Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06SEOUL2182, STRENGTHENING SELF-RELIANCE, BUT NOT AT THE COST

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SEOUL2182.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SEOUL2182 2006-06-30 08:33 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2182/01 1810833
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300833Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8764
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0882
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7378
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0950
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1276
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
UNCLAS SEOUL 002182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID KN KS
SUBJECT: "STRENGTHENING SELF-RELIANCE, BUT NOT AT THE COST 
OF U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE," SAYS ROH TO ROK MILITARY 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a recent speech to ROK generals, 
President Roh Moo-Hyun identified security as the most 
important element in inter-Korean relations, above peace and 
unification.  While reaffirming his commitment to realizing a 
&self-reliant8 defense, Roh emphasized the importance of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance, a timely transfer of wartime 
operational command (OPCON), and an inter-Korean dialogue on 
the Northern Limit Line (NLL).  In a departure from his usual 
public remarks, he recognized North Korea as a threat and the 
possibility of a military conflict on the peninsula.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
&Korea,s Strategic Thinking for the Future8 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Titled &Korea,s Strategic Thinking for the Future,8 
Roh,s 90-minute speech took place at Gyerongdae, the 
headquarters for all ROK military branches, immediately after 
the bi-annual military leaders, dialogue.  Participants 
included Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-woon, 120 generals and 
chiefs of staff for the ROK Army, Navy and Air Force. 
Pointing out the regional and national vulnerability to 
instability, Roh highlighted the fragility and significance 
of inter-Korean relations as the possible &detonating fuse 
for a conflict in northeast Asia.8  Citing neighbors, 
invasions in the past, Roh also acknowledged the 
&possibility of North Korean provocation8 and identified 
North Korea as a security threat.  Roh urged that Korea,s 
strategy for the future include achieving self-reliance 
through strengthened economic and military capabilities, 
attributing &lack of strategy and national strength8 as 
reasons for Korea,s turbulent past.  Roh favorably mentioned 
the benefits of economic reform and exchange, hinting at his 
support for the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement. 
 
 
Return of Wartime Operational Command (OPCON) 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (U) Roh suggested that the return of OPCON was an 
imperative element in promoting a more &self-reliant defense 
capability.8  In an off-the-record remark, Roh revealed that 
the issue of returning OPCON to the ROK &has been cautiously 
addressed( and that this issue, along with the possibility 
of a reduction/withdrawal of USFK troops, was already 
discussed back in the late 1980s in an internal national 
defense posture report.8  Roh elaborated that the report 
reflects the &situation at the time when there was serious 
debate on the American side on the withdrawal of USFK 
troops8 and commented that &interestingly enough, both 
countries are (still) currently working closely with each 
other on these very issues.8  Roh also underscored that 
self-reliance is &far from anti-Americanism8 and that 
independent defense readiness can be achieved &while being 
pro-American.8 
 
Northern Limit Line (NLL) Inter-Korean Dialogue 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4.  (U) While identifying North Korea as a potential threat, 
Roh expressed the need to find a &rational method of 
coexisting with the DPRK (on the NLL issue)8 through an 
inter-Korean dialogue to enhance inter-Korean 
confidence-building measures.  Roh assured the generals that 
the ROKG will not be disadvantaged by initiating an 
inter-Korean dialogue on NLL, as is commonly perceived.  Roh 
focused on the need to &remove potential threat factors, 
decrease pressure, and promote trust.8  In a following 
off-the-record comment, Roh justified his position by 
comparing the NLL dialogue with Kaesong Industrial Complex 
(KIC), which he believed has successfully promoted 
inter-Korean confidence-building measures despite initial 
security concerns. 
 
&Gradual Progress8 
------------------ 
 
5.  (U) Roh concluded his speech by advocating a gradual 
approach on various military issues, including self-reliant 
defense.  Roh also noted his desired three-stage-unification 
process, beginning with economic integration, followed by 
 
cultural integration, leading to political integration, to be 
carried out also in a &gradual manner, over a long time 
span.8 
 
REACTION 
--------- 
 
6. (SBU) Roh,s first speech since his party,s dramatic loss 
in the May 31 local elections received mixed reviews.  While 
some observers welcomed his emphasis on the importance of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance, opposition GNP politicians questioned his 
sincerity in describing North Korea as a security threat. 
The military audience also expressed some uneasiness over 
Roh,s remarks in the need to engage the North on NLL. 
VERSHBOW