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Viewing cable 06HANOI1389, FURTHER VIETNAMESE NEW PARTY DISSIDENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI1389 2006-06-06 10:15 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO0587
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #1389/01 1571015
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061015Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2276
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY PRIORITY 1295
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 001389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: HUMANR PREL PGOV PHUM VM
SUBJECT:  FURTHER VIETNAMESE NEW PARTY DISSIDENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: A) HANOI 1368; B) HCMC 607; C) HANOI 1338; D) HANOI 
1320 
 
HANOI 00001389  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On June 6, Poloff delivered a verbal 
message to a representative of the Democracy Party of 
Vietnam (DPV) representative that we will continue to meet 
with dissidents, but this should not be misconstrued as 
active support presaging intervention with the GVN.  Police 
harassment of DPV members continues as party organizers 
finalize an action plan.  Meanwhile, the GVN is considering 
the DPV's fate entirely outside of the public's view.  They 
caution us in the strongest possible terms not to get 
involved.  We continue to tell the GVN that the United 
States is interested but not involved in the DPV's actions, 
and that we support freedom of expression and peaceful 
political activity, and urge Vietnam to extend and expand 
the political space for people like the members of the DPV. 
Our current course, quietly counseling restraint on both 
sides while remaining out of the fight, maximizes the 
chances of averting a confrontation and, if that 
confrontation occurs, preserving our ability to maintain 
forward momentum in the relationship. End Summary. 
 
Our message to the DPV 
---------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On June 6, poloff met with DPV activist Lawyer Dai 
Nguyen to deliver a verbal message (per Ref A) to the DPV 
leadership that while the United States might want 
Vietnamese law to change, until it does, the DPV and other 
Vietnamese political dissidents are subject to severe 
penalties for their political actions, and if they are 
arrested, there will be little that the U.S. Government can 
do about it.  Dai acknowledged that he understood the 
message and agreed that future meetings with Western 
diplomats should be more discreet than the May 30 meeting 
(Ref D) and on a one-on-one basis.  He also agreed not to 
actively publicize future meetings with Western diplomats. 
 
3. (SBU) Dai reported that DPV leader Hoang Minh Chinh is 
currently isolated in his home.  The Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) has established two barriers preventing 
anyone from entering or leaving Chinh's house.  One 
checkpoint blocks the alleyway leading to the home; the 
other barrier blocks the actual door to Chinh's house. 
Chinh and his family cannot be reached by phone or internet, 
Dai added. 
 
4. (SBU) Dai also stated that police observation of his 
activities diminished over the weekend although his cell 
phone and internet services were disconnected on Saturday. 
Other DPV advocates have had members of their families 
contacted by MPS officers "for informational purposes," and 
one lawyer in training at Dai's office, Pham Sy Nguyen, was 
"terrorized" (NFI) into cooperating with the police 
investigation of Dai and the DPV on June 5.  Nevertheless, 
Dai reported that the DPV has finished drafting an action 
plan and will publish it soon on an international website, 
hopefully by June 30 which is the anniversary of the DPV's 
founding in 1944. 
 
Our Message to the GVN 
---------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) We have met several times with MPS and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to discuss this issue.  Poloff 
raised it with MFA (Americas Desk) June 5 and the General 
Department of Security of MPS on June 6.  The Ambassador 
addressed the issue directly with Vice Foreign Minister Le 
Van Bang at a private lunch on June 7 (septel).  The message 
we have delivered to the GVN is that the United States 
supports freedom of expression and peaceful political 
activity, and urges Vietnam to extend and expand the 
political space for people like the members of the DPV. 
Furthermore, the members of the DPV are a small group that 
represents little threat to the regime.  The GVN's reaction 
to the DPV organizers will determine their significance; 
arresting them will turn them into martyrs and an instant 
global example of Vietnam's continuing intolerance of free 
speech and political expression.  The United States, the 
Ambassador told VFM Bang, is interested, but not involved, 
in the activities of the DPV.  He warned Bang that arresting 
the political dissidents would inflame opposition to Vietnam 
 
HANOI 00001389  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
and could slow down the PNTR vote process. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) The DPV's fate is a Vietnamese domestic drama 
playing out almost entirely outside of the public's view. 
Both sides are very interested in the United States' role. 
Chinh and his group want the USG, and the Embassy, to 
support them strongly and perhaps create an umbrella of 
protection under which they can operate.  For them, 
publicizing any contact with the USG legitimized their 
movement and, they believe, protects them against 
retaliation by the GVN.  MPS and MFA, however, caution us in 
the strongest possible terms not to get involved.  The 
message we have received subtly but clearly is that the 
DPV's activity is a political crisis that the authorities 
are trying to manage, and that evidence of foreign 
(especially American) involvement will force the GVN's hand 
and force them to crack down on the dissidents.  Normally 
friendly and warm contacts ice over dramatically when this 
subject comes up, an indication of its seriousness to the 
GVN.  Our current course, quietly counseling restraint on 
both sides while remaining out of the fight, maximizes the 
chances of averting a confrontation and, if that 
confrontation occurs, preserving our ability to maintain 
forward momentum in the relationship. 
 
MARINE