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Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK912, UN ON LRA: 'SYMPTOM OF PROBLEM THAT ONLY UGANDA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06USUNNEWYORK912 2006-05-04 12:52 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0912/01 1241252
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041252Z MAY 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8911
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1069
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0617
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0212
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0242
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0184
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0822
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0618
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0747
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0820
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 8783
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000912 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CG ETTC MOPS PGOV PREL SU UG KPKO
SUBJECT: UN ON LRA: 'SYMPTOM OF PROBLEM THAT ONLY UGANDA 
CAN RESOLVE' 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1. (SBU) At April 26 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
consultations, Department of Political Affairs (DPA) 
Assistant-Secretary-General Kalomoh made recommendations for 
addressing the regional threat posed by the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA), most of which centered around a more proactive 
approach from the Government of Uganda (GOU).  Kalomoh and UK 
Permanent Representative (PR) Jones Parry disagreed over the 
question of including Uganda on the UNSC's agenda, with 
Kalomoh warning that Council scrutiny could preclude future 
GOU cooperation on political issues.  Meanwhile, Jones Parry 
has sought to establish himself as the LRA crusader on the 
Council, hosting a Uganda Core Group meeting on April 26 and 
a seminar on the LRA threat (with the Ugandan PR as co-host) 
on April 27, and requesting another briefing on the LRA 
threat in the coming weeks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) According to DPA A/SYG Kalomoh, resolution of the 
LRA threat would come only through the GOU's addressing the 
'root cause' of the conflict: resentment by the northern 
Acholi population at its marginalization by the present 
government.  Kalomoh claimed that less than 200 combatants 
remain, with considerably diminished strength and resources 
(COMMENT. This number seemed unrealistically low in USUN's 
estimation.  END COMMENT).  Kalomoh said that the GOU had to 
engage in a 'genuine' dialogue with the Acholis to address 
their grievances, and he assured that the UN stood ready to 
assist in this process. 
 
UNMIS AND MONUC ARE NOT THE ANSWER 
---------------------------------- 
3. (SBU) The scope of the UN's capability to assist, Kalomoh 
warned, remained limited, especially as LRA insecurity was 
spreading from northern Uganda to southern Sudan and eastern 
DRC.  In southern Sudan, Kalomoh noted an increase in the 
number of LRA attacks as combatants were scrambling to 
re-supply, but he lamented that the UN Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS) lacked the mandate, assets and offensive capacity to 
go after the group.  UNMIS' current mandate allowed only for 
the detention, not the arrest, of LRA terrorists, and the 
Sudanese Government of National Unity's (GNU) memorandum of 
understanding with the ICC required it to immediately hand 
over LRA leaders to The Hague. 
 
4. (SBU) In the DRC, Kalomoh reported the LRA was using 
Garamba National Park (near the Sudan border) to re-group. 
He noted that the battalion-sized force close to the Park 
would be sufficient for security but added that the Armed 
Forces of the DRC (FARDC), together with the UN Organization 
Mission in the DRC (MONUC), were exploring other options to 
address the LRA presence.  Under UNSCR 1565 (2004), MONUC had 
a mandate to protect civilians but not to tackle the threat 
of foreign armed combatants; it was authorized only to 
support the FARDC's disarmament efforts in this regard. 
According to Kalomoh, MONUC has been encouraged to better 
patrol the border against LRA activity, especially with the 
advent of DRC elections in June.  The main priority in the 
DRC, Kalomoh stressed, was promoting a secure environment for 
the polls. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------- 
5. (SBU) Kalomoh asserted that UNMIS and MONUC should not be 
considered substitutes for Ugandan authorities in addressing 
the LRA threat.  In addition to a credible dialogue, the GOU 
needed to prioritize its national budgetary assistance to 
ensure long-term development in the north.  Further, the GOU 
needed to strengthen its data on the LRA, particularly 
updating background information and acquiring real-time 
intel.  LRA leaders Kony and Otti needed to be isolated and 
indicted.  A credible program of disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration (DDR) should be encouraged to deal with the 
80 percent of LRA ranks made up of child soldiers.  Kalomoh 
solicited Members' assistance in establishing a Panel of 
Experts to expose and ultimately cut off the LRA's financial 
backers and supply channels, noting that some of these groups 
were based in southern Sudan. 
 
 
6. (SBU) On the issue of a Special Envoy to Northern Uganda, 
Kalomoh said President Museveni had agreed in principle to 
the office but only if it steered clear of addressing 
internal issues.  In a subsequent meeting of the Northern 
Uganda Core Group representatives hosted by UKUN, the 
Norwegian PR said that former Mozambican President Chissano's 
name was circulating in Kampala diplomatic circles as a 
possible candidate.  Kalomoh appealed for GOU acceptance of 
such an appointment, particularly in working with the Core 
Group on the reintegration of ex-combatants.  He also 
recommended a Special Representative for Children in Armed 
Conflict liaise with the Core Group on the reintegration of 
child soldiers.  Finally, Kalomoh urged increased regional 
cooperation through the Tripartite Plus Commission. 
 
UK AS LRA CRUSADER 
------------------ 
7. (SBU)  As host of an informal meeting of Core Group 
representative, UK PR Jones Parry suggested that there would 
eventually need to be a military solution to the problem 
posed by the '20 percent' of the LRA that were 'sociopaths' 
and beyond redemption through any DDR effort.  He hinted 
broadly that none of the regional militaries was up to the 
challenge and that some sort of 'special operation' would 
likely be required. 
 
8. (SBU)  In the UK's April 27 LRA seminar, Ugandan PR 
Butagira made clear the GOU supported neither inclusion of 
Uganda on the SC agenda nor appointment of a Special Envoy or 
a Panel of Experts.  OCHA U/SYG Egeland reported that nearly 
1.7 million persons still remain displaced by the LRA 
conflict.  NGOs OXFAM, CARE, Human Rights Watch and 
International Crisis Group were represented. 
BOLTON