Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KIGALI579, TRIPARTITE PLUS SUB-COMMISSION STRENGTHENS FUSION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KIGALI579.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KIGALI579 2006-06-19 16:28 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kigali
VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #0579/01 1701628
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191628Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2920
INFO RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 1507
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0089
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 1408
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0058
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0050
UNCLAS KIGALI 000579 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/C, AND IO/PSC 
USUN FOR SANCTIONS UNIT 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR ETTC PTER PINR RW
SUBJECT:  TRIPARTITE PLUS SUB-COMMISSION STRENGTHENS FUSION 
CELL AND PROPOSES NAMES FOR SANCTIONS 
 
REF:  BUJUMBURA 389 
 
This is sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
1.  Summary:  The U.S.-facilitated Tripartite Plus Sub- 
Commission on Security and Defense met in Kigali May 26-27 
to discuss ways to enhance the operational effectiveness of 
the Tripartite Fusion Cell (TFC) and to develop a 
consolidated "most wanted" list to submit to the Tripartite 
Plus Council of Ministers for sanctioning by member states 
and possibly also by the African Union (AU) and the UN.  Sub- 
Commission members agreed to improve the quality and 
quantity of intelligence to the fusion cell, outlined 
standard operating procedures for operationalizing 
"actionable" intelligence, and developed initial lists of 
rebel leaders to be sanctioned.  The ministers will next 
meet informally on the margins of the AU Summit in Banjul in 
July and possibly in a formal ministerial in New York in 
September on the margins of UNGA.  End summary. 
 
2.  The Government of Rwanda hosted a U.S.-facilitated 
meeting of the Tripartite Plus Sub-Commission on Security 
and Defense in Kigali May 26-27 to follow up on agreements 
made during the April 20-21 Bujumbura ministerial (reftel). 
This was the 14th meeting of the Tripartite Plus Joint 
Commission and second meeting of the Sub-Commission. 
Representing the four Tripartite Plus member states were: 
Amb. Richard Sezibera, Special Presidential Envoy for the 
Great Lakes Region (Rwanda); Col. Godefroid Niyombare, 
Deputy Army Chief of Staff (Burundi); Mbadu Khonde, 
Diplomatic Office of the Presidency (DRC); and LTC Octavius 
Butuuro, Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence (Uganda). 
Amb. Don Yamamoto, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs (U.S.), facilitated the meeting in conjunction with 
host representative Amb. Sezibera.  MONUC representatives 
LTC Patrick Van Hees and LTC Mike Burke, and ONUB 
representatives Col. Waldemar Vrey, LTC Wiese, and Col. 
Mzinjana participated as observers. 
 
3.  As mandated by the Bujumbura ministerial in April, the 
Sub-Commission focused on improving intelligence processing 
by the fusion cell, developing standard operating procedures 
for acting on intelligence, developing a timeline for 
operational effectiveness, and drawing up a list of rebel 
leaders for the Tripartite Plus Council of Ministers to 
approve and submit to the AU and UN for possible 
sanctioning. 
 
Opening Remarks 
--------------- 
4.  In opening remarks, Amb. Sezibera, head of the Rwandan 
delegation hosting the meeting, noted that the Tripartite 
Plus Commission has come a long way since its formation but 
that there is more work to be done to strengthen regional 
cooperation and to reduce the threat of armed rebel groups. 
He welcomed the continued support of the U.S., and 
reiterated the Commission's decision to hold accountable 
armed groups that failed to voluntarily disarm by the 
September 30, 2005 deadline by recommending imposition of 
sanctions to restrict their activities. 
 
5.  Amb. Yamamoto thanked the delegations for their 
commitment to work together to address the fundamental 
problems that affect all their countries:  countering the 
threat of rebel forces, enhancing diplomatic relations, and 
promoting and developing economic integration.  He commended 
the delegations for their exemplary commitment, which has 
served as a model for other bodies.  He pointed out that 
everything that has been accomplished has been the 
collective effort of each of the member countries and that 
the U.S., as facilitator, is their "service provider."  He 
reaffirmed U.S. commitment to continue its support. 
 
Improved Regional Relations 
--------------------------- 
6.  Rwandan Foreign Affairs Minister Charles Murigande 
commended the delegates for their participation and 
commitment to addressing issues that are critical to the 
region.  He observed that problems in the region, which are 
primarily security-related, affect diplomatic relations 
among the states and that improved regional security would 
lead automatically to improved diplomatic relations. 
 
 
7.  He expressed Rwanda's appreciation to the U.S. for 
creating the Tripartite Plus forum and commented that Amb. 
Yamamoto's frequent visits to the region demonstrate the 
commitment of the U.S. to the process, which has already 
yielded tangible results.  For example, relations between 
Rwanda and the DRC, which were "extremely bad," are now 
"very cordial."  The two countries have agreed to exchange 
envoys and they no longer exchange sharp words at 
international meetings.  (Note:  DRC officials have 
repeatedly said that a formal exchange of ambassadors would 
not be possible until after the July 30 presidential 
elections.  End note.)  He reiterated the GOR's commitment 
to the process and assured that it will attempt to implement 
whatever decisions are made. 
 
Tripartite Fusion Cell 
---------------------- 
8.  Parties reaffirmed their commitment to making the U.S.- 
facilitated fusion cell fully operational and integrated 
with national intelligence operations, and adopted a 
timeline with measurable milestones for attaining 
operational effectiveness by August 30, 2006.  They agreed 
to provide intelligence to the TFC, enhance the quality and 
quantity of data for "fused" actionable intelligence to more 
effectively respond to the regional threat of armed groups, 
and form a military planning component within the cell to 
coordinate immediate and long-term responses to actionable 
intelligence. 
 
9.  They requested that the U.S. play a more active role in 
providing requisite logistical and material support for the 
processing and analysis of intelligence, assist the TFC in 
evaluating intelligence, and serve as a neutral advisor in 
resolving disagreements among member states and 
deconflicting competing intelligence.  In addition, parties 
requested that MONUC, within its mandate, play a more active 
role in sharing intelligence and providing logistical 
support to the TFC, and formally respond to the TFC's 
earlier request for assistance. 
 
10.  MONUC observer LTC Mike Burke reaffirmed MONUC's 
commitment to the fusion cell, stressing that sharing of 
intelligence and other joint efforts to remove the threat of 
negative forces are "of paramount importance to regional 
security."  He noted, however, that no guidelines have yet 
been developed to instruct MONUC on its responsibilities. 
He pledged to work with UNDPKO to hasten development of 
guidelines, but noted that if the UN Security Council 
changes MONUC's Chapter VII mandate to a Chapter VI mandate 
after the July DRC elections, MONUC's ability to undertake 
joint operations would be hampered. 
 
11.  Col. Timothy Rainey, U.S. Senior Military Advisor for 
African Affairs, emphasized that the role of the fusion cell 
is to receive, process, analyze, and disseminate 
intelligence, not to collect information. 
 
Most Wanted Lists 
----------------- 
12.  Parties reaffirmed their commitment to impose 
sanctions, as outlined in "The Way Forward" signed by the 
Council of Ministers in Uganda in October 2005, on armed 
groups and their leaders and supporters who have not met the 
September 30, 2005 deadline for voluntary disarmament. 
These measures include an assets freeze and restrictions on 
travel, fundraising, political discussions and negotiations, 
and restricted access to the media and visas. 
 
13.  As a follow-up to their October 2005 commitment, each 
member state developed and submitted to the facilitator an 
initial list of "most wanted" political and military leaders 
of negative forces.  These lists will form the basis of a 
consolidated, focused list of individuals to be subject to 
sanctions within the four member states, and possibly also 
by the AU and UN. 
 
14.  Parties agreed to submit to the facilitator requests 
for clarification on the provisional lists that they failed 
to resolve among themselves.  The USG agreed to harmonize 
the provisional lists and to submit a consolidated list to 
the Tripartite Plus Council of Ministers prior to the AU 
Summit in Banjul in July for approval and submission to the 
 
AU for sanctioning.  (Note:  if approved, this would be the 
first time the AU has imposed sanctions.  End note.)  Amb. 
Yamamoto noted that imposing sanctions would be the first 
step, and that the second step -- determining the 
consequences when member countries fail to enforce the 
sanctions -- would be discussed at the next ministerial 
meeting.  The USG agreed to provide proposed procedures for 
arrest and prosecution, sample legislation and extradition 
treaties, ideas on steps for improved diplomatic relations, 
and to explore the possibility of using the fusion cell as a 
mechanism for tracking sanctioned individuals. 
 
Final Outcome Documents 
----------------------- 
15.  The two-day Kigali meeting concluded with the signing 
by delegation heads of a Summary of Conclusions, with three 
attachments (attachment 1, modifications to the Security 
Experts' recommendations of January 30, 2006, on the TFC 
communications architecture and operational coordination; 
attachment 2, procedures for operationalizing actionable 
intelligence; and attachment 3, Tripartite fusion cell 
actions and milestones).  The ministers will next meet 
informally on the margins of the AU Summit in Banjul in July 
and possibly in a formal ministerial in New York in 
September on the margins of UNGA. 
 
Comment 
------- 
16.  The commitment of all four Tripartite Plus member 
states, and facilitation by the U.S., to improve cooperation 
toward eliminating the common threat of negative forces 
ensured the success of this meeting.  While negotiations 
were at times prolonged and difficult, especially during 
discussions of specific individuals for sanctioning, the Sub- 
Commission succeeded in meeting its overall objectives.  The 
evident willingness of the parties to cooperate on regional 
security, despite past differences, sends a strong, positive 
message for the future of conflict prevention and resolution 
in the Great Lakes region.  With greater operational 
effectiveness, the Tripartite fusion cell will serve as a 
critical mechanism in ensuring regional peace and stability. 
ARIETTI