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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA1209, UPBEAT PRESIDENT BOLANOS HOPES SUCCESSOR BUILDS ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA1209 2006-06-05 22:54 2011-06-01 08:00 SECRET Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0021
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1209/01 1562254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 052254Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6488
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0698
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T MANAGUA 001209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN TPIERCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM MARR MOPS NU
SUBJECT: UPBEAT PRESIDENT BOLANOS HOPES SUCCESSOR BUILDS ON 
HIS LEGACY 
 
REF: MANAGUA 1180 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: President Bolanos recently confided to 
Ambassador his desire for his successor, ideally Liberal 
dissident Eduardo Montealegre, to build on his legacy.  He 
justified his firing of a number of government employees for 
corruption, downplaying the fact that they had recently 
abandoned his Alliance for the Republic (APRE) party to join 
Arnoldo Aleman's Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC). 
According to a recent private sector-contracted Cid-Gallup 
poll, Daniel Ortega leads with 26%, followed by Liberal 
dissident Eduardo Montealegre at 22%, Sandinista dissident 
Herty Lewites 16%, and PLC candidate Jose Rizo trailing at 
12%.  The poll suggests that in a runoff between Montealegre 
and Ortega, Montealegre will win.  The region's capital 
appears to realize that Montealegre is the most viable 
candidate to beat Ortega, but this sentiment could shift if 
Rizo's numbers rise and/or support for Montealegre wanes.  At 
present, the PLC appears increasingly desperate for funds, 
possibly prompting the party to spread rumors that Washington 
will soon replace the U.S. Ambassador.  END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (C) On June 2, Ambassador, DCM, and polcouns lunched at 
the Presidency with an upbeat President Bolanos, along with 
Foreign Minister Caldera, adviser Frank Arana, and former 
Minister of Transport Pedro Solorzano.  Bolanos justified his 
recent firing of a number of government employees, including 
former Minister of Family Ivania Toruno and Telcor director 
Martha Lugo, while downplaying the fact that they had 
recently abandoned his Alliance for the Republic (APRE) party 
to join Arnoldo Aleman's Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC). 
Bolanos remarked that the removal of these and other 
officials supporting the PLC would cut off their "access" to 
government funds.  While Bolanos justified his firing of 
these turncoat officials for reasons of corruption, Solorzano 
went to great lengths to dispel the charges of corruption and 
mismanagement during his tenure as Transport Minister, 
terming them false and politically motivated (Reftel). 
 
3.  (SBU) NOTE/COMMENT: Bolanos' decision to fire these 
officials has drawn considerable criticism from competing 
presidential candidates, especially Jose Rizo and Herty 
Lewites, the latter suggesting that all candidates should 
resign from the government.  Nicaragua electoral law does 
not/not require that candidates resign from office, unless 
they are running for president or vice president.  END 
NOTE/COMMENT. 
 
POLL CONVINCES FINANCIERS THAT MONTEALEGRE, NOT RIZO, CAN 
BEAT ORTEGA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - 
 
4.  (C) Confiding to Ambassador the desire for his successor 
to build on his legacy, Bolanos reiterated his support for 
Eduardo Montealegre.  Bolanos' senior political adviser Frank 
Arana shared details of the recent private sector-contracted 
Cid-Gallup poll (conducted during the third week in May with 
1,162 respondents, 3% margin of error).  He recounted how 22 
financiers from the region, including Carlos Pellas envoys, 
had met on June 1 to hear the results of the poll.  Daniel 
Ortega leads with 26%, followed by Liberal dissident Eduardo 
Montealegre at 22%, Sandinista dissident Herty Lewites 16%, 
and PLC candidate Jose Rizo 12%.  In the poll, 12% did not 
reveal their preference; 11% claimed they will not vote. 
However, support for the legislative slates of candidates 
favored Ortega and Rizo: 30% will vote for FSLN; 22% for PLC; 
11% for Montealegre's ALN; and 8% for Lewites' MRS.  (NOTE: 
the survey was conducted before May 31 when parties 
registered their National Assembly and Parlacen lists.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
5.  (C) According to Arana, the poll also suggests that no 
candidate will win on the first round, and in the likely 
event the two frontrunners are Montealegre and Ortega, 
Montealegre will win with over double the votes of Ortega's. 
He also shared that in a scenario pitting Ortega against Rizo 
in a runoff, Rizo could win by 2%.  However, given the 
likelihood that the FSLN could easily steal 2% to 5% of the 
vote, plus the 3% margin of error, Ortega could beat Rizo, 
warned Arana. 
 
PLC APPROACHES TAIWAN 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
6.  (S) Bolanos alerted Ambassador that Aleman supporters 
have approached the Taiwanese government to seek its 
financial backing for PLC candidate Rizo.  According to 
Bolanos and his advisers, PLC campaign manager Gilberto Wong, 
whose brother was until recently Nicaragua's ambassador to 
Taipei, is leading this effort and has requested USD 7 
million for Rizo's campaign.  He warned that Taiwanese 
support for the PLC would be disastrous.  Bolanos remarked 
that he recently discussed with his Taiwanese counterpart the 
possibility of Taiwanese support for Liberal dissident 
Eduardo Montealegre.  According to Bolanos, the Taiwanese 
president was receptive to the idea.  (NOTE: President 
Bolanos plans on visiting Taiwan o/a June 9, along with chief 
of staff Leonardo Somarriba, and they intend to pursue this 
possibility further at that time.  END NOTE.) 
 
POLTICS MAKES FOR STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) A bemused Bolanos related the ironies of Nicaraguan 
politics, citing the fact that his logical enemies, the 
Sandinistas (FSLN), have become "strange friends," supporting 
him on a number of laws, including the Framework Law (that 
allowed him to continue governing) and legislation required 
for CAFTA implementation.  Bolanos was optimistic that the 
FSLN will also support him on the destruction of 651 MANPADS. 
 He lamented that the PLC, which normally would be an 
ideological ally of his government, has refused to support 
important legislation because he refused to support amnesty 
for their leader Arnoldo Aleman. 
 
WHAT'S WITH MORALES? 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (C) Speculation arose regarding Ortega VP 
candidate/Liberal dissident lawmaker Jaime Morales' decision 
to run on the FSLN ticket.  Bolanos ventured that Morales had 
concluded that even if the PLC won the election, Morales 
would still enjoy Ortega's protection.  And, if Ortega lost 
to Montealegre, Morales would have a National Assembly seat 
(second-place presidential and vice-presidential candidates 
are accorded Assembly seats).  Bolanos also noted that Jaime 
Morales' brother, millionaire Rene Morales, firmly backs 
Montealegre.  (NOTE: Over the weekend, glossy, blue and 
yellow posters featuring Morales appeared in Managua.  These 
posters underscore the FSLN's "reconciliation" ticket as one 
that will bring peace and prosperity to Nicaraguans.  In 
Managua, FSLN propaganda outnumbers other party campaign 
materials by at least ten to one.  END NOTE.) 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
9.  (S) Now that the bulk of the region's capital, including 
Carlos Pellas, appears to realize that Montealegre is the 
most viable candidate to beat Ortega and  lead Nicaragua in 
the right direction, we can expect these financiers will 
direct the bulk of their funding to his campaign.  The next 
series of polls will be crucial, however.  If Rizo's numbers 
do not rise, support for him will likely migrate to 
Montealegre, while, if Rizo gains ground and Montealegre's 
support wanes or stagnates, much of the region's private 
sector may reconsider.  In any event, some financiers, like 
Pellas, will probably hedge their bets by contributing more 
modest sums to Ortega and Rizo.  We also hear that now that 
the private sector appears less willing to support the PLC, 
and the party no longer enjoys access to Nicaraguan 
government coffers, the PLC is desperate for funds. 
Possibly, this desperation has prompted PLC-owned media and 
outlets sympathetic to its cause, such as the Arnoldista rag 
"La Trinchera," to spread the rumor that Washington will soon 
replace the U.S. Ambassador. 
TRIVELLI