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Viewing cable 06AITTAIPEI2005, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06AITTAIPEI2005 2006-06-12 22:05 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0012
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #2005/01 1632205
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 122205Z JUN 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0634
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5294
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6511
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 002005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION:  U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused 
coverage June 10-12 on the pan-Blue and pan-Green camps' discussion 
Monday of the agenda for an extra legislative session; the pan-Blue 
camp's rally in Taipei Saturday calling for President Chen Shui-bian 
to step down; AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt's visit to Taiwan; the 
havoc caused by heavy rain in central and southern Taiwan; Vice 
President Annette Lu's possible role in a post-Chen era; and 
investigations into President Chen's son-in-law's insider trading 
scandal and questionable gifts received by First Lady Wu Shu-chen. 
Almost all papers carried reports on inside pages June 10 of the 
United States' welcoming President Chen's reaffirmation of the Four 
Nos pledge.  The pro-status quo "China Times" ran a banner headline 
on page two June 10 that read "Meeting with Raymond Burghardt and 
Reiterating Four Nos Pledge, Bian Proves to United States that He Is 
More Reliable Than Lu."  The same newspaper also ran the results of 
its latest survey June 10, which showed that 43 percent of those 
polled support the motion to recall Chen, and 46 percent hope that 
Chen will step down himself.  In the same poll, 46 percent of 
respondents support Lu's succession, and 31 percent said they 
support Lu to be the president while incumbent Legislative Yuan Wang 
Jin-pyng heads the Cabinet. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an analysis in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, said 
President Chen pitched in his chip in time to woo the United States, 
as he realized that the U.S. is his most important ally at the 
moment.  An editorial in the limited-circulation, pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" criticized KMT Chairman Ma 
Ying-jeou's attempt to recall Chen, saying the move is akin to a 
frontal assault on the United States' "beloved cross-Strait 'status 
quo.'"  An opinion piece in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" said 
the moment that AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt returns to the United 
States is not the end of U.S.-Taiwan tensions, but the beginning of 
how to shape future U.S.-Taiwan relations.  A "China Times" 
editorial predicted that Taiwan will have to undergo a period marked 
by confrontations between the ruling and opposition parties.  End 
summary. 
 
A) "To Woo the United States, Bian Pitches in His Chip in Time" 
 
Washington correspondent Nadia Tsao commented in an analysis in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 600,000] (6/10): 
 
"Just at the moment when Chen Shui-bian is facing a recall crisis, 
the United States suddenly got the Four Nos pledge it has been 
waiting for for nearly six months.  Chen, on the other hand, also 
got a certain endorsement from the State Department's generous 
response.  Chen obviously decided that the United States is his most 
powerful ally at this moment. ... 
 
"Even though the United States reiterated more than once that it 
will not interfere in Taiwan's internal affairs, Washington's 
political influence in Taiwan is a fact that cannot be covered up. 
The State Department's statement is worth pondering in many 
resspects.  For example, the statement made no effort to hide the 
Bush administration's joy, as evidenced especially in its sentences 
such as 'these measures will not change during his remaining two 
years in office.'  [The United States] even urged Beijing to take 
parallel steps to fulfill its 'obligations' and reach out to 
Taiwan's duly elected leaders.  [The statement] has indirectly 
proved that the deal over the Four Nos pledge included the terms 
that Washington used in its call for Beijing to push for the latter 
to engage in direct talks with the Bian administration. 
 
"Even though one cannot over-interpret the State Department 
statement as Washington's endorsement of Chen to finish his 
remaining term of office, Chen is evidently adding chips that are 
favorable for him on the U.S. scale, in an attempt to counterattack 
the opposition parties or even restrain the pressure from within the 
DPP.  It is, however, noteworthy to see whether Chen will give up 
his voice with regard to cross-Strait issues after having clearly 
shown his stand to the United States." 
 
B) "The Foppish Barking of Ma Ying-jeou" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (6/10): 
 
"Surprise, surprise.  It appears that Chinese Nationalist Party 
Chairman Ma Ying-jeou is not the strong and upright leader that the 
public regularly swoons over.  In the space of seven days, Ma has 
abandoned his temperate position on the controversy enveloping the 
Presidential Office - not because of any meaningful development in 
the investigation of the son-in-law of President Chen Shui-bian, but 
because of hardline forces he is unable to control or ignore within 
the KMT and the People First Party (PFP). 
 
"Critically at this time, the US has given Chen a boost for his 
cooperation on cross-strait affairs.  Washington, if nobody else, 
recognizes that campaigning for removal of a president from office 
for the alleged misdemeanors of others is nothing less than a 
frontal assault on the beloved cross-strait 'status quo.'  The fact 
that Ma toured the US only a few months ago depicting himself as a 
champion of this 'status quo' provides all the evidence to declare 
Ma a disingenuous, limp and flaky heir to his idol and former 
employer, dictator Chiang Ching-kuo.  You can't be a 'shuaige' 
[Chinese characters meaning handsome guy] fop and morph into a power 
hungry thug-in-waiting for too long without the strain beginning to 
show." 
 
C) "Burghardt Alone Cannot Decide Whether [Washington] Supports Bian 
Or Not" 
 
Assistant Professor Yu Pen-li at Tamkang University's Graduate 
Institute of American Studies opined in the mass-circulation "Apple 
Daily" [circulation: 500,000] (6/12): 
 
"... It is not difficult to tell by looking back at history that 
when Raymond Burghardt returns to the United States, it does not 
indicate the end of tensions between the United States and Taiwan, 
but the beginning of how to shape future U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
Will A-bian be able to maintain stability in Taiwan's political 
situation if he continues his rule?  Will the new leader be able to 
hold on to the new situation and stabilize cross-Strait relations if 
A-bian steps down?  Will Taiwan people's anti-Bian awareness be 
transformed into the power for the United States to respect Taiwan 
people's choice?  All these possibilities are the direction that 
Washington needs to cautiously evaluate in the future.  Without a 
doubt, it is not up to Burghardt to decide whether Washington wants 
to support Bian.  As a result, one will easily lose focus if he 
tries to examine Burghardt's every move using a magnifying glass. 
..." 
 
D) "Taiwan Perhaps Will Have to Undergo Period in Which Ruling and 
Opposition Parties Use up Each Other!" 
 
The pro-status quo "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (6/10): 
 
"... In the confrontation over the next months, the pan-Blue camp 
will naturally not give up so easily, since it has launched the 
recall campaign with strong public support.  In order to consolidate 
its ruling position, the DPP, too, will not easily back out. ... 
Judging from the current situation, only three factors will make the 
confrontation end earlier:  One is unexpected external pressure (the 
U.S. involvement, for example); the second is an unexpectedly quick 
court ruling; and the third is unexpected exposure of more 
information.  We of course do not wish to see any external forces 
intervene in Taiwan's internal affairs, and many people perhaps do 
not expect that the investigation agencies will wake up suddenly. 
As a result, the only thing that Taiwan people can look forward to 
is, like the Watergate case, undeniable evidence provided by a Deep 
Throat, with which the media and public opinion will exert immense 
pressure.  In that way maybe all the political impasses may be 
resolved. ..." 
 
YOUNG