Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06PANAMA1072, PANAMA CITY MAYOR PESSIMISTIC ABOUT CANAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06PANAMA1072.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PANAMA1072 2006-06-05 21:03 2011-05-29 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Panama
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #1072/01 1562103
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 052103Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8197
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2316
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1028
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0892
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J5/J2/POLAD//
UNCLAS PANAMA 001072 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR WHA/CEN, INL AND INR/B 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA CITY MAYOR PESSIMISTIC ABOUT CANAL 
 
REFERENDUM 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1. (SBU) During a brief but intense conversation on May 22, 
Panama City Mayor Juan Carlos Navarro told Emboffs that 
possibilities for the GOP to win a potential Canal 
referendum in 2006 are close to null.  Navarro, a usually 
cheerful and positive character, was pessimistic when 
explaining why he, and many Democratic Revolutionary Party 
(PRD) members and GOP officials, believe President Torrijos 
will embarrassingly fail in getting a "yes" vote in the yet- 
to-be scheduled Canal widening referendum.  Navarro cited 
poor political strategy, including clumsy political 
patronage on one hand, and unemployed and disgruntled party 
members on the other.  For example, he criticized GOP 
slowness to repair local social and infrastructure problems. 
In his frustration Navarro feels that the Canal referendum 
may have to wait.  End summary. 
 
Torrijos Pays No Attention 
-------------------------- 
2. (SBU) Navarro claimed that last March while flying 
together to the western province of Chiriqui, he told 
President Torrijos of his concerns about the possibility of 
losing the Canal referendum.  According to Navarro, Torrijos 
was surprised by his worries and ignored him.  PRD board 
members Balbina Herrera, Hector Aleman, and Navarro began 
making field trips to meet local PRD leaders to survey them 
on the referendum.  Navarro said that the group issued a 
detailed report for Torrijos explaining internal PRD 
disenchantment with his government and suggesting solutions, 
but Torrijos has taken no action yet. 
 
Ham-handed Patronage Committee 
------------------------------ 
3. (SBU) One of the suggestions included in the report was 
to give jobs to key unemployed party leaders, which Navarro 
thought could be easy to do.  "We would only need to hire 
around 2,500 more people but nothing has been done," Navarro 
complained.  Early in his administration, Torrijos 
established an unofficial committee ran by his personal 
friend Felix "Pille" Gonzalez to screen and approve new 
GOP/PRD hiring.  Navarro confided that Torrijos once 
complained that the GOP had already hired 40,000 people but 
that he couldn't "find them."  Navarro wondered if those 
40,000 PRDs were the right ones to hire and stated that the 
patronage committee is feathering its own nest.  For 
instance, two Cortizo siblings still hold GOP jobs, despite 
their brother Laurentino Cortizo's public resignation as 
Agricultural Minister on the eve of the FTA's ninth round. 
Cortizo's flamboyant walkout embarrassed Torrijos but most 
importantly ruined the conclusion of the FTA, a firm GOP 
goal at the time. 
 
Unreasonable Expectations 
------------------------- 
4. (SBU) Navarro claimed that Cocle provincial PRD Governor 
Dario Fernandez recently confided his increasing worries 
about having to promote the referendum in his province when 
their own party members were not behind them supporting the 
cause.  Lack of much-needed infrastructure solutions 
concerns Navarro as well.  "How do they expect our people to 
go to the communities and ask them to vote with us?  The 
people will ask `where is the bridge you promised us?'" 
Navarro stated.  Many rural communities in Panama face the 
same problem.  Navarro believes that it is already "too 
late" to think that small social projects would prompt a 
"yes" Canal expansion vote.  Even the $50M that the GOP put 
aside last January for this purpose won't help, he said, and 
"anyway, where are those $50M?  I haven't seen it!" Navarro 
added. 
 
Running for president 
--------------------- 
5. (SBU) Navarro, who confirmed that he will run for the 
sensitive but largely ceremonial job as PRD president in 
2007 and for PRD presidential candidate during the party 
primaries in 2008, shared with Emboffs that his campaign 
team is actively polling his presidential possibilities.  He 
told Ambassador that President Torrijos is supporting his 
candidacy for PRD president.  He also told Ambassador that 
Torrijos had promised to support his candidacy for President 
of Panama in 2009 if Navarro supported his candidacy in 
2004. 
 
Waiting Is Better Than Losing 
----------------------------- 
6. (SBU) Navarro's polls show anti-Canal referendum 
sentiment increasing and the "yes" supporters losing 
territory.  The polls, Navarro claimed, are nationwide and 
use a sample of 1200 people.  Navarro's concerns increase 
when asked what happens if the referendum fails.  "The GOP 
would become a lame duck.  The GOP is at stake, the party is 
at stake, I am at stake," Navarro remarked, adding that if 
polls continue to show the "no" vote growing, then it would 
be advisable not to hold the referendum in 2006.  Navarro 
believes that Torrijos made a mistake by holding a big, 
splashy event to launch the Canal expansion project.  By 
holding the event and giving a speech, Torrijos politicized 
the project.  Navarro considers that it should have been a 
Panama Canal Authority event instead and that delaying the 
referendum is a reasonable option to avoid losing it. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
7. (SBU) Navarro's feelings reinforce those of opposition 
legislators who have told Emboffs that winning the 
referendum is becoming more questionable as days go by. 
Inevitably any referendum in Panama becomes a test of the 
government's popularity.  Lack of governing party unity is 
bad enough.  But added to increases in energy and 
transportation costs, a worsening crime rate, and higher 
income and property taxes threaten the referendum. 
Panamanians may "punish" the GOP via the referendum. 
 
Eaton