Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK1065, SYG SELECTION: INDIA PUSHES UNHELPFUL GA RESOLUTION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06USUNNEWYORK1065.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1065 2006-05-24 13:20 2011-04-04 01:00 CONFIDENTIAL USUN New York
Appears in these articles:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1597309.ece
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1065/01 1441320
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241320Z MAY 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9143
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1335
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0664
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2011 
TAGS: PREL UNSC UN IN

SUBJECT: SYG SELECTION: INDIA PUSHES UNHELPFUL GA RESOLUTION 

REF: A. USUN - IO/UNP EMAIL 5/19 

     B. USUN 1033      C. USUN 892 

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Permanent Representative, 1.4  b and d. 

1. (C) Summary.  The Indians are reportedly leading an aggressive General Assembly (GA) effort by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to advocate for a GA resolution that would demand the Security Council recommend more than one candidate to be the next Secretary-General.  The proposal, which seeks to capitalize on the current contentious atmosphere among member states after the G-77 successfully forced votes on the SYG's management reform proposals, is part of a broader Indian effort to bolster its standing in the developing world and its chance for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Other delegations appear to have joined the effort to support a stronger role for the GA against what is perceived to be an increasingly powerful Security Council.  In advocating for the proposal, its proponents are further polarizing a sharply divided UN membership. We believe the GA has no authority under the UN Charter to dictate the scope of the Security Council's recommendation under Article 97, and that the recommendation of more than one name would be deeply harmful to the UN as an institution and to U.S. interests in particular.  If the NAM is successful in bringing this issue before the GA for a vote, and certainly if it passes, there will be a serious fight over Charter language and Security Council authority this fall.  End Summary. 

Indians want the GA to have a choice 
------------------------------------ 

2. (C) The Indian delegation to the UN has circulated, to potentially supportive delegations, "draft elements" of a General Assembly (GA) resolution that would modify a 1946 resolution and decades of practice regarding the election of the Secretary-General (SYG).  Instead of having the Security Council recommend one name to the GA for its approval (as called for in resolution 11(1) of 1946), the Indian draft would "decide that the Security Council will proffer two or more" candidates. 

3. (C) The Indians are aggressively campaigning for their proposal.  Indian PR Sen hosted a lunch for one hundred of his Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) colleagues on May 16 and the NAM has reportedly established a working group to follow-up on the Indian proposals.  We understand that the draft elements have been strongly supported by the Egyptian mission here, though the strength and breadth of support among the broader NAM membership is more difficult to judge.  A number of delegations have told us that NAM members have shown "a lot of sympathy and support" for the idea, but that many remain concerned about provoking another contentious fight in the General Assembly.  Pakistan's Deputy PR told USUN that they and others had asked the Indians to consider the P5's reaction to the proposal. 

4. (C) Russian PR Churkin (currently serving as the unofficial P5 coordinator) has been seeking an appointment with Sen for more than a week to discuss the issue but has been unable to get on the Indian PR's schedule.  Churkin told the other P5 PRs that he thought Sen was clearly avoiding the meeting.  Churkin will try to see the Malaysian PR, who serves as the NAM Chairman.  (USUN also understands that the French - who supported India's candidacy for permanent membership with the G-4 - are also demarching in New Delhi.) 

For India, is it all about the Security Council? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 

5. (C) The Indians are trying to take advantage of the current atmosphere of conflict between the G-77 and the developed world, and to capitalize on momentum from the G-77's recent management reform votes.  French PR de La Sabliere said that he thought the Indians were trying to establish a "general practice of contentious votes" as part of their campaign for a permanent seat in the Security Council.  (If the process of "reform" dissolves into a series of divisive votes in the GA, the Indians, Germans and Brazilians believe they have a stronger chance to call for a vote on a framework resolution for Security Council expansion.  The opponents of expansion, including NAM members like Pakistan and Egypt, have regularly emphasized the importance of consensus on important issues of reform.) 

6. (C) Many delegations view the Indian effort as part of their campaign for a permanent seat, which the Indian Deputy PR admitted to USUN (ref B).  The Indians continue to try to 

establish themselves as the strongest voice of the G-77 and to burnish their credentials as an "outside" voice that would make the Security Council more "accountable" to the developing world.  The Indians, in campaigning for a permanent seat on the Security Council, have repeatedly argued that only the addition of new, "more representative" permanent members will reverse the Council's "encroachment" into the authorities and powers of the GA.  (Comment: The Indian challenge, we assume, must be particularly discomforting to the Chinese who like to see themselves as the G-77's "representative" among the P5.  End Comment.) Those opposed to India's Security Council candidacy will have to balance their desire to block India's power play against the need not to be seen as betraying the broader GA membership or serving the interests of the P5. 

Others focused on shifting power back to the GA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 

7. (C) In support of the Indian proposal, delegations emphasize the need to "rebalance" the Security Council-GA relationship and to ensure the new SYG is more "responsive" to the developing world.  The populist arguments are directed primarily at the P5, and in particular at the U.S.  In rallying support for this idea, India's Sen has been widely quoted as saying that the current process creates a "Secretary-General who is secretary to the P5 and general to the General Assembly," and that a new process is needed to "reverse the situation."  He has also referred to the current SYG as "the P5's official executioner" (ref C). 

8. (C) The NAM effort is a symptom of the deeper divide among the UN membership, but the aggressive campaign to build support on the basis of divisive language is only exacerbating the problem.  The Egyptians and others do not share India's larger strategic goal regarding Security Council expansion, but see the debate as an opportunity to assert GA authorities against what is widely perceived to be an increasingly aggressive Security Council.  The current environment in New York is highly conducive to the effort. 

Two candidates: Bad for the UN, and the U.S. 
-------------------------------------------- 

9. (C) We believe strongly that the GA has no authority under the UN Charter to dictate the scope of the Security Council's recommendation under Article 97, and - in the best interests of the organization - the Security Council should not provide more than one name.  If the NAM gets is wish and this resolution passes, there will likely be clash over Charter language and Security Council authority this fall.  India, Egypt and the other agitators will benefit, positioning themselves as the champions of the GA, in direct opposition to the "un-democratic" forces in the Security Council.  One possibility, already being talked about in the corridors here, is that the NAM might try to get the GA to vote down a candidate "on principle" if the Security Council only provides a single recommendation. 

10. (C) Providing two candidates to the GA, however, would dramatically curtail the influence of the U.S. in the selection process.  The new SYG would enter office with either weak support among the general membership or a compromised position on key issues.  A debate in the GA on multiple candidates could result in a SYG elected with just over a majority of votes.  In this case, he or she would enter office as a candidate of only part of the membership. It would be widely known which delegates had worked for or against the incoming SYG, only adding to the atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust between the membership and the Secretariat. 

SIPDIS 

11. (C) More problematic would be scenario where the election becomes a beauty contest among the G-77 in which candidates are forced to provide commitments inimical to U.S. interests.  In a process that enhances member states' ability to elicit pledges, SYG candidates could be forced, for example, to limit the representation of the developed world in the Secretariat's senior ranks.  We would expect candidates to 

SIPDIS address controversial issues such as development assistance levels, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and management reform.  Given the balance of votes in the GA, such a campaign would work against U.S. interests at the UN. BOLTON