
position. 
 
Reportedly, Megumi was not talked about during the family reunion 
yesterday. The Japanese government, however, assumes that North 
Korea will give a detailed account of the evidence relating to the 
death of Megumi during a press conference by Young Nam set for today 
or on other occasions. 
 
In the talks in Beijing in early February between the Japanese and 
North Korean governments, Japan urged North Korea to (1) return 
abductees to Japan; (2) illuminate the truth; and (3) hand the 
abductors over to Japan. North Korean officials, however, did not 
 
TOKYO 00003620  002 OF 007 
 
 
come up with any positive answer at all. At one point in the past, 
North Korea insisted that the abduction issue has been already 
settled. Even now, there is no doubt that Pyongyang wants to put an 
end to the abduction issue without accepting Japan's assertions, if 
possible. 
 
Japan intends to aim to resolve the abduction issue via a dual 
approach of dialogue and pressure, but North Korea is certain to 
stand against Japan, as evidenced by the family reunion this time. 
Tokyo will urge Pyongyang to come up with a sincere response by 
further stepping up pressure on it. 
 
Abe: Kim Young Nam is likely the same man who identified himself as 
Megumi's husband during meeting with Japanese survey team 
 
At a news conference yesterday afternoon, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Shinzo Abe was asked about South Korean abductee Kim Young Nam, 
believed to be the husband of Megumi, and said: "It is highly 
probable that he is the same man who identified himself as Kim Chol 
Jun, whom North Koreans said was Megumi's husband." 
 
Abe told reporters that several Japanese government officials who 
have met with Kim Chol Jun confirmed from video footage of the 
family reunion that Kim Young Nam was identical to Kim Chol Jun. 
 
Referring to how Japan will deal with North Korea down the road, Abe 
said, "There are contradictions (in what Mr. Kim Chol Jun said to 
Japanese government officials). We need to verify this." He 
indicated he would ask North Korea about them. In this regard, a 
government source commented: "There are several questions about the 
letter Mr. Kim Chol Jun sent to Megumi's parents four years ago. For 
instance, the letter showed the date of Megumi's death, but that 
date was the one before North Korea revised it." 
 
(2) Prime Minister Koizumi makes Yasukuni a campaign issue in LDP 
presidential race 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Abridged slightly) 
June 29, 2006 
 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi told reporters in Ottawa, Canada, 
on June 27: 
 
"Is the Chinese leader's assertion that he cannot hold Japan-China 
summits because I visit Yasukuni Shrine acceptable? Those opposing 
my visits to the shrine believe that China's such a view is 
correct." 
 
He then added: "Those who tell me to obey the Chinese side's demands 
are those who oppose my visits to Yasukuni Shrine, aren't they? I 
wonder if such a view is correct." 
 
He stated in a press conference in March: "If we do something that 
China does not want, Japan-China relations will not go well." It is 
true that the view is strong in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
that it is not the case that the prime minister should stop visiting 
the shrine because he has been told to do so by other countries. 
 
However, some LDP members have opposed Koizumi's annual pilgrimages 
to Yasukuni Shrine, attaching emphasis to constitutional doubts and 
the responsibility of Class-A war criminals for the World War II. 
They are not just giving consideration to China, but they are 
seriously concerned that Koizumi's visits to the shrine have 
 
TOKYO 00003620  003 OF 007 
 
 
narrowed options for Japan's Asia diplomacy. 
 
Koizumi's remarks on the 27th in Canada appear to have simplified 
the Yasukuni issue and created a situation similar to last year's 
House of Representatives election in which the prime minister asked 
voters whether they agreed or disagreed with his 
postal-privatization plan. Koizumi has reiterated that the Yasukuni 
issue should not be a campaign issue in the LDP presidential race. 
"The more he talks about the issue, the more Yasukuni becomes a 
campaign issue," said a former cabinet member. The dominant view in 
political circles is that if Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine on Aug. 
15, it will inevitably become a campaign issue. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who supports Koizumi's visits to 
the shrine but takes the position that Yasukuni should not be made 
to be a major campaign issue, just stated in a press conference 
yesterday: "There are those who have fundamentally opposed the 
visits to the shrine, and some others who are opposing to them due 
to the same reason as that the prime minister has pointed out." 
 
Anti-Abe forces in the post-Koizumi race are strongly calling for 
making Yasukuni a campaign issue. Koichi Kato, a former LDP 
secretary general, yesterday underlined: 
 
SIPDIS 
 
"It is a big mistake to think that the Yasukuni issue is a matter of 
the heart. It's a diplomatic issue. Therefore, we will have to 
thoroughly discuss it in the party presidential campaign." 
 
New Komeito leader Takenori Kanzaki told reporters: 
 
"It is not that the Japanese public opposes the prime minister's 
annual pilgrimages to Yasukuni Shrine just because China has said 
that the prime minister should stop visiting the shrine. The prime 
minister should take public opinion into consideration." 
 
(3) Post-Koizumi diplomatic strategy after end of honeymoon-like 
Japan-US relations (Part 3): US stands in way of Japan's diplomacy 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
June 28, 2006 
 
When informed in August 2002 of a plan for Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi to visit North Korea on Sept. 17, a senior member of the 
Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau felt a strong 
shock. He compared the shock to the Nixon Shock that followed 
President Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972. 
 
Japan had not been informed beforehand of Nixon's visit to China. 
Koizumi's visit to North Korea was also planned behind closed doors 
under the lead of the Prime Minister's Office. When information of 
the prime minister's visit plan reached the North American Affairs 
Bureau, which has been dubbed as the "Japan desk of the US State 
Department," it was greatly shocked, but the news also gave a shock 
to Washington. 
 
In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush 
had branded North Korea and two other countries an "Axis of Evil," 
expressing his determination to continue to fight terrorism. In 
reference to the remark, Koizumi indicated his understanding to Bush 
during their meeting in February of the same year. 
 
Five days before his departure for North Korea, Koizumi held a 
meeting with Bush in New York, in which the two leaders exchanged 
 
TOKYO 00003620  004 OF 007 
 
 
sharp words. Bush warned Koizumi not to be so eager to promote talks 
on normalizing diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, 
saying: "If you really go, I would like you to also discuss such 
issues as nuclear, missile, and conventional weapons thoroughly, in 
addition to human rights." In winding up the meeting, the president 
said: "Good luck," but according to a senior Foreign Ministry 
official, "The atmosphere in the US government was such that the 
prime minister's visit to North Korea was unacceptable to all 
officers, excepting the president." 
 
Two days after he visited Pyongyang, the prime minister briefed the 
president on his tour on the phone: "You probably hate it, but there 
will be no other choice but to talk directly with President Kim Jong 
Il. How about sending personnel to Pyongyang?" The prime minister's 
aim was to urge the US to take a policy of dialogue. 
 
Prime Minister Koizumi has taken a cooperative policy stance toward 
the US over the past five years. Former Prime Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa criticizes his stance toward the US as "going too far," 
keeping in mind Japan's responses to the Iraq war and the 
realignment of US forces in Japan. The surprise visit to Pyongyang, 
though, was a diplomatic approach completely independent from the 
US. The prime minister was also aiming to normalizing diplomatic 
ties between Japan and North Korea in 2002. 
 
The horror of the abductions, though, escalated anti-North Korea 
feelings in the nation. As if to add fuel to the fire, the US 
government released information on Pyongyang's nuclear development, 
blocking Japan's efforts to normalize diplomatic ties with North 
Korea in 2002. 
 
In response to Koizumi's suggestion, Assistant Secretary of State 
Kelly visited North Korea. After returning home, Kelly informed 
Tokyo that Pyongyang acknowledged that it had a uranium-enrichment 
program in response to his disclosure that Washington has obtained 
information on the plan. In 2003, Pyongyang escalated its 
brinkmanship diplomacy by announcing its plan to withdraw from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that it had nuclear 
weapons. 
 
In the Japanese government, the leadership in dealing with North 
Korean issues has shifted to hardliners, including Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Shinzo Abe, backed by public sentiment and the US. As a 
 
SIPDIS 
result, "dialogue and pressure" has become the government's basic 
policy. The prime minister, who gave up on an early normalization of 
diplomatic relations with North Korea, met with President Bush in 
Crawford, Texas, in May 2003. According to Kelly, Bush and Koizumi 
"totally agreed on a diplomatic approach to North Korea." 
 
The prime minister tried to pave the way to normalizing diplomatic 
relations with North Korea by making another visit to Pyongyang in 
May 2004, but the negotiations have been at an impasse. North Korea 
has continued to refuse to return to the six-party talks and appears 
to be preparing to test-fire a Taepodong-2 missile. 
 
The dominant view in the government and the ruling parties is that 
it will be impossible to break the impasse in Japan-North Korea 
relations and that a third visit to North Korea by Prime Minister 
Koizumi is inconceivable. Under such a situation, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Abe and Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who are likely 
 
SIPDIS 
candidates for the upcoming Liberal Democratic Party presidential 
election, began to launch a diplomatic offensive in a bid to 
establish an international coalition against North Korea over the 
 
TOKYO 00003620  005 OF 007 
 
 
abduction and missile issues. Will the prime minister's goal of 
normalizing diplomatic ties between Japan and North Korea fizzle 
out? 
 
(4) I will do my utmost, says JA Zenchu Chairman Isamu Miyata 
 
The Agriculture News (Full) 
June, 2006 
 
A ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will 
start in Geneva, Switzerland, from June 29. The talks will go to the 
wire with an eye on drafting modalities (guidelines for cutting 
protectionist tariffs). Isam Miyata, chairman of the Central Union 
of Agricultural Cooperatives (Zenchu) will go to Geneva as a leader 
of the delegation of the JA Group in order to assist the Japanese 
government in the talks, which will aim at realizing trade rules 
that ensure the coexistence of the diverse agriculture of various 
countries. 
 
In Geneva, he will strengthen cooperation with agricultural groups 
representing food importing countries (G-10), including Japan, and 
the European Union. He will relay messages from farmers around the 
world at the conference hosted by the Swiss Farmers Federation to be 
held on the eve of the ministerial meeting. 
 
He is focusing his mind on the upcoming final-stage talks, saying: 
"I will assist Agriculture Minister Shoichi Nakagawa with all my 
strength along with the group of lawmakers of the Liberal Democratic 
Party and delegations from the fisheries and forestry industries." 
In particular, he is determined to fight with a firm stance of 
absolutely rejecting the selfish proposals of the US and Brazil, 
which are calling for substantially reduced tariffs and restricting 
the number of key trade items eligible for being treated as 
exceptions. 
 
(5) Japan-US alliance at crossroads 
 
MAINICHI (Page 20) (Abridged) 
June 28, 2006 
 
The security of Japan has been affected by America's global strategy 
throughout the postwar period. In particular, Okinawa has been 
forced to shoulder a heavy burden for the security of mainland 
Japan. A nationwide movement against the US-Japan Security Treaty 
eventually developed into a broad-based peace movement. The Japan-US 
alliance has also changed with the end of the Cold War and the 
emergence of new threats, exemplified by America's war on terror. US 
Forces Japan Commander Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright expressed hopes for 
Japan's greater contributions, saying: "It is necessary to continue 
discussing to what extent we should contribute to the peace and 
stability of the Asia-Pacific region." 
 
Civic movement 
 
On June 15 this year -- exactly 46 years after a massive student 
demonstration against the Diet to protest the US-Japan Security 
Treaty -- some 300 people again headed for the Diet in the rain. 
Included in the demonstrators was Koichiro Shinohara, 68, a former 
student activist. 
 
Shinohara was arrested in the April 26, 1960, Diet demonstration and 
sent to prison. He later became a director of a Tokyo-based 
nonprofit organization providing telecommunications assistance to 
 
TOKYO 00003620  006 OF 007 
 
 
disaster-stricken areas in Asia and other regions. Shinohara, who is 
still deeply committed to the peace of Japan, took this view about 
Japan-US relations: 
 
"Japan is subordinate to the United States. I believe the 
anti-Security Treaty movement helped prevent Japan from becoming a 
major military power. Japan must remain as a non-military power. 
Japan should use the United States politically and diplomatically by 
utilizing innovative ideas." 
 
Yoshiko Nakamura, the 33-year-old secretary general of Peace Depot, 
a think tank in Kanagawa Prefecture, has been endeavoring to present 
cogent counterplans to the government in a bid to guide Japan and 
the US in the right direction. Nakamura became one of a few 
professional activists in Japan in the spring of 2001 after studying 
international relations at a university and a graduate school in the 
United States. 
 
Peace Depot presented many proposals, including a plan to conclude a 
treaty among Japan, South Korea, North Korea, the United States, 
Russia, and China to make Northeast Asia a demilitarized zone. 
Nakamura finds Japan's willingness to remain under America's nuclear 
umbrella despite its being the only victim of atomic bombing utterly 
disagreeable. "Japan's security is at a crossroads. I want to ask 
the government if it thinks the current system is sufficient to 
defend the country." 
 
Okinawa 
 
The History of the Ryukyus and Okinawa, a high school textbook and 
the first guide to the history of Okinawa, has sold 15,000 copies 
since it went on sale in March 2001. Its author is Toshiaki 
Arashiro, a 55-year-old high school social studies teacher. Arashiro 
penned it in the hope that the children of Okinawa will learn 
lessons from Okinawa's past and establish their own identity. 
 
Arashiro's boyhood was packed with unfortunate events. There was an 
Okinawa-wide movement started in 1956 to resist leasing land to the 
US military. Arashiro's father died at age 28 after being hit by a 
vehicle driven by a US serviceman. Arashiro was just five. 
Arashiro's father was blamed for the accident, and the US serviceman 
was acquitted. With no compensation from the US military, the young 
Arashiro was forced to move to Naha to live in a relative's house 
along with his grandmother. 
 
Four year later, in 1960, an Okinawa association to return to Japan 
was launched. 
 
In 1968, Arashiro took part in the national high school athletic 
meet in Hiroshima. His inability to answer questions from other 
students on Okinawa's history prior to the Battle of Okinawa 
prompted him to become a history teacher. 
 
Okinawa's movement to return to Japan gradually escalated into a 
movement to go under the pacifist Constitution in tandem with an 
anti-Vietnam War movement. 
 
In 1974, two years after Okinawa returned to Japan, Arashiro became 
a junior high school teacher in his hometown of Motobu. In 1977, he 
published The History of Okinawa at his own expense. In 1994, he 
also published at his expense The History of the Ryukyus and 
Okinawa, which is now in use at nearly 20 high schools in Okinawa. 
The chapter on the Battle of Okinawa reflects his strong desire that 
 
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future generations will not repeat the same mistake by learning 
lessons from the history of Okinawa. 
 
US forces and SDF 
 
US force realignment will accelerate the integration of US forces in 
Japan and the Self-Defense Forces. On May 1, a road map was released 
for the implementation of US force realignment. An agreement was 
also reached on joint training, joint base use, and joint 
operational plans. 
 
Eight scouts swam some 300 meters to the shore and ensured safety 
first and then 30 armed troops aboard five rubber boats jumped onto 
the beach in pitch darkness. This was part of the training members 
from the Western Army Infantry Regiment conducted. 
 
In January, 125 GSDF personnel received training for about a month 
directly from US Marines in California. 
 
Looking back on the joint training, the regiment's commander Yoji 
Yamanaka said: "We keenly felt it was far more effective than 
descending from helicopters. We are going to apply the skills we 
learned from the US Marines to drills in Japan." A sense of 
cooperation is growing between Japan's SDF and the US military. US 
Forces Japan Commander Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright also categorically 
said: "Onsite training is important, although such is costly and 
involves some risks. But there isn't any training that is more 
effective." 
 
In addition to the GSDF, joint drills were conducted earlier this 
month in Guam by the Air Self-Defense Force 3rd Air Wing (based in 
the Misawa base), the US 5th Air Force (Yokota base), and the 11th 
Air Force 3rd Air Wing (Alaska). The US Air Force and the ASDF are 
also scheduled to conduct joint drills at Kaneda Air Base. 
 
DONOVAN