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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA1429, AMBASSADORS SHARE ELECTION CONCERNS WITH A/S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA1429 2006-06-30 16:35 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1429/01 1811635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301635Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6802
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0127
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0041
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0449
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3675
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0085
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0204
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORS SHARE ELECTION CONCERNS WITH A/S 
SHANNON 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: A group of ambassadors resident in Nicaragua, 
most of whom are contributing funds to election efforts, 
shared their conviction with A/S Shannon on June 26 that a 
thorough international observation effort is necessary to 
prevent fraud during the November 5 national elections.  The 
ambassadors are also concerned about fraud and governability 
after the elections.  Spanish Ambassador Jaime Lacadena 
warned that FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega has a chance of 
winning in the first round of voting if one of the Liberal 
candidates does not concede in favor of the other before the 
elections.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) On June 26, A/S Shannon, Senior Advisor Tamburri, 
Ambassador and Emboffs met with the ambassadors of Japan, 
Norway, Mexico, Spain, Finland and Germany to discuss the 
upcoming national elections in Nicaragua.  The following is a 
summary of their comments: 
 
3. (C) GERMANY (Amb. Gregor Koebel): Germany's interests 
coincide with those of the USG ) the Government of Germany 
prefers to spend taxpayers, money efficiently and this can 
not happen with the kind of rampant official corruption that 
has plagued Nicaragua.  Regarding the elections, Germany is 
concerned about the possible (politically motivated) 
exclusion of candidates. 
 
4. (C) MEXICO (Amb. Columba Calvo): Mexico supports President 
Bolanos in his fight against corruption and shares technical, 
scientific and cultural cooperation with Nicaragua.  Mexico 
would like to see transparent elections and believes that the 
OAS mission, and the observation effort generally, are very 
important to minimize fraud on election day. 
 
5. (C) JAPAN (Amb. Mitsuhiro Kagame): The FSLN and PLC are 
very strong in rural areas ) one should not be deceived by 
the level of support for the dissident candidates evident in 
Managua.  Eduardo Montealegre and Herty Lewites must organize 
their party structures in rural areas.  Japan recently 
contributed $61,000 to the Democracy Center to promote voting 
among young people, a key demographic in Nicaragua. 
 
6. (C) NORWAY (Amb. Kirsten Christensen): Norway desires 
clear and transparent elections, so the Government of Norway 
has provided funds to support the OAS observation mission and 
local observers under Etica y Transparencia.  Christensen 
agreed with Ambassador Kagami, but remarked that the ALN is 
growing throughout Nicaragua.  Christensen observed that, 
despite the ambassadors' private personal preferences, the 
direct endorsement of any candidate could be the &kiss of 
death.8 
 
7. (C) SPAIN (Amb. Jaime Lacadena): Spain maintains very 
significant interests in Latin America.  Lacadena stated that 
he maintains his personal preferences regarding the 
elections, but Spain will remain publicly neutral.  The 
Government of Spain is very concerned about governability 
after the elections.  President Bolanos has very honorable 
intentions, but the lack of legislative support has 
handicapped his administration, he remarked. 
 
8. (C) Lacadena believes that the FSLN can capture 35-38 
percent of the vote, and could possibly add 2-3 percent more 
through fraud to avoid a runoff election.  The FSLN vote is 
very disciplined, he asserted.  Lewites will only take five 
percent of the Sandinista vote, plus six to eight percent of 
the independent vote.  Montealegre and Rizo will divide the 
50 percent that remain unless one of them renounces in favor 
of the other.  Lacadena remarked that even if Montealegre 
wins, he may be burning too many bridges with the PLC to be 
able to form a unified Liberal block of deputies in the 
National Assembly after the elections.  In any event, he 
believes the candidates will need to make concessions to 
govern. 
 
9. (C) FINLAND (Amb. Marja Luoto): Finland will head the EU 
in July through the end of the year.  The Finnish President 
is personally interested in Nicaragua and has visited the 
country eight times.  The Government of Finland is concerned 
 
what an Ortega presidency would mean for the EU,s efforts to 
develop a free trade area with Central America as the EU is 
not interested in negotiating with the countries 
individually.  Luoto stated that some of her contacts believe 
enough FSLN leaders have business interests so that Ortega 
would not radically alter economic policy, but she is 
unconvinced.  Finland is also concerned about governability. 
Luoto commented that the war between the Executive and the 
National Assembly has made doing business very difficult for 
the donors. 
 
10. (C) A/S Shannon responded that the USG understands that 
the direct endorsement of a particular candidate would be 
counterproductive.  He clarified that although many in the 
PLC still believe that the USG will make amends with 
convicted PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman to prevent an Ortega 
victory, for us Aleman is as much a problem as Ortega.  A/S 
Shannon stated that the USG will acknowledge the results of a 
fair and transparent election, but we will not do business 
with corrupt politicians. 
 
11. (C) Comment: Lacadena may be overestimating the strength 
of the FSLN "hard core" vote, which a recent poll indicated 
was only 20 percent, and post estimates is at about 25 
percent.  Lewites supporters consistently claim that they 
will win 20-25 percent of the Sandinista vote, although 
Lewites' support seems to be largely concentrated in the 
central Pacific region. 
 
12. (U) Participants, U.S.: 
 
WHA A/S Thomas Shannon 
Ambassador Paul Trivelli 
Senior Advisor Maria Tamburri 
DCM Peter Brennan 
Polcouns Victoria Alvarado 
Poloff Timothy Smith (notetaker) 
TRIVELLI