Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06MANILA2777, GRP LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNIST INSURGENTS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MANILA2777.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANILA2777 2006-06-30 09:08 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Manila
VZCZCXRO5796
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHML #2777/01 1810908
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300908Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1828
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 002777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PTER PHUM PINS PREL RP
SUBJECT:  GRP LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNIST INSURGENTS 
 
REF: 05 MANILA 5506 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  In In June 2006, President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo approved a new strategy for defeating 
Asia's longest-running communist insurgency by the 
Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People's 
Army (CPP/NPA).  Under this plan, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP), with a subsidiary role for the 
Philippine National Police (PNP), will launch multiple 
offensives to "eliminate" the NPAew People's Army in 
critical areas, including Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, 
parts of Northern Luzon, and the BicolSorsogon 
regionProvince.  The new campaign will simultaneously seek 
socio-economic development, lack of which has fueled the 
Communist insurgency over almost forty years.  U.S. experts 
working with the AFP on Philippine Defense Reform are so 
far convinced that the new anti-NPA campaign will not be a 
distraction.   While total victory over the CPP/NPA in the 
foreseeable future remains unlikely, the new campaign could 
over the next couple of years contribute to improvements on 
the ground, although at the risk of higher AFP casualties 
that may be politically difficult to sustain, especially 
with elections due in May 2007. 
  End Summary. 
 
-------------- 
"New" strategy 
-------------- 
 
2.  (U) The New People's Army (NPA), with an estimated 
strength of 7,400 members and 130 guerrilla fronts, 
continues to threaten the the Philippines' internal security 
and impede economic development (reftel).  In a Cabinet 
meeting in Isabela province on June 16, President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo rejected an estimate by the Department of 
National  Defense of 10 years to defeat the communist 
insurgency as "too long," and set a target of two years 
instead.  Under a "new" strategy entitled the Internal 
Security Operations (ISO) Oplan Bantay Laya,  President 
Arroyo announced a special new budget allocation of P1 
billion (approximxately  US$18,870,000), effective 
immediately (ref A). 
 
3.  (U)  According to media accounts, the AFP will receive 
P400 million (approximately $7,550,000) of the new fund, 
primarily to purchase attack helicopters but also to fund 
overall anti-NPA military operations.  The AFP reportedly 
has redeployed three Army battalions from Mindanao -- about 
1,500 soldiers -- to areas in Luzon to assist in military 
operations against the NPA: the 3rd Infantry Battalion (IB) 
to Central Luzon and parts of Northern Luzon; the 4th IB to 
Tanay, Rizal in Southern Luzon; and, the 9th IB to the Bicol 
regionProvince.   The AFP has announced that an additional 
3,000 troops now assigned to other duties (notably, security 
details of VIPs and other civilians) will also join the new 
campaigns. 
 
4.  (U) The PNP will receive P300 million (approximately 
$5,660,000), reportedly mostly to beef up protection of and 
capabilities of police outposts in remote areas, but also to 
resume the counterinsurgency role in metro Manila ofby its 
elite Special Acton Force (SAF). 
 
5.  (U) The remaining P300 million (approximately 
$5,660,000) will be part of a major "hearts and minds" 
campaign, led by the AFP, to wean away remote and under- 
served parts of the Philippines from CPP and NPA control or 
influence.  The still-unpassed 2006 budget had included 
special funding for a "500 barangays" project by the AFP 
with this same goalto this intent by the AFP; this funding 
could also become available if the Senate and Lower House 
approve a budget once the two houses of Congress resumes 
their sessions in late July.  President Arroyo has also 
announced a plant to commit an additional P75 billion 
(approximately  $1,415,000,000) over the next three years to 
generate investment and development in Northern Luzon in 
particular. 
 
6.  (U) GRP leaders have separately also indicated a new 
effort to  target CPP/NPA "sympathizers and financiers," 
stating publicly that anyone who provides comfort or aid to 
the insurgents will be subject to counterinsurgency 
operations.   Leftists have already expressed concern that 
the AFP or PNP could go after local farmers already 
 
MANILA 00002777  002 OF 002 
 
 
"squeezed" by the NPA's revolutionary taxes, possibly 
leading to an increase in extrajudicial killings allegedly 
involving security forces.  However, GRP officials have 
claimed that they will also investigate and prosecute 
business firms that pay "revolutionary taxes" to the NPA, 
with the objective of restricting the flow of funds to the 
communist insurgents, although they have not publicly 
targeted the largest suspected "victims" - cell phone 
companies whose remote relay stations are often at risk if 
they do not pay up. 
 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The NPA indeed remains a deadly threat throughout 
the Philippines; its elimination would tangibly improve the 
prospects for peace and development nationwide.  The NPA 
has suffered significant losses during the Lombat-Bitag 
campaign in 1989-1993,, and have then resortedcommitted to 
traditional guerrilla tactics since their its reemergence 
in 1996 as a serious threat.  Likewise, Due to with the 
designation by the U.S. and the EU as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization, the CPP has had to adopted more 
diversifiedsophisticated methods to raise funds from their 
legal front support base, methods difficult if not 
impossible to prove evidentiary.  The NPA havse also had to 
recommitted to Netherlands-based CPP leader Joma Sison's 
original strategy of being self-sufficient units, making 
them less easy targets for the AFP.Early campaigns have 
scattered NPA forces into ever-smaller operating units 
(making them more difficult targets for AFP or PNP 
offensives), while the listing of the CPP/NPA by the U.S. 
Government and EU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization has 
led to a major cutback on foreign funding, forcing the NPA 
into its current role as a serious extortion gang.    Apart 
from the announced AFP troop redeployment from Central 
Mindanao (where observers sayth theey were no longer 
needed), other elements of the new "strategy" remain vague, 
with no clearer prospect for success than earlier 
campaigns.  However, AFP programs with the U.S. Joint 
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSTOF-P) in 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago - notably in Basilan and 
now in Jolo - have enhanced the skills of AFP troops in 
conducting civil/humanitarian programs, which that could 
improve the likelihood of success in this larger "hearts 
and minds" campaign nationwide.  U.S. experts working with 
the AFP on Philippine Defense Reform are so far convinced 
that the new anti-NPA campaign will not be a distraction 
from PDR initiatives, and actually reflect some of the 
priorities enunciated in the first-ever DND Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG), DND planning guidelines issued in 
2005.  While total victory over the CPP/NPA in the 
foreseeable future remains unlikely, the new campaign could 
over the next couple of years contribute to improvements on 
the ground, although at the risk of higher AFP casualties 
that may be politically difficult to sustain, especially 
with elections due in May 2007. 
KENNEY