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Viewing cable 06TOKYO3430, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/20/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO3430 2006-06-20 08:17 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4346
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3430/01 1710817
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200817Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3482
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 9440
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6826
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0085
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 6737
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 7972
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2901
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9054
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0829
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 TOKYO 003430 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST 
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/20/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Poll on Koizumi cabinet, political parties, LDP race 
 
(2) Poll: Koizumi cabinet's support rate down to 40.6% 
 
(3) Poll on LDP race: Abe stands at 50% in LDP local exec 
support, Fukuda at 38% 
 
(4) Bush & Koizumi (Part 3): National interests conflict over 
whether to focus on nuclear issue or oil development in Iran 
policy 
 
(5) Japan to recall Iraq-based GSDF troops; Over 2 years in Iraq 
for Japan-US alliance; GSDF distances itself from US forces, 
putting safety first 
 
(6) Japan-US alliance and a Japan-China entente essential for 
sailing through wild seas of the 21st century 
 
(7) Regular Diet session closes; Prime minister stresses results 
of his management of the economy; Seeks continuation of his 
reform initiative 
 
(8) Interview with Heizo Takenaka on achievements of Koizumi 
administration over five years (Part 3): Reform policy collapsed 
following changing of economic panel into just a meeting place 
 
(9) Editorial: Japan must persistently search for ways to 
continue whaling 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Poll on Koizumi cabinet, political parties, LDP race 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 20, 2006 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage. Parentheses denote the results of a 
survey conducted in May.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Koizumi cabinet? 
 
Yes                      52.0       (54.4) 
No                       38.7       (35.4) 
Other answers (O/A)       2.2        (2.7) 
No answer (N/A)           7.1        (7.5) 
 
Q: Give up to two reasons for your approval of the Koizumi 
cabinet. 
 
I can appreciate its political stance       33.3 
I can appreciate its policy measures        15.9 
It's stable                                 18.2 
The prime minister is trustworthy           16.5 
It's achieved actual results                35.5 
It's a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New 
Komeito                                      7.2 
It's better than its predecessors           39.3 
O/A                                          2.0 
N/A                                          0.6 
 
 
TOKYO 00003430  002 OF 012 
 
 
Q: Give up to two reasons for your disapproval of the Koizumi 
cabinet. 
 
I can't appreciate its political stance         34.4 
I can't appreciate its policy measures          41.8 
It's unstable                                   17.1 
The prime minister is untrustworthy             25.5 
It's failed to achieve noticeable results       23.5 
It's a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New 
Komeito                                         14.2 
It's worse than its predecessors                 5.1 
O/A                                              1.8 
N/A                                              2.6 
 
Q: Which political party do you support now? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)                 40.5       (42.3) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto)    14.8       (15.8) 
New Komeito (NK)                                2.7        (3.4) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)                  2.4        (2.0) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto)       1.3        (1.2) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto)      ---        (---) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon)         0.1        (0.2) 
Other political parties                         ---        (0.1) 
None                                           37.4       (34.5) 
N/A                                             0.8        (0.7) 
 
Q: Prime Minister Koizumi has clarified his intention to resign 
as prime minister in September this year when his term as LDP 
president runs out. This September's LDP presidential election is 
a de facto election of the next prime minister. Are you 
interested in this LDP presidential election? 
 
Very interested            34.3 
Somewhat interested        37.8 
Not very interested        18.0 
Not interested at all       9.4 
N/A                         0.5 
 
Q: Who do you think is the most appropriate person for the next 
prime minister? Pick only one from among those listed below if 
any. 
 
Taro Aso                4.0 
Shinzo Abe             43.7 
Sadakazu Tanigaki       1.9 
Yasuo Fukuda           19.3 
Taku Yamasaki           0.4 
Others                  1.2 
None                   25.2 
N/A                     4.2 
 
Q: (Only for those who gave an appropriate person for prime 
minister) What's your impression of that person? Pick as many as 
you like from among those listed below, if any. 
 
Leadership ability         22.4 
Coordinating ability       27.1 
Reform-oriented            16.9 
A sense of balance         30.1 
Accountability             18.1 
Political career           21.2 
Young                      28.3 
 
TOKYO 00003430  003 OF 012 
 
 
Friendly                   28.5 
O/A+N/A                     4.4 
 
Q: What would you like the LDP presidential election to focus on? 
Pick as many issues as you like from among those listed below, if 
any. 
 
Economic, employment measures 
47.0 
Fiscal reconstruction 
25.1 
Consumption tax 
30.0 
Social security reform, including pension and healthcare systems 
53.4 
Low birthrate countermeasures, including childcare support 
24.5 
Educational reform 
15.2 
Administrative reform, including public service personnel cuts 
17.2 
Social divide, including income gaps 
19.0 
Yasukuni Shrine issue 
13.9 
Asia diplomacy, including China and South Korea 
24.5 
North Korea issue 
26.1 
Defense, security 
12.8 
Constitutional revision 
6.4 
Public security, crime prevention 
16.4 
Food safety 
10.8 
O/A 
0.4 
Nothing in particular 
3.9 
N/A 
0.9 
 
Polling methodology 
Date of survey: June 17-18. 
Subjects of survey: 3,000 persons chosen from among all eligible 
voters throughout the country (at 250 locations on a stratified 
two-stage random sampling basis). 
Method of implementation: Door-to-door visits for face-to-face 
interviews. 
Number of valid respondents: 1,815 persons (60.5% ). 
Breakdown of respondents: Male-47%, female-53%. 
 
(2) Poll: Koizumi cabinet's support rate down to 40.6% 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Abridged) 
June 18, 2006 
 
The approval rating for Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's 
cabinet was 40.6% in a recent public opinion survey released by 
Jiji Press for June, showing a decrease of 3.9 percentage points 
over the preceding month. The disapproval rating for the Koizumi 
 
TOKYO 00003430  004 OF 012 
 
 
cabinet was 38.6%, an increase of 2.6 points over the previous 
poll. The figures can be taken as reflecting the Social Insurance 
Agency's unlawful exemption from payments into the National 
Pension Plan. The survey was conducted across the nation on June 
9-12. A total of 2,000 persons were chosen for face-to-face 
polling from among those aged 20 and over. The retrieval rate was 
67.4%. 
 
In the breakdown of public support for political parties, the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party stood at 24.4%, down 1.5 points 
from the preceding month. The leading opposition Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) was tat 12.1%, up 2.1 points. Among 
other parties, the New Komeito party, currently in office as a 
coalition partner of the LDP, was at 3.3%, down 0.8 points; the 
Japanese Communist Party at 1.3%, down 0.2 points; the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) at 1.2%, up 0.4 points; and 
the People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) at 0.1%, up 0.1 
points. No respondents picked the New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto 
Nippon). 
 
(3) Poll on LDP race: Abe stands at 50% in LDP local exec 
support, Fukuda at 38% 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Abridged) 
June 18, 2006 
 
Kyodo News yesterday released findings from its recent poll of 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's local chapter executives on 
the party's presidential election scheduled for September this 
year. In the survey, respondents were asked to answer who they 
thought would be appropriate for the next prime minister. In 
response to this question, a total of 78 persons gave specific 
names. Among them, 39 persons or 50.0% specified Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Shinzo Abe, with 30 persons or 38.5% recommending Yasuo 
 
SIPDIS 
Fukuda, one of Abe's predecessors in the CCS post. As seen from 
these figures, the LDP's local organizations are prone to single 
out either Abe or Fukuda. 
 
In the survey, the secretaries general, policy board chairmen, 
and executive board chairmen of the LDP's prefectural federations 
were asked what they thought should be focused on in the 
forthcoming LDP presidential election. In response, 55.8% 
insisted on the necessity of correcting the nation's social 
divide. This answer topped all other answers, showing that they 
want the government under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's 
successor to dissolve economic disparities resulting from the 
Koizumi cabinet's structural reforms. 
 
The survey was conducted in early and mid-June. Answers were 
obtained from a total of 128 persons in 45 LDP prefectural 
federations. The mindset of each LDP prefectural federation's 
three top executives is believed to be close to that of about one 
million party or fraternity members eligible to vote in the LDP's 
presidential election. 
 
Among other issues for the LDP's presidential election campaign, 
16.7% wanted the party's presidential election to focus on the 
necessity of reforming pension, healthcare, and other social 
security systems, with 10.8% preferring economic stimulus 
measures, 5.0% for constitutional revision, and 4.2% for Japan's 
foreign relations. 
 
Abe gained broad support across the nation. Meanwhile, Fukuda was 
 
TOKYO 00003430  005 OF 012 
 
 
named in Tottori, Shimane, and some other prefectures where the 
LDP's support base is comparatively steadfast. 
 
Respondents were also asked if they thought the next prime 
minister should pay homage at Yasukuni Shrine. In response to 
this question, 41 persons answered "yes," with 34 persons saying 
"no." Among Abe supporters, pro-Yasukuni answers outnumbered anti- 
Yasukuni answers. Among Fukuda supporters, however, anti-Yasukuni 
answers topped pro-Yasukuni answers. 
 
(4) Bush & Koizumi (Part 3): National interests conflict over 
whether to focus on nuclear issue or oil development in Iran 
policy 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
June 20, 2006 
 
On the night of May 31, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi talked 
on the phone with US President George W Bush. 
 
The teleconference was held at the request of President Bush, 
ahead of their planned meeting in Washington on June 29. Taken up 
as the main theme was unprecedentedly the issue of Iran's nuclear 
development program. After the telephone conversation, Bush told 
reporters at the White House that he had asked Koizumi to 
cooperate in preventing Iran's developing a nuclear capability. 
 
Since Iran's suspected development of nuclear weapons was 
reported in December 2002, Bush and Koizumi have held six summit 
meetings, but Iran's nuclear problem was discussed only once. 
 
In the Japan-US summit held on the sidelines of the G-8 Summit in 
Sea Island, Georgia, in June 2004, President Bush referred to 
Iran's nuclear issue: "I have strong concerns about it." In 
response, Prime Minister Koizumi insisted on the need to aim at a 
peaceful settlement through an international agency. 
 
The positions of Japan and the US toward Iran are crucially 
different. That is why the two leaders have sidestepped the Iran 
issue. Both countries apparently did not want the honeymoon-like 
bilateral ties established between their leaders to be negatively 
affected by the Iran nuclear issue. 
 
Japan imported 14% of oil from Iran (in 2005). The government 
succeeded in obtaining concession rights for Iran's largest oil 
field Azadegan in 2004. Iran's crude oil is thus extremely 
essential for Japan's energy security. 
 
Should oil exports from Iran stop as a result of Japan upsetting 
that nation, the Japanese economy will receive a serious blow. 
 
In contrast, Iran is a bitter enemy for the US. The US severed 
diplomatic ties with Iran the year after the Iran hostage crisis 
at the US embassy in Teheran in 1979. 
 
In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush 
branded Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as part of the 
"axis of evil." 
 
The US has been alert particularly to Iran's nuclear program, 
Vice Chairman Richard Cheney remarking: "The program is intended 
to destroy Israel," an ally of the US. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003430  006 OF 012 
 
 
The Bush administration has called on Japan to give up on its 
Azadegan program since Iran's nuclear development was uncovered. 
Then Secretary of State Colin Powell once stated: "There is a 
serious problem about Iran's nuclear development plan. I hope 
that (Japan) will make a judgment on energy-related investment 
while taking it into consideration." In an effort to resolve the 
nuclear issue, the Bush administration very recently made a 
policy switch from the conventional stance of refusing 
negotiations with Iran. 
 
About three hours after the Bush-Koizumi teleconference, US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a package of 
 
SIPDIS 
rewards proposing that if Iran halts its uranium enrichment 
activities, the US would join multinational negotiations. 
 
There is the possibility that if Iran declines this proposal, the 
Bush administration may call on a "coalition of the willing" 
including Japan to line up with the US on economic sanctions 
against that nation. In the Japan-US summit slated for June 29, 
the Iran issue is expected to be high on the agenda for the first 
time. 
 
On that occasion, which will Japan choose, the US as its ally or 
Iran as an important oil supplier? Japan's response to the 
Iranian nuclear issue will be a test case to forecast the essence 
of the honeymoon relations between Bush and Koizumi. 
 
(5) Japan to recall Iraq-based GSDF troops; Over 2 years in Iraq 
for Japan-US alliance; GSDF distances itself from US forces, 
putting safety first 
 
MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full) 
June 20, 2006 
 
The government today will order an end to the current deployment 
of Ground Self-Defense Force troops in Iraq, two and a half years 
after the first dispatch of a GSDF detachment there in January 
ΒΆ2004. However, the deployment of GSDF troops in Iraq-apart from 
conducting humanitarian reconstruction assistance to that 
country-was meant to be a symbolic gesture of the Japan-US 
alliance. Including those engaged in logistics, Japan has so far 
sent a total of 5,500 GSDF members to Iraq, the largest scale 
ever for Japan's overseas dispatch of GSDF troops. One of the 
GSDF's initial main tasks in Iraq was to supply water for its 
host local communities. In February last year, however, the 
GSDF's water supply services ended because water-purifying 
facilities installed there with Japan's official development 
assistance (ODA) program went into operation. The GSDF's water 
supply totaled 53,500 tons. 
 
After its water supply services, the GSDF's engineer corps 
oversaw the work of repairing schools, roads, and other local 
public facilities. In addition, the GSDF's medical unit provided 
local medical institutions with technical guidance. In Iraq, the 
GSDF has helped repair 34 schools and 27 roads and carried out 
about 260 medical support activities as of June 18. The GSDF has 
also hired a total of about 475,000 locals as of June 14. 
 
However, the GSDF's presence itself in Iraq is the purpose of its 
deployment there. Japan complied with a request from the United 
States for "boots on the ground." A number of countries have 
pulled their troops out of Iraq, so the United States reportedly 
asked Japan to stay on. "It's OK if you're just there," a US 
 
TOKYO 00003430  007 OF 012 
 
 
official was quoted as saying. So the GSDF deployment in Iraq 
cannot be evaluated from the perspective of its performance 
alone. 
 
The Iraq-based detachment of GSDF troops is the Reconstruction 
Assistance Group (RAG), which is an on-site unit conducting 
humanitarian reconstruction assistance. The RAG has rotated its 
personnel every three months and is now made up of those 
dispatched on a tenth batch. When the local security situation 
went bad from worse, those GSDF troops stayed inside their 
Samawah camp for their own security. The GSDF's oversight and 
guidance were intended to help with Iraqi people's self- 
sustainability. In fact, however, that was because the GSDF, if 
and when it is in imminent danger, can give advice from the camp. 
 
In June last year, a roadside bomb exploded near a convoy of GSDF 
vehicles as they were running through the city of Samawah. The 
explosion damaged one of the GSDF vehicles. The GSDF has 
therefore had no choice but to be careful in its activities. 
 
Many of the multinational force's members, including US troops, 
wear desert-color uniforms. The Samawah-based GSDF members, 
however, are in green, which is said to be the color of peace in 
Iraq. At the political level, the GSDF has played up the Japan-US 
alliance. At the level of local deployment, however, the GSDF has 
secured its members by distancing itself from the US military 
engaged in security operations. 
 
(6) Japan-US alliance and a Japan-China entente essential for 
sailing through wild seas of the 21st century 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Abridged) 
June 18, 2006 
 
By Makoto Iokibe, Professor, Kobe University 
 
The 21st century has rolled in when the world was, and still is, 
mired in confusion with no signs of a new world order in sight. 
Many countries are extremely inward looking, gripped by 
nationalism, and there seems to be no end to terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation, and other global issues. The deteriorating natural 
environment evidenced by a lack of energy and water may add to 
the moral decay of the global community. 
 
Can Japan navigate safely through the rough seas of the 21st 
century? 
 
For its survival, Japan must have a clear set of priorities. One 
of its top priorities, I believe, is to maintain good relations 
with major powers -- specifically with the United States and 
China. Failed relations with them would leave Japan half dead 
internationally. Conversely, building good relations with them 
would allow Japan to conduct activities vigorously as an 
international leader. 
 
Some insist that Japan should enhance itself in the areas of 
economy, technology, military, and information instead of 
struggling to forge friendly ties with other countries. The 
argument has its point. But Japan can never put the world under 
its control, however powerful it becomes. 
 
A stable international system and good relations are essential 
for Japan as a trade-oriented nation with limited resources. 
 
TOKYO 00003430  008 OF 012 
 
 
Relations with the US and China are particularly important, 
though in different ways. To weather the wild seas of the 21st 
century, Japan's diplomacy must have two key elements: the Japan- 
US alliance and a Japan-China entente. 
 
As was proven by World War II and the period thereafter, Japan 
was not able to survive and pursue its national interests without 
the cooperation of the United States. Both Japan and the US are 
in need of an order embracing freedom. The US is expected to take 
the trouble to maintain the world order over the next five 
decades, which would allow Japan to engage in activities as a 
trade and maritime state. Japan needs to give serious thought to 
how it can assist the US in maintaining that order instead of 
relying on US efforts entirely. 
 
Entente is a diplomatic approach to settle a specific bilateral 
issue to reach an accord to move forward in cooperation with each 
other. Although it is a single issue that is settled, an entente 
carries an important implication for overall bilateral relations. 
For instance, if Japan and China reached an agreement on the 
joint development of a gas field in the East China Sea, that 
would go beyond drawing a line between the interests of the two 
countries in the East China Sea. A combination of a gas field 
accord and a depoliticized Yasukuni issue would provide Japan and 
China with a clear view for the joint management of East Asia. 
 
Concerned about poor relations with countries in Asia, some are 
urging Japan to shift its diplomatic weight from the US to Asia. 
I do not subscribe to that argument for Japan might end up losing 
Asia and the US at the same time. Instead, Japan must enhance its 
relations with the US so that they can survive beyond the Koizumi- 
Bush era and foster stronger ties with Asian neighbors, centering 
on China. Japan must pave the way for a combination of the Japan- 
US alliance and a Japan-China entente for its people of the 21st 
century. 
 
(7) Regular Diet session closes; Prime minister stresses results 
of his management of the economy; Seeks continuation of his 
reform initiative 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 20, 2006 
 
Following the adjournment of the regular Diet session, the last 
for the Koizumi administration, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
visibly boasted of the results of his management of the economy 
during his five years in office. The dominant view in the 
government and the ruling camp is that the prime minister would 
bow out in triumph after declaring the end of deflation. However, 
a dilemma that has developed in this scenario is that if he does 
so, it would make easier for the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to lift its 
zero interest policy, the timing for which it is now searching. 
This move would shackle the successor administration in managing 
the economy. During the final stage of the Koizumi 
administration, a war of nerves on financial policy will likely 
take place between the government and the ruling camp. 
 
Focus on declaration of end of deflation; War of nerves against 
government, ruling parties, BOJ 
 
The prime minister during the press conference praised his own 
managing of the economy, saying, "During the economic slowdown, I 
constrained the issuance of government bonds. I also kept general- 
 
TOKYO 00003430  009 OF 012 
 
 
account expenditures from rising over the previous year's level. 
As a result, the economy is now back on track." He called for 
balancing economic revitalization and fiscal reconstruction, 
based on this trend. 
 
He was not just boasting. With the Upper House election close at 
hand next year, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Upper House 
Leadership is negative about the idea of extensively cutting 
public works, because it wants to repair damaged relations with 
support organizations. Out of concern that his reform policy 
might be derailed by the next administration, the prime minister 
cautioned, "We must be prepared for opposition from within the 
ruling parties." As a condition for his successor, he stressed: 
"It is extremely important for my successor to have enthusiasm to 
tenaciously achieve targets he has set himself." 
 
All economic indicators have turned upward during the Koizumi 
administration. The real economic growth rate stood at a negative 
0.8% in fiscal 2001, but in fiscal 2005, it jumped to 3.2%. The 
Nikkei Stock Average temporarily surged from the 11,000 yen mark 
to the 17,000 yen mark. 
 
In fiscal 2005, the consumer price index, which serves as a 
benchmark for the Bank of Japan to judge its financial policy, 
took an upward turn from the preceding year for the first time in 
eight years. 
 
Koizumi, though, did not adopt a demand policy, which had been 
the pillar for the distribution of profits in the postwar period 
when the economy expanded every year. In managing the economy, 
too, Koizumi changed the LDP's traditional methods Declaring the 
end to deflation would be effective in order not to reverse that 
trend, too. 
 
The problem is the presence of Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo 
Abe, who is viewed as being cautious about lifting the zero 
interest policy at an early date, according to a government 
source. Since Abe is viewed as a candidate close to the prime 
minister's heart, he has to taken into consideration Abe's 
intention to some extent. 
 
The declaration on the end to deflation will not necessarily lead 
to the removal of the zero interest policy. Stock prices are now 
on a mild downtrend. The issue of Bank of Japan Governor 
Toshihiko Fukui's investment in the Murakami Fund could affect 
the bargaining between the government and the ruling camp on one 
hand and the BOJ on the other. 
 
LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa, who 
supports Abe, has called for giving priority to cutting 
expenditures with the aim of constraining the margin of an 
increase in the consumption tax at a low level in the fiscal 
reconstruction process. 
 
In a speech given in Yokohama on June 19, Nakagawa underscored, 
"It is necessary to properly discuss a spending cut policy during 
the presidential race and make most of this effort in the 
compilation of the next fiscal year's budget. We will make 
spending cuts an Upper House election campaign issue and drive 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ = Minshuto) into disbandment." 
 
(8) Interview with Heizo Takenaka on achievements of Koizumi 
administration over five years (Part 3): Reform policy collapsed 
 
TOKYO 00003430  010 OF 012 
 
 
following changing of economic panel into just a meeting place 
 
ASAHI (Page 15) (Full) 
June 16, 2006 
 
Yamada: What will become of the ongoing battle with bureaucrats 
after the prime minister changes? 
 
Takenaka: There is no choice but to hold in place for a while. 
 
Yamada: Do you mean that the government will take a break from 
the ongoing reform drive until a favorable wind blows? 
 
Takenaka: Taking a break is not desirable, so I expect the next 
prime minister will hang in there. 
 
Hoshi: Some see the upcoming Liberal Democratic Party 
presidential election as the dividing line that will determine 
whether the politics-led trend will accelerate or decelerate. 
 
Takenaka: You are right. The prime minister has always taken the 
initiative under the Koizumi cabinet. To take the initiative, the 
administration first used the Council of Economic and Fiscal 
Policy (CEFP) but he is skillfully making use of the LDP Policy 
Research Council now. I think that the next prime minister should 
copy this style. 
 
Yamada: The Koizumi reform initiative has been gradually 
undermined over the past year. Where was the turning point? 
 
Takenaka: The CEFP used to be the engine for the Koizumi reform 
drive, but the council has been turned into just a forum (meeting 
place). The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is now 
responsible for drawing up a strategy of growth, while the Policy 
Research Council under chairman Hidenao Nakagawa is in charge of 
simultaneously reforming revenues and spending. The CEFP has not 
fulfilled its initial role recently. 
 
Yamada: Bureaucracy-led politics is reviving recently. 
 
Takenaka: Ridiculously speaking, elite bureaucrats draw up plans 
that are interesting. But they remain unable to come up with 
effective policy measures for their offices. The Finance Ministry 
slashed public works, but it is still maneuvering to maintain its 
influence in reforming government-affiliated financial 
institutes. Policies will affect each government agency's 
interests. 
 
Yamada: It is necessary to set up a system to apply the brakes to 
each other, isn't it? 
 
Takenaka: Of importance is to apply the brakes. How to apply the 
brakes differs in each case. For instance, junior and mid-ranking 
lawmakers well versed in the government's official development 
assistance (ODA) policy, as remarkably splendid powers, worked 
hard to prevent the Japan Bank for International Cooperation from 
surviving. 
 
Yamada: An end of the Bank of Japan's zero-rate policy will be a 
major theme for future economic policy, won't it? 
 
Takenaka: If the policy is removed, I think that the Japanese 
economy will be seriously damaged. On fiscal issues, only I, 
 
TOKYO 00003430  011 OF 012 
 
 
playing a bad-guy role, have made complaints in CEFP meetings. 
Fiscal issues have been left in the hands of the LDP, but if the 
council had been responsible for such issues, the panel would 
have come up with a plan for significantly raising taxes. It is 
necessary to minimize the margin of tax increase, and I think it 
is possible to do so. 
 
Yamada: Depending on who will become next prime minister, the 
situation will change, won't it? 
 
Takenaka: You are probably right. The major point is to what 
extent the next prime minister will be able to bring bureaucrats 
under his or her control. 
 
Yamada: Will potential candidates have the capability to do so? 
 
Takenaka: The political world is interesting, but there were 
cases in which persons whose leadership had not been expected 
much unexpectedly displayed remarkable leadership after assuming 
office as prime minister. 
 
(9) Editorial: Japan must persistently search for ways to 
continue whaling 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 20, 2006 
 
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) adopted in its annual 
meeting on June 19 a nonbinding declaration supporting a 
resumption of commercial whaling proposed by Japan and other 
whaling countries by a margin of one vote. This was the first 
time for the IWC to approve a resolution calling for the approval 
and promotion of whaling since it imposed a moratorium on 
commercial whaling in 1982. 
 
However, it does not mean an end to the moratorium because 
lifting it requires a three-quarters majority. It can be 
predicted that the fact that the number of pro-whaling nations 
exceeded that of the anti-whaling countries is a sign that the 
tide is changing. 
 
The nonbinding declaration, which was adopted in the Federation 
of St. Christopher and Nevis, an island nation with the 
population of less than 50,000 in the Caribbean, the venue of the 
IWC's annual meeting, may become a turning point to put an end to 
the international commission's history or a factor to deepen the 
uproar, instead. 
 
With many anti-whaling nations' entry in the IWC, the moratorium 
on commercial whaling was approved in 1982. Since then Japan had 
persistently argued against a radical environmental organization 
that insists with insufficient scientific evidence that whaling 
is evil. The maintenance of the marine ecosystem and use of 
marine products are a matter concerning the future of human 
being. 
 
As a result, the IWC's Scientific Committee decided unanimously 
on the Revised Management Plan (RMP), a scientific method of 
setting hunting permits for continued use of whaling without 
decreasing whales stocks. If the Revised Management Scheme to 
monitor and implement the RMP is created, the moratorium will not 
be necessary. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003430  012 OF 012 
 
 
It has been learned by scientific research that the number of 
minke, fin, sei and sperm whale have increased sufficiently. It 
is estimated that whales consume every year huge quantities of 
fish that are equal to the world's annual gross fish catches. At 
present, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) now goes along with 
whaling under the strict control. 
 
When the scientific data and scheme for resuming commercial 
whaling were presented, the anti-whaling nations started saying, 
"Even if whales have increased, we will not allow whales to be 
caught." In a meeting in February on the RMS, they said, "We will 
not respond to talks on the scheme promoting commercial whaling." 
 
Realizing that meetings in the IWC will go nowhere, the Japanese 
government seems to be heading toward holding an international 
conference of pro-whaling nations outside the IWC. It is obvious 
that such anti-whaling countries as Britain, the United States, 
and New Zealand, which have strong backlashes against the 
adoption of the declaration, will further toughen their stance. 
 
The IWC talks over the past quarter century should not have been 
in vain. Japan needs to search for ways to keep and take 
advantage of that international forum, eliminating cultural 
intolerance. 
 
SCHIEFFER