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Viewing cable 06BANGKOK3792, THAI MARKET ACCESS POSITIONS IN THE WTO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BANGKOK3792 2006-06-27 11:17 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBK #3792/01 1781117
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271117Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9737
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1669
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
UNCLAS BANGKOK 003792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB CMOORE AND WCRAFT 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR DWOSKIN AND ROHDE 
GENEVA FOR ALLGEIER AND SHARK 
USDOC FOR JKELLY 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: WTRO ETRD ECON TH
SUBJECT:  THAI MARKET ACCESS POSITIONS IN THE WTO 
 
REF:  A) STATE 103936; B) STATE 104561 
 
1.  Econoff met with Ms. Sirinart Chaiman, Director of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, and delivered talking points on WTO market 
access negotiations per reftels.  Sirinart reiterated the Royal Thai 
Government's (RTG) commitment to the WTO negotiations and a 
successful conclusion of the Doha round by the end of 2006.  She 
related that WTO Director General Pascal Lamy had recently expressed 
concern that Thailand had lost focus on the WTO in favor of pursuing 
bilateral trade agreements, but that Minister of Commerce Somkid was 
careful to allay these concerns. 
 
Agricultural market access 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  Sirinart said the RTG was particularly focused on reform in 
agricultural market access and lamented that an agreement on 
modalities on agriculture had missed several deadlines to date.  As 
a member of the G-20 group of developing nations, Thailand's 
position on market access in this area tracks closely with overall 
G-20 positions, though there were notable differences.  Sirinart 
said the RTG did not consider itself to be a leader in the G-20, but 
preferred to play a role as facilitator within the group, guiding 
varied positions closer to consensus. 
 
3.  Sirinart said the RTG position on minimizing "special products" 
for exemption from tariff cuts was similar to that of the U.S.  The 
RTG considered the U.S. position on special products to be 
ambitious, perhaps too ambitious to be a starting point for 
negotiations, but Sirinart emphasized that RTG goals were similar to 
those of the U.S., and that the RTG would be willing to work 
together to advance these positions.  Within the G-20, the RTG is 
attempting to remove rice and sugar, two important Thai exports, 
from inclusion on any list of special products. 
 
4.  Sirinart said the RTG was substantially less supportive of 
domestic supports and hoped for greater cuts in U.S. farm support. 
Although Thailand is not directly affected by the U.S.'s support 
programs, the RTG sees them as production and market distorting, and 
possibly taking third markets away from Thai exports.  Ms. Sunanta 
Kangvalkulkij, Director of Agriculture Negotiations, said that she 
had sensed some flexibility in the U.S. position on domestic support 
in recent weeks, and was surprised and somewhat disappointed that 
the talking points in reftel B reflected past positions and showed 
no flexibility. 
 
5.  Sirinart was not overly optimistic that the coming weeks would 
see great progress, noting that over 500 brackets remained in 
negotiating texts.  She advised Minister Somkid to focus on making 
progress on core modalities.  Sirinart expressed her hope that the 
U.S. and EU would move closer together toward what she saw as a more 
realistic middle position set out by the G-20.  She recognized that 
more cuts were needed than what the G-20 was advocating, but urged 
progress in order to move the round forward. 
 
Services 
-------- 
 
6.  Mr. Ron Sirivanasandha, Trade Officer for services negotiations, 
said the RTG considered the U.S. proposal to be ambitious, perhaps 
too much so, and complained that the U.S. position did not take into 
account situations in individual countries.  Ron explained that for 
Thailand, financial and telecommunication services were in a 
transition period, presently developing regulations for management 
of these two industries.  The RTG would find it difficult to make a 
commitment in WTO services negotiations in these two areas before 
these regulations were finalized.  Ron recommended instead that 
negotiations proceed sector by sector and that the U.S. specify its 
priorities and look for agreement in each sector, rather than 
pushing for a "maximum position" of full liberalization in all 
sectors.  Ron noted that the RTG could improve their offer in 
computer services. 
 
NAMA 
---- 
 
7.  Mr. Nathasit Diskul, trade officer for non-agricultural market 
access, said the RTG was in favor of moving toward zero end rates in 
the market access negotiations, as was the U.S.  However, he 
expressed RTG dismay over U.S. support for a proposal introduced by 
Turkey that would remove textile and clothing products from normal 
tariff cutting rates.  While recognizing the sensitivity of apparel 
in the U.S., Nathasit said that U.S. support for this proposal was 
undermining the U.S. position on NAMA and sending a mixed signal to 
other developing countries.  Other developing countries have 
mentioned to the RTG that they have been less willing to show 
flexibility on U.S. proposals on drugs and chemicals because of the 
U.S. stance on apparel. 
 
8.  Comment:  The RTG sees itself as a facilitator in the market 
access negotiations, looking for a middle way through U.S., EU and 
developing country positions.  Sirinart made a point of emphasizing 
RTG commitment to seeing positive results from this week's meetings 
in Geneva and completing the Doha round by year end.  Despite the 
current unclear political situation in Thailand, the Department of 
Trade Negotiations does not appear to have been affected and we see 
no barriers to the RTG moving ahead with negotiating commitments in 
this round and obtaining approval for a final agreement.  End 
Comment. 
ARVIZU