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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA1566, ETHIOPIA: UN U/S GENERAL GUEHENNO LAYS OUT NEXT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA1566 2006-06-08 14:12 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO2266
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1566/01 1591412
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081412Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0989
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001566 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AF/E. 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR SU AU
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA:  UN U/S GENERAL GUEHENNO LAYS OUT NEXT 
STEPS FOR AMIS TO UN OPERATION TRANSITION 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  United Nations Undersecretary General 
Jean-Marie Guehenno met with the Charge and Admiral Hunt June 
7 to review the AMIS to UN transition efforts and his views 
of next steps.  By the time he returned to Khartoum, he hoped 
that he would be able to gain greater clarity on the mandate 
and agreement about the nature of the transition.  He 
believed that the best case scenario for the transition from 
AMIS to UN is January 2007.  Guehenno worried that the 
biggest challenge now was the interim period.  Guehenno noted 
that much was expected of the US politically as it was the 
real catalyst in getting the agreement and now the US and 
others need to keep the political momentum going. Guehenno 
said that to overcome misperceptions of a UN "invasion" he 
and the UNSC -- also visiting the AU -- must work with Sudan 
to create a foundation of cooperation at all levels.  The 
message that Guehenno wanted us to take home was the same one 
we received from the President of the UNSC, AMIS must not 
fail in the next six months and to avoid that we must find 
ways to enhance its performance and capacity.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) On the eve of the joint UN-AU trip to Sudan and 
Chad, Charge Huddleston, accompanied by the Combined Joint 
Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Rear Admiral Richard 
Hunt and poloff, met June 7 with United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Undersecretary General 
Jean-Marie Guehenno, DPKO Africa Division Director Dmitriy 
Titov, DPKO Africa Division Senior Political Affairs Officer 
Michael Gaouette, Head of the UN Assistance Cell to the AU 
Major General Henry Anyidoho, and Deputy Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the UN Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Azouz Ennifar. 
 
3.  (SBU) Guehenno's itinerary for the remainder of the UN 
visit includes travel to Khartoum, Darfur, southern Sudan, 
and Chad. 
 
FOUNDATION OF COOPERATION 
------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Undersecretary General Guehenno told the Charge 
June 7 that his primary mission over the next three to four 
weeks was to "educate" the Sudanese on the strategic value of 
a UN operation, begin building cooperation at all levels of 
the GOSS necessary for a successful transition, and lay the 
foundation for negotiating the required changes associated 
with the operation.  Guehenno emphasized that the UN 
operation would be significantly different than the AMIS 
operation and his intention was to send a "message of 
strength."  In Guehenno's view, the transition should be 
clear cut rather than a gradual transition.  There must be a 
clear change in the way the force is used, if public 
perceptions are to be changed, he said.  Utilizing the same 
command and overall structure would dent the UN mission's 
credibility.  Guehenno said the UN mission should start from 
the top of the mountain not by climbing up.  He indicated the 
UN operation would require a more robust force with a 
largely, though not entirely, African composition.  Guehenno 
said certain operational activities, such as night patrols, 
currently forbidden by the GOSS will need to be revisited. 
The Undersecretary said that an ultimate solution to the 
Darfur crisis may include "blood money," compensation to all 
involved parties. 
 
AMIS IN "STATE OF DESPAIR" 
-------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Guehenno pointed out little support had been given 
to AMIS since the decision was made to transition to a UN 
mission.  He added that the partners had provided little or 
no support in the past few months and allowance had not been 
paid. Guehenno contended that AMIS must be strengthened over 
the next six months to ensure any measure of success.  He 
also said AMIS's success will determine the UN mission's 
success.  Major General Anyidoho warned that lack of funds to 
pay salaries, weapons, gear and other equipment had led to a 
"state of despair" at AMIS and without assistance a 
deteriorating situation will be "dropped in the lap" of the 
UN.  Anyidoho said African countries were not in a position 
to offer assistance and AMIS would need to rely on the UN, 
United States, Canada, and other countries. 
 
6.  (SBU) Guehenno agreed that AMIS must not be allowed to 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001566  002 OF 002 
 
 
fail prior to the UN handover and said the UN Secretary 
General was looking for a solution that was not just limited 
to troops as there were weaknesses in the area of command and 
control.  He said even if the troops were ready -- the South 
Africans have already indicated a readiness to deploy -- 
there would be no facilities to house them.  The 
Undersecretary noted that given the circumstances perhaps the 
smart option was to enhance the capacity of AMIS with 
targeted assistance that will improve its performance. 
Guehenno mentioned that setting up the Joint Operation Center 
(JOC) and/or UN personnel to shadow the AMIS personnel to 
learn and to reinforce their capacity would be two 
possibilities.  Admiral Hunt indicated that the USG would 
like to provide the J2 and J9 to the JOC and that the EUCOM 
mission now in Addis might be able to also assist in this 
endeavor.  He also stated that NATO is looking at 300-400 
troops to assist the UN Mission. 
 
USG ROLE 
-------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Guehenno said that security for UN personnel -- 
given the Al Qaida threat -- was a serious matter that they 
will need help on.  Any intelligence of long or short term 
nature from the USG on this would be appreciated.  General 
Anyidoho said that in his view there were two sets of issues 
for the US military, namely what to do now with AMIS and what 
to do in the future with the UN.  In his opinion, the US 
could be most useful in providing intelligence and mobility - 
air forces. 
HUDDLESTON