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Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK913, UNSC: A/SYG ANNABI AND PERSONAL ENVOY VAN WALSUM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06USUNNEWYORK913 2006-05-04 13:04 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED USUN New York
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0913 1241304
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041304Z MAY 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0899
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6163
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0041
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0548
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8913
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000913 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: UNSC: A/SYG ANNABI AND PERSONAL ENVOY VAN WALSUM 
BRIEF COUNCIL ON THE WESTERN SAHARA 
 
 
1. Summary:  During a private meeting of the Security Council 
April 25, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations Heidi Annabi reported on MINURSO operations, and 
the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara 
Peter van Walsum discussed the Secretary-General's latest 
report on the situation in Western Sahara.  Council members 
generally supported Van Walsum's call for direct negotiations 
between the parties to the conflict without preconditions, 
although opinions differed as to specifics.  Most Council 
members called for a six-month renewal of the MINURSO 
mandate.  End Summary. 
 
2. In his briefing on MINURSO activities of the past six 
months, Annabi noted that MINURSO's ability to monitor the 
cease-fire has improved and that cease-fire violations have 
decreased.  However, he said Laayoune demonstrations calling 
for Western Saharan self-determination and respect for human 
rights had created a tense situation, which had the potential 
for instability if a solution to the problem is not found. 
Annabi underscored the Secretary-General's view that MINURSO 
plays an important role in monitoring the cease-fire and 
facilitating confidence-building measures among the parties, 
and conveyed his recommendation to extend MINURSO's mandate 
for six months. 
 
3. Van Walsum clarified why he has recommended direct 
negotiations between the parties and without preconditions. 
He characterized his decision as a "compromise between 
international legality and reality," arguing that thirty 
years of failed efforts to find a solution to the problem 
based on international legitimacy led him to the conclusion 
that such a compromise is necessary.  Van Walsum contrasted 
past Council calls for self-determination and a mutually 
acceptable solution with Morocco's refusal to agree to a 
solution based on Sahrawi self-determination.  Van Walsum 
stated that to overcome this contradiction, a solution should 
be based on negotiations between the parties.  While the UN 
could not advocate disregarding international law to reach a 
solution, he suggested that once the parties agreed to a 
solution they had negotiated themselves, international law 
would move to the background and the solution would move to 
the foreground. 
 
4. Van Walsum observed that since Morocco rejected the peace 
plan in 2004, there had been an absence of reaction from the 
Council.  Because of the Council's strong desire for a peace 
plan based on an agreement between the two parties, he 
concluded that the Council had effectively "rescinded" its 
support for the plan once Morocco's decision was made clear. 
COUNCIL MEMBERS, COMMENTS 
------------------------- 
 
5. The majority of Council members who spoke focused their 
comments on the status of negotiations between the parties to 
the conflict.  Ghana, Congo, and the U.S. expressed 
frustration that there seemed to be no solution to the 
conflict on the horizon.  Qatar and Slovakia supported direct 
negotiations without preconditions as recommended in the 
Secretary-General's report.  Many members supported Van 
 
SIPDIS 
Walsum's proposal generally, but differed from him on 
specifics.  The UK said that it agreed that the parties 
should stop emphasizing preconditions, and that such an 
emphasis is what has been preventing them from negotiating. 
The UK argued, however, that any solution must be tied to 
previous UN resolutions on the matter, namely 
self-determination and "mutual acceptability."  France 
expressed support for Van Walsum, adding, however, that 
direct negotiations "in which Algeria should participate" are 
the only way to get around the deadlock.  Russia stated that 
Moscow would support any formula that was mutually 
acceptable.  Peru and Congo expressed concern about 
negotiations without preconditions established by UNSC 
resolutions.  Peru asserted that direct negotiation under the 
UNSC would not have a positive outcome, "because the solution 
of independence is unacceptable to Morocco and no one wants 
to pressure Morocco." 
 
6. There was a general consensus for a six-month MINURSO 
mandate renewal. Japan cautioned, however, that it was "not 
acceptable for MINURSO to continue indefinitely without the 
prospect of a solution."  The UK stressed its concern about 
the human rights situation, expressing support for the Human 
Rights Commission's planned trip to the region, and stating 
that "at a minimum" a reference to this visit should be 
included in the resolution.  While France welcomed the Human 
Rights Commission visit, the PermRep simply urged Morocco to 
be transparent regarding human rights. 
BOLTON