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Viewing cable 06PRAGUE591, CZECH ELECTIONS: THE SHORT, BRUTISH, NASTY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PRAGUE591 2006-06-01 10:11 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Prague
VZCZCXRO4326
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHPG #0591/01 1521011
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011011Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7424
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000591 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH ELECTIONS: THE SHORT, BRUTISH, NASTY 
CAMPAIGN ENDS INDECISIVELY 
 
REF: A. PRAGUE 284 
     B. PRAGUE 427 
     C. PRAGUE 482 
     D. PRAGUE 516 
     E. PRAGUE 535 
     F. PRAGUE 549 
     G. PRAGUE 579 
 
PRAGUE 00000591  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: With the June 2-3 election only a 
day away, political pundits are still waffling on 
their predictions and a significant number of voters 
remain uninspired and unsure of whom to support. 
The choices made by this large block of still 
undecided voters, as high as 25% according to some 
surveys, will determine the outcome.  Whatever the 
result, coalition talks are expected to be 
protracted and difficult.  It could be many weeks or 
even months before we know the composition of the 
next government.  END SUMMARY 
 
2. (U) In Leviathan, Hobbes said that life in a 
state of nature is poor, nasty, brutish, and short. 
Much the same could be said of the Czech election 
campaign that ends June 1.  The official one-month 
campaign preceding the June 2-3 election has been 
labeled "smear month" by some journalists, with 
many potentially damaging corruption allegations 
and an unprecedented number of physical attacks 
against candidates.  The charges and countercharges 
of unethical behavior touched many across the 
political spectrum.  Chairman of the Green Party(SZ) 
Martin Bursik was accused of abusing his position 
in the Prague City Council in the mid 90's to gain 
access to public funds which were used to renovate 
a house he owns in a very expensive neighborhood in 
Prague.  A week before the election, an anonymous 
source leaked to an internet-based news agency 
wiretapped recordings of conversations between 
opposition Civic Democrat (ODS) party chair Mirek 
Topolanek and two aides that might implicate ODS in 
attempted bribery of a parliamentarian.  Just days 
before the election, the head of the State Police 
Organized Crime Unit told the Parliamentary Defense 
and Security Committee that the current government 
has ties to organized crime and has interfered in 
and restricted his unit's investigation into certain 
cases. 
 
3. (U) The string of physical attacks began last 
April when Communist MP and Deputy Party Chair Jiri 
Dolejs was beaten bloody by a group of young 
assailants while walking home from a metro stop. 
Then on May 1, Katerina Jacques, number two on the 
Green Party slate in Prague, was roughed up by 
police when they arrested her for protesting against 
extremism at a rally.  One of the policemen is 
facing charges.  In mid-May, Health Minister David 
Rath was whacked on the back of the head by the 
former Deputy Party Chair of the opposition Civic 
Democrats Miroslav Macek at a national conference 
for dentists.  The videotaped incident became for a 
short time one of the most watched video clips in 
the world on Google.  On May 29, Social Democrat 
deputy and candidate from Pardubice was attacked 
while walking home from a neighborhood pub. 
 
4. (U) Pundits have different views on the impact of 
the attacks and corruption charges.  Some feel the 
allegations against the Prime Minister must have 
some negative effect on support for his Social 
Democrat party (CSSD) and could put an end to their 
eight-year rule.  Others point to the numbing effect 
the many scandalous charges have had.  This group of 
observers says the violence and mudslinging will put 
voters off, lowering the overall turnout and 
possibly even strengthening the share of the vote 
taken by parties with disciplined bases, such as the 
Communists (KSCM) and the Christian Democrats 
(KDU-CSL).  It is unclear whether the Communists, 
who have been in a de facto partnership with the 
Social Democrats for nearly a year, will again enjoy 
the protest vote this year, or whether those votes 
will go to new parties such as the Greens or the 
Independents/European Democrats (SNK-ED), both of 
whom are campaigning for change. 
 
5. (U) A serious obstacle to predicting the 
election outcome is that Czech opinion surveys are 
notoriously unreliable, and possibly even 
intentionally so, since most agencies also take 
commissions from political parties to do work in 
 
PRAGUE 00000591  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
addition to the polls on voter preferences.  For 
example, in the 2002 election, a small party for 
pensioners was drawing 11% just days before the 
election, but finished just above 2%, widely 
missing the 5% threshold for entry into Parliament. 
In the final week before this year's election, one 
poll had the Civic Democrats winning by more than 
6% over the Social Democrats.  The same day, another 
poll had the ODS losing to the Social Democrats by 
1%.  One poll also had the Christian Democrats at 
9%, making them a strong choice for a coalition 
junior partner, while another poll had them 
receiving only 4.6% and failing to make it into 
Parliament at all.  Poll results on support for 
the Communist party are also untrustworthy as people 
are still reluctant to openly acknowledge their 
support for the party. 
 
6. (U) Weather is another factor that will likely 
influence voter turnout and the final outcome.  In 
summer months, many of the well-to-do urbanites, 
particularly those who live in apartments and own 
cars, like to leave the city for their country 
cottages.  Rush hour usually starts about noon on 
Fridays.  Since polls are open 2:00pm - 10:00pm on 
Friday, June 2, and again 8:00am - 2:00pm on 
Saturday, June 3, going to the country cottage 
means not going to the polls.  Conversely, bad 
weather that keeps people from going to the 
countryside can make it more likely for Prague 
residents, who disproportionately support the 
Civic Democrats and oppose the Communists, to 
vote.  The weather forecast for Friday is a high of 
57 and rain.  Showers and a high of 60 are 
predicted for Saturday. This should help the Civic 
Democrats in Prague, its stronghold. 
 
7. (SBU) COMMENT: Exit polls will begin at 2:00 pm 
local on June 3 when the polls close.  Preliminary 
election results are expected to be released as 
early as 10:30 pm local on June 3.  It is unlikely 
that this weekend's vote will produce a clear, 
strong winner that is able to quickly form a 
majority coalition government.  As reported ref G, 
we see few signs that the upcoming elections will 
produce a government that is either stronger than 
recent governments have been, or one that is 
better able to connect with its citizens.  Rather, 
we expect a close election that will be followed by 
many weeks of closed-door negotiations between 
party leaders and the President, who continues to 
state his preference for a majority coalition of 
like-minded parties, however unlikely this is. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: In light of the 
closeness of the race, the high number of undecided 
voters, and the number of unpredictable variables, 
several outcomes are still possible.  The three most 
probable scenarios are a right-of-center coalition 
of the Civic Democrats, the Christian Democrats, and 
the Green Party; a grand coalition of the Civic 
Democrats and the Social Democrats; and a minority 
Social Democrat government supported in the initial 
vote of confidence by the Communist Party.  None of 
these scenarios would result in significant changes 
to Czech foreign policy or on bilateral relations 
with the U.S., although the last scenario involving 
the communists would be least pro-NATO, pro-EU, and 
pro-business.  However, as PM Paroubek recently 
emphasized, to involve the Communist Party fully in 
the political system, they would have to accept NATO 
and EU membership, show fiscal responsibility, own 
up to the past "sins" of the Communist party. 
CABANISS