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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA1210, HERTY: I STAND BETWEEN ORTEGA AND THE PRESIDENCY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA1210 2006-06-05 22:54 2011-08-19 20:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0029
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1210/01 1562254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 052254Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6490
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0700
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN TPIERCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: HERTY:  I STAND BETWEEN ORTEGA AND THE PRESIDENCY 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0251 
 
     B. MANAGUA 0969 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.   (C) SUMMARY: Sandinista dissident (FSLN) Herty Lewites 
recently asserted to Ambassador that he stands between Daniel 
Ortega and the presidency.  He believes he can whittle down 
support for Ortega to 25% of the vote in November -- thereby 
ensuring a runoff, which Ortega would lose.  Lewites warns, 
however, that inadequate financial backing could force him to 
resign his candidacy.  George Soros has offered Lewites his 
support, and Lewites will also seek support from the Jewish 
private sector in New York City.  Lewites alleges that Ortega 
prevented the reunification of Nicaragua's Liberal forces by 
insisting that Aleman not cede the PLC's leadership to Rizo 
and claims that Ortega could "allow" Aleman to walk free by 
June or July.  He believes that the legal proceedings against 
Aleman and his family in Panama and the United States are 
helpful, as is the Schengen nations' recent decision to 
forbid Aleman's admission into their countries.  Lewites' 
presence in the presidential race is crucial to reducing 
Ortega's chances to win, and our engagement with him deflects 
PLC and FSLN accusations that the USG has somehow endorsed 
Eduardo Montealegre as its candidate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Over coffee at the Ambassador's residence on June 3, 
Sandinista dissident (FSLN) Herty Lewites asserted to the 
Ambassador that he is the one person who stands between 
Daniel Ortega and the presidency and that he believes he can 
whittle down support for Ortega to 25% of voters -- thereby 
ensuring a runoff, which Ortega would lose.  Lewites ventured 
that he can draw at least 5% of the total vote from citizens 
traditionally supportive of the FSLN to his side.  Ortega 
rival Alejandro Martinez Cuenca would add an additional 2% to 
3% of FSLN militants if he were to join Herty's campaign, 
suggested Lewites. 
 
3.  (C) Lewites related how he had attempted to convince 
Martinez Cuenca to run as his vice presidential candidate -- 
instead of Edmundo Jarquin --- quickly noting that Jarquin 
had supported the idea.  Instead, a stubborn Martinez Cuenca 
had insisted on challenging Ortega's right to run as the 
FSLN's candidate to the very day of its May 28 convention, 
when Martinez Cuenca was bounced at the door.  Lewites 
explained that he will continue his efforts to recruit 
Martinez.  As for his challenging Ortega, Lewites remarked 
that he will take advantage of the FSLN's "millionaire 
ticket" (Ortega and Morales are millionaires) to discredit 
their claims that they are the best option to help 
Nicaragua's poor masses. 
 
FINANCIAL WOES COULD CAUSE LEWITES TO WITHDRAW FROM RACE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - 
 
4.  (C) Lewites reiterated his commitment to remaining in the 
race, but warned that lack of financial backing could force 
him to withdraw.  He confided his plans to travel to New York 
City on June 6 to meet with a few Jewish businessmen and then 
travel to Miami for the meeting of Nicaraguan expats with 
Nicaraguan presidential candidates (Eduardo Montealegre and 
Jose Rizo are also expected to attend.)  Lewites also shared 
that George Soros will support him, primarily through get out 
the vote support.  However, Lewites was less optimistic about 
backing from  Nicaragua's private sector, hinting that U.S. 
influence could encourage local financiers to lend some 
support to his campaign.  Responding to Ambassador's query 
regarding Lewites' plans to travel to Washington, Lewites 
noted he will leave Washington for later, preferring to 
downplay any association with the U.S. government for now. 
 
5.  (C) Lewites voiced particular concern over the large 
number of youth who do not possess national ID cards 
(cedulas) required to vote.  According to Lewites, who 
estimated that some 300,000 youth do not have cedulas, he has 
made the cedula issuance one of his prime objectives.  (NOTE: 
 Lewites polls very well among university students; in a 
recent poll of Managua universities, he was the most popular 
presidential candidate.  END NOTE.)  Regarding the weeks of 
FSLN-masterminded student demonstrations, Lewites asserted 
that the violence will continue until/unless President 
Bolanos agrees to pressure Nicaraguan oil company Petronic to 
provide the infrastructure required to receive, store, and 
distribute Venezuelan oil to advance Ortega's campaign. 
 
HERTY'S VIEWS ON THE LATEST ROUND OF THE ORTEGA-ALEMAN PACT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) Touching on the latest round in the Ortega-Aleman 
pact, Lewites alleged that Ortega had ordered Aleman "to 
stand firm" and to prevent Rizo from assuming the leadership 
of the PLC.  In exchange, claimed Lewites, Ortega would 
arrange for the FSLN-controlled Appeals Court to rule against 
Aleman's appeal regarding his 20-year sentence for money 
laundering and embezzlement of Nicaraguan government funds. 
Then the Supreme Court's PLC-dominated constitutional chamber 
would hear the case and absolve Aleman of all charges and 
order his release, explained Lewites.  (COMMENT:  In this 
scenario, the FSLN would be able to uphold its position of 
condemning Aleman's corruption, while PLC magistrates and the 
party would take the fall for releasing him - actions that 
would favor Ortega's campaign.  END COMMENT.) 
 
KEEP THE PRESSURE ON ALEMAN, ENCOURAGE RIZO TO ASSERT SELF 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) According to Lewites, the legal proceedings against 
Aleman and his family in Panama and the United States are 
helpful, as is the Schengen nations' recent decision to 
forbid Aleman's admission into their countries.  However, he 
voiced concern that the Aleman family could win the civil 
case in Miami, noting that the PLC has already declared 
victory.  Ambassador clarified that the Miami case is still 
proceeding and that the judge will rule o/a June 21 after 
both parties in question present final statements on June 15. 
 The Ambassador added that another case against Aleman could 
be built in the Dominican Republic. 
 
8.  (C) Finally, Lewites added that he would meet with Rizo 
the following day and encourage him to continue his efforts 
to reform the PLC.  (NOTE: A split Liberal vote also favors 
Lewites.  If Rizo asserts his leadership over Aleman, even 
half-heartedly, he could draw some Montealegre supporters to 
the PLC.  END NOTE.) 
 
COMMENT 
- - -  - 
 
9.  (C) Several Embassy contacts have told us that Ortega may 
soon "allow" Aleman to walk free to enable Aleman can 
campaign against Montealegre, especially in the rural areas 
where Aleman still enjoys support and Montealegre is weakest. 
 Lewites' presence in the presidential race is indeed crucial 
to reducing Ortega's chances to win.  Further, our engagement 
with him deflects PLC and FSLN accusations that the USG has 
somehow endorsed Eduardo Montealegre as its candidate. 
TRIVELLI