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Viewing cable 06PANAMA1116, EMBASSY PANAMA SHARPENS ITS FOCUS ON SECURITY,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PANAMA1116 2006-06-09 16:41 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #1116/01 1601641
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 091641Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8236
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 001116 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016 
TAGS: KSPR EAID AMGT PINS KTAO
SUBJECT: EMBASSY PANAMA SHARPENS ITS FOCUS ON SECURITY, 
DEMOCRACY AND POVERTY 
 
REF: A. A. PANAMA 01029 
     B. B. PANAMA 000897 
     C. C. PANAMA 00919 
     D. D. PANAMA 000676 
 
Classified By: Classified by Amb. William A. Eaton for reasons 1.4(b) a 
nd (d) 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Country team met off-site to assess the 
status of U.S./Panama bilateral relations, review our 
priorities and ensure the correct alignment of USG activities 
and resources.  Participants reached consensus that USG 
interests were best served by focusing on three strategic 
areas: security, democracy, and poverty.  GOP cooperation on 
cananl security, law enforcement, and third border priorities 
remains high.  Although Panama is committed to democracy, 
country team remains concerned about corruption, lack of 
transparency, weak rule of law and press manipulation as well 
as increased interaction with Cuba and Venezuela.  While 
Panama's macroeconomic indicators (real growth, trade, 
investment, fiscal performance, and per capita income) are 
strong, a stubborn poverty rate of 40% and vast income 
disparities leave significant portions of the population 
vulnerable to anti-capitalist and anti-democratic ideology 
popular in the region.  Country team identified key 
priorities for each strategic area.  On the security area, 
our medium term objectives are to increase USG presence in 
the Darien and support the development of a competent border 
patrol and coast guard.  On democracy, we will remain 
actively engaged in countering corruption and shoring up the 
rule of law and freedom of the press.  Country team will 
increase its vigilance of GOP actions that could ultimately 
affect our interests (e.g. closer relations with Cuba and 
Venezuela).  On poverty, we will leverage our dwindling 
assistance budget through partnerships with NGOs, the private 
sector, international institutions and the Panamanians to 
promote free trade, and access to opportunity as well as 
programs that address the needs of the poor.  To win hearts 
and minds, each strategic area will be accompanied by an 
aggressive public diplomacy program which raises the 
visibility of the generosity of the people of the United 
States and focuses on the personal angle for the average 
Panamanian.  The off-site also identified the importance of 
internal communications and cooperation in order to act 
cohesively as one USG.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------- 
SECURITY 
-------- 
2. (C) Country team reviewed our security programs and 
concluded that U.S. law enforcement, security and military 
agencies conduct operations unimpeded and receive excellent 
cooperation from the GOP.  Our agencies are focused on 
deepening existing programs (counter-narcotics, money 
laundering, international crime, terrorism finance, and 
institution building).  Country team agreed that the biggest 
concern remains the ungoverned Darien region bordering 
Colombia and the Colon Free Zone as a center for money 
laundering and other illegal activities.  Noting the GOP's 
sensitivities about projecting an image of being too close to 
the USG on security matters, public outreach regarding U.S. 
security assistance will remain focused on the humanitarian 
aspects of DoD and law enforcement activities. 
 
3. (C) Comment:  This level of cooperation is expected to 
continue as long as the target of investigation by U.S. law 
enforcement and military remains primarily non-Panamanian and 
specifically not any alleged illicit activities of President 
Torrijos or his administration. 
 
--------- 
DEMOCRACY 
--------- 
 
4. (C) Country team believes it is in the U.S. interest to 
maintain and strengthen democratic institutions.  Panama's 
democratic development is hindered by a constitution that 
concentrates power in the executive branch, and weak 
legislature and judiciary branches.  The political class sees 
public service as a vehicle to exercise influence and self 
enrichment.  Combined with a weak press and significant 
poverty, Panama's democracy remains vulnerable to a 
charismatic, anti-capitalist candidate.  Country team also 
noted a series a GOP steps contrary to U.S. interests, such 
as a lack of cooperation on the Colastra kidnappings (Ref A), 
 
overt pursuit of closer diplomatic ties to Cuba (Ref B), the 
appointment of many Noriega-era officials, including one that 
critized President Bush on the eve of his November visit, 
(Refs B&C), and the denial of due process to a major U.S. 
investor (Ref D). 
 
5.(C) In response to these changes, country team will 
redouble its vigilance of GOP activities, engage the GOP to 
express out displeasure, deepen our relationship with 
oppositon parties and all factions within the PRD, and remain 
vocal in our support for transparency and judicial reform. 
 
------- 
POVERTY 
------- 
 
6. (C) Country team believes the stubborness of poverty in a 
country with strong macroeconomic performance remains a 
threat to its economic and political stability.  Massive 
flows of foreign direct investment from the U.S., Canada, 
Europe and Asia and a building boom contrast quite starkly 
with an overall 40% poverty rate and vast income disparities. 
 Twenty percent of Panamanians control two thirds of the 
country's wealth, while the bottom 20 percent control only 
1.5 percent of wealth.  With wages stagnant, the strong 
affinity of many Panamanians for a welfare state makes Panama 
vulnerable to the rise of populist demagogues. 
 
7. (C) With traditional USG aid to the region declining, 
country team will promote prosperity through free trade 
advocacy and the leveraging of our resources in support of 
partnerships with the private sector, NGOs and international 
institutions aimed at providing more employment opportunities 
and addressing Panama's poverty issues.  Country team will 
focus its activities on education, small business 
development, and self-help. 
 
--------------- 
PUBLIC OUTREACH 
--------------- 
 
8. (C) Our public diplomacy objective is to remain Panama's 
partner of choice and to maintain our "special" relationship. 
 The U.S. enjoys a 90% approval rating among Panamanians. 
While increasing interaction with Cuba, Venezuela and/or 
Bolivia is worrisome, the U.S. remains the "incumbent" in 
Panama with deep cultural and family ties between the two 
countries.  Privately, focusing our resources on security, 
democracy and poverty while publicly leveraging our 
humanitarian impact can counter these influences without 
allowing them to change our main game.  We will package USG 
programs in Panama to emphasize the personal angle to the 
average Panamanian and expand our outreach to include radio, 
tabloids, television and other media that reach the majority 
of Panamanians in rural and marginal urban areas.  To ensure 
maximum impact and consistency, country team will develop 
carefully targeted messages that the entire country team will 
deliver.  We will also leverage important visitors to help us 
deliver those messages. 
EATON