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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1359, SUDAN: Update on U.S. Government Support for

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1359 2006-06-08 09:50 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1897
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1359/01 1590950
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080950Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3119
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP, DCHA/OFDA, DCHA/OTI 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, SFO 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR SHORTLEY 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL EAID PREF PREL PHUM SOCI SU MOPS KPKO AU
SUBJECT:  SUDAN:  Update on U.S. Government Support for 
Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1282 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
1. (SBU) As described in previous cable traffic, U.S. 
Government priorities for Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
implementation are three-fold: (1) quickly disseminate 
information about the content of the DPA to counter 
confusion and anger among Sudanese due to misinformation 
or lack of information; (2) support the DPA 
implementation process to the greatest extent possible 
through the African Union (AU), in order to shore up the 
African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) credibility; and 
(3) immediately increase the capacity of the SLM-Minawi 
(SLM-M) faction to fulfill its obligations under the DPA. 
 
2. (SBU) Immediate efforts by AMIS, UNMIS, and government 
donors to ensure widespread dissemination of information 
about the DPA are underway.  Support for DPA 
implementation through AMIS proceeds, albeit slowly. 
 
3. (SBU) Preliminary results of a USAID-funded assessment 
of opportunities for peace-building and reconciliation 
reveal that continued lack of security and distrust on 
the part of displaced populations regarding Government 
intentions necessitate an extremely careful approach to 
community-level engagement in the near term. End summary 
and comment. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Immediate Outreach Efforts Underway 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (U) Post is pursuing multiple avenues for increasing 
access to information about the DPA among key 
stakeholders in Darfur and Khartoum.  Post has provided 
the AU factsheet to USAID-funded Sudan Radio Service 
(SRS) for broadcast on shortwave radio into Darfur. 
Through funding from USAID's Office of Transition 
Initiatives (USAID/OTI), academic experts have translated 
the AU factsheet on the DPA into simple Arabic and will 
shortly translate it into the major tribal languages 
spoken in Darfur (Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, Dajo, Tama, 
Midoob, Berti) for broadcast on SRS and state radio 
stations as possible, and distribution on cassette. USAID 
Director will meet with the head of Government-controlled 
TV and radio outlets to discuss freeing up air time for 
"neutral" programming on the DPA. 
 
5. (U) Additionally, State/PRM and USAID-funded partner 
Internews is broadcasting material about the DPA provided 
by Embassy N'Djamena on Radio Absoun, which reaches 
Darfurian refugees in IDP camps on the Chadian border. 
 
6. (SBU) In addition to radio broadcast, USAID/OTI has 
identified several Khartoum-based NGOs with offices in 
Darfur that are willing to conduct community-level DPA 
outreach efforts.  These groups are developing their 
dissemination strategy, which will include distribution 
of the DPA full text, AU summary, and UNMIS "DPA Made 
Easy" brochure.  Several NGO representatives are on the 
ground in Darfur presently discussing outreach efforts 
with local groups.  One organization has already received 
funding for distribution of 600 copies of the full text 
in Arabic and English in Khartoum and El Fasher. (Note: 
Due to the still controversial nature of the DPA, only 
the most courageous groups are currently willing to 
conduct dissemination and outreach activities.  End 
note.) 
 
7. (U) USAID/OTI is also exploring with interested 
academics and NGOs a plan to organize discussion seminars 
in Khartoum and at the three major universities in El 
Fasher, Nyala, and Geneina. 
 
------------------------------------ 
AU As A Partner Is Amenable But Weak 
------------------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) Embassy and USAID officials have met with AMIS 
 
KHARTOUM 00001359  002 OF 004 
 
 
in Khartoum and El Fasher to discuss support to the AU 
and the signatories for DPA implementation.  AMIS 
officials indicate that they are eager for assistance and 
support, but follow-through from their side is slow. 
 
9. (U) As reported in reftel, on several occasions Post 
has discussed with AMIS officials the establishment of 
office facilities for DPA signatories and AU DPA 
Implementation Teams in El Fasher and Khartoum. 
USAID/OTI will provide an in-kind grant to the AU in El 
Fasher.  USAID/OTI has already identified an appropriate 
facility and is now securing the lease and beginning 
renovations.  Assistance with Commerce licenses will be 
needed in order to provide computer and communications 
equipment. 
 
10. (U) Per reftel, Post has also discussed with AMIS 
officials the establishment of an office in Khartoum. 
AMIS would like a facility that could house up to 50 
people including the DPA implementation team, DDDC 
preparatory committee staff, signatories, and UK-seconded 
media/outreach staff.  Support for this office will be 
provided through an existing Department contract with 
Dyncorp, and implementation awaits the arrival of Dyncorp 
staff from Washington.  AMIS officials identified this as 
their most urgent need at present and are extremely eager 
for progress on this facility.  Again, assistance with 
Commerce licenses will be needed in order to provide 
computer and communications equipment. 
 
11. (SBU) The SLM-M and AMIS have also requested that 
advisors already expert on Darfur and familiar to the SLM- 
M be deployed as soon as possible to assist with wealth 
and power-sharing issues; several individuals have 
already been identified by SLM-M and AMIS and 
arrangements are currently underway.  USAID/OTI is also 
prepared to second technical support through the AU to 
SLM-M in the form of Arabic-speaking strategic 
communications advisors.  These individuals are prepared 
to deploy and Post has provided some CVs to MS. 
Communications support will be coordinated with three- 
person team seconded to AMIS from UK. (Note: SLM-M is 
also keenly interested in arrival of USG security expert 
to provide assistance in this area.  End note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Quick Impact Projects and Humanitarian/Recovery 
Programming 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
12. (U) In anticipation of the pending supplemental, 
which includes $66.7 million for non-food humanitarian 
assistance in Darfur, USAID's Darfur Field Office is 
urging its partners to submit proposals that integrate 
activities supporting the potential return of internally- 
displaced persons and that maintain flexibility to 
responds to DPA-related humanitarian needs as they 
develop on the ground.  USAID is also identifying 
possibilities for quick-impact projects that will more 
immediately demonstrate a tangible impact of the DPA, 
where security will allow. 
 
13. (U) USAID is also intensely engaged with preparations 
for the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (JAM).  The JAM 
will undertake an assessment of recovery and 
reconstruction/development needs to present to donors at 
a pledging conference hosted by the Netherlands in early 
October.  Organization of the Core Coordinating Group 
(CCG), chaired by the Netherlands and comprised of the 
parties to the DPA, the UN and World Bank, and key 
donors, is well underway.  USAID will provide funding and 
technical experts to the JAM, as well as serve on the CCG 
which will provide overall guidance to the JAM. 
 
------------------- 
Other Donor Support 
------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) Other donors are also planning early support 
for DPA implementation and quick impact projects.  UK 
will provide a three-person communications team to the AU 
to strengthen capacity to design and implement 
 
KHARTOUM 00001359  003 OF 004 
 
 
dissemination and outreach strategies.  USAID is prepared 
to provide complementary media support to DPA signatories 
as well as administrative platform for UK team, through 
facilities in El Fasher and Khartoum.  UK is also 
preparing to provide English language training for 100 
SLM-Minawi.  The Netherlands and Norway both have funding 
for quick impact projects, looking to UNMIS to take lead 
on identifying and coordinating these activities.  Norway 
is prepared to fund logistics for local-level meetings in 
support of the DPA, as well as a DPA 
Signatories/Implementation Team office in Nyala similar 
to what USG has offered for Khartoum and El Fasher. 
 
15. (SBU) Efforts between AMIS and UNMIS to coordinate 
DPA implementation support are not off to a great start, 
though meetings between the two have been held.  UNMIS 
has produced a matrix of actions to take place, many of 
which fall into AMIS' area of responsibility.  AMIS is 
receiving offers of assistance from a variety of 
bilateral donors, and is expected to provide a 
consolidated set of priorities for donors to coordinate 
and organize around. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
On the Ground, Peacebuilding Remains Sensitive Topic 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
16. (SBU) USAID fielded a two-person consultant team 
including Sudan expert Victor Tanner and a local Darfur 
expert linked to El Fasher University to conduct an 
assessment of short- and medium-term opportunities for 
peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts in Darfur.  The 
team is still in the field, having already traveled to 
Nyala, Abu Ajura, Tulus, Katila, Idd-al-Fursan, and Kass, 
and is scheduled to travel to Geneina, Mornei, Zallingei, 
Saraf Omra, Birkat Saira, and Kabkabia. 
 
17. (SBU) More complete findings of the assessment will 
be forthcoming at the end of fieldwork o/a June 15, but 
preliminary results suggest that the situation on the 
ground at present requires an extremely sensitive 
approach to community-level reconciliation efforts.  Key 
informants among displaced communities report that they 
view the conflict as primarily between communities and 
the GoS, rather than between tribes, and they view inter- 
tribal reconciliation as secondary to the need for 
addressing government violence. 
 
17. (SBU) The GoS has supported a number of tribal 
reconciliation efforts, but these are viewed by many key 
stakeholders as an attempt by the government to decrease 
their own responsibility for the conflict, thereby 
rendering tribal reconciliation efforts suspect in the 
eyes of many. 
 
18. (SBU) The team reports that the topic of the DPA is 
still very sensitive, and most community representatives 
do not even want to discuss it, although this will likely 
change if additional Fur leaders sign.  Many Darfurian 
elites in the major cities have reportedly not yet seen 
or read the DPA, therefore a phased dissemination 
strategy beginning in urban centers and proceeding to 
rural areas and IDP camps may be most appropriate. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Support for SLM Leadership Tenuous 
---------------------------------- 
 
19. (SBU) Feedback from the USAID-funded travel to North 
and South Darfur of a Sudanese NGO director to interview 
various communities on the DPA suggests that support 
within the SLM for either Abdul Wahid or Minni Minawi 
remains extremely tenuous, with different dynamics 
operating in each case.  The Fur and other SLM-AW 
constituencies are reportedly frustrated with Wahid and 
may seek outside support to convene a conference to 
discuss leadership issues. 
 
20. (SBU) This organization further reports that support 
for Minawi within the Zaghawa tribe is increasingly 
tenuous and more and more localized to his sub-tribe and 
clan base. Incidents of the past week around Birmaza in 
 
KHARTOUM 00001359  004 OF 004 
 
 
North Darfur cited to support this.  While these reports 
may reflect one perspective on Minawi's hold on 
leadership, the ICRC sub-delegation head in El Fasher 
told a USG delegation on June 1 that SLM-M is 
"crumbling". 
 
STEINFELD