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Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD2059, XXXXXXXXXXXX BLAMES UK FOR SECURITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD2059 2006-06-18 12:52 2011-06-05 03:00 SECRET Embassy Baghdad
Appears in these articles:
http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/wikileaks/Wikleaks-US-anger-at-Gordon.6779840.jp
http://news.scotsman.com/iraq/Wikileaks-Gordon-Brown-39wanted-to.6779847.jp
http://news.scotsman.com/iraq/Wikileaks-Iraqi-premier-feared-British.6779849.jp
http://news.scotsman.com/iraq/Wikileaks-Tories-asked-to-oppose.6779848.jp
http://news.scotsman.com/opinion/Leader-Historical-insight.6779771.jp
VZCZCXRO2631
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2059/01 1691252
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181252Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5131
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002059 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 
REL UK 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PNAT PREL PTER KDEM KISL IZ
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX BLAMES UK FOR SECURITY 
PROBLEMS 

REF: A. A. BASRAH 93 

B. B. BASRAH 95 
C. C. BAGHDAD 1994 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARGARET SCOBEY FOR 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

1. (S//REL UK) Summary: In a June 12 conversation with 
PolOff, XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff the UK is largely to blame for the 
unrest in Basrah. The UK has not brought militias under 
control, and so Basrah is now a violent place, he said. 
This, combined with the activities of foreign intelligence 
services, corruption, and political rivalries makes Basrah 
difficult to govern, he said. The Ministry of Defense 
(MOD), however, is a trusted organization, and many in 
Basrah would prefer that it handle security, rather than 
the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which many see as corrupt. 
End Summary. 

----------------------------------- 
UK to Blame for Situation in Basrah 
----------------------------------- 

2. (S//REL UK) On June 12, XXXXXXXXXXXX
told PolOff that the UK was to blame 
for the lack of security in Basrah. He said the UK has 
allowed Shia militias to largely control Basrah and has 
done little to assert control. The UK, he argued, "worked 
with the strong, not the qualified," and therefore Basrah 
has serious rule of law problems. 

---------------------- 
Three Fights in Basrah 
---------------------- 

3. (S//REL UK) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the violence in Basrah 
is the result of three fights that are happening 
simultaneously, all of which involve Iran. The first fight 
is about corruption. XXXXXXXXXXXX accused Fadhila of using the 
money it garners through graft and corruption, sometimes 
totaling 650,000 USD in one month, to finance party 
activities. For this reason, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued, Fadhila wants 
desperately to maintain control of the province. If 
another party should gain control of Basrah in the upcoming 
provincial elections it would mean the collapse of Fadhila, 
XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted. This, in turn, he asserted, would mean 
the downfall of Fadhila's spiritual leader, Sheikh Mohammad 
al-Yaqubi. Sheikh Yaqubi is therefore willing to resort to 
corruption and violence in order to hold on to Basrah, XXXXXXXXXXXX opined. 

4. (S//REL UK) The second fight in Basrah involves foreign 
intelligence services, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. He said Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and Iran are all actively engaged in covert 
operations in Basrah. Iran, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, is 
especially troublesome, funding such terrorist groups as 
the Imam Hussein Battalion, which is responsible for the 
recent death of a Basrah FSN (ref B). 

5. (S//REL UK) The third fight, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, is 
among the various political parties in Basrah. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that, as the various political parties struggle for 
control of Basrah politics, parties in the Basrah 
Provincial Council (PC) do not wish to see the central 
government insert itself into Basrah affairs. The Basrah 
PC therefore viewed Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki's 
recent visit to Basrah as a direct challenge to the PC's 
authority. 

6. (S//REL UK) The Basrah PC, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, has been trying 
to pull away from central government authority. "There is 
an attitude among the provincial leadership that Basrah's 
treasure should be for Basrah only," XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that it would take a good deal of effort to bring 
the situation in Basrah back under control. With Iran so 
heavily involved in stirring up trouble in Basrah, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said, any conflict between the U.S. and Iran could result 
in the complete collapse of the Basrah government. 

--------------- 
MOI Not Trusted 
--------------- 

7. (S//REL UK) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the people of Basrah trust 
the Iraqi Army and MOD, but not the MOI. The MOI, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said, is a divided ministry; each section of the ministry 
is like its own country, and people in different sections 
rarely communicate. The Iraqi Police, he said, is heavily 

BAGHDAD 00002059 002 OF 002 


infiltrated by militias. In Basrah, he explained, there 
are approximately 15,000 Iraqi Police Officers. The Basrah 
Chief of Police has said that half belong to a militia. 
The MOD, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, is not infiltrated by militias, and 
so many Iraqis would rather see the MOD in charge of 
security. 

------- 
Comment 
------- 

8. (S//REL UK) Our contacts tell us that certain groups, 
such as Basrah's rival political parties and the Iranian 
intelligence services, appear to have an interest in 
promoting unrest in Basrah (ref C). A strong provincial 
government that is able to withstand such influences still 
appears to be a distant prospect. As the provincial 
elections draw near and rivalries for power intensify, we 
expect violence to increase unless the central government 
proves able to assert control over Basrah. 

9. (S//REL UK) Bionote: XXXXXXXXXXXX

10. (S//REL UK) Bionote continued: XXXXXXXXXXXX End Bionote. 
SPECKHARD