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Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK1039, COUNCIL APPEARS READY TO DOWNSIZE UNMEE, BUT SOME

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1039 2006-05-23 13:03 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO4392
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #1039/01 1431303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231303Z MAY 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9109
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0865
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0710
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1096
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0062
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0442
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0630
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0832
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 8787
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: COUNCIL APPEARS READY TO DOWNSIZE UNMEE, BUT SOME 
MEMBERS URGE CAUTION 
 
REF: 05/2202006 SCHOFIELD-BRUNO E-MAIL 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Acknowledging the failure of the May 17 
meeting of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) to 
produce a breakthrough in the border standoff between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
members finally expressed their readiness to downsize the UN 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).  Members were not 
fooled by the last-minute ploy by the Government of the State 
of Eritrea (GSE) to stave off the prospect of downsizing by 
submitting a letter of its intention to lift restrictions 
imposed on UNMEE (refmail).  The Greek delegation will 
circulate a draft resolution reflecting the views expressed 
by Members, with an Experts Meeting on the text scheduled for 
May 25.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
Under-Secretary-General (U/SYG) Guehenno reported that UNMEE 
observed no major developments since May 8, with both 
Ethiopian and Eritrean troops deployed in defensive postures 
and engaged in training exercises where deployed around the 
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ).  Guehenno's read-out of the 
May 17 EEBC meeting (which he said would be followed by 
another on June 15) highlighted the Government of Ethiopia's 
(GOE) imposing of four preconditions on its commitment to 
implement the delimitation decision: one, that the GSE 
renounce the use of force; two, that the GSE respect the 
integrity of the TSZ; three, that the GSE reinstate the full 
capacity of UNMEE; and four, that the GSE agree to direct 
negotiation on disputed border areas - all of which, 
according to Guehenno, the GSE dismissed as further pretext 
for delay by the Ethiopians.  Demarcation could resume, 
Guehenno declared, when UNMEE force size reached a sufficient 
level; when both parties could ensure security for the 
process (noting that Ethiopia had missed its May 19 deadline 
for submission of a security plan); when surveys were 
completed; and when both parties cooperated with 
commissioners in the field.  Guehenno noted that funds were 
also in short supply, with only $3.3 million of the requisite 
$10 million currently in the UN Trust Fund.  Guehenno added 
that even if expedited, the process of identifying and 
deploying surveying contractors would take 12 weeks and would 
be further hindered by the lack of funds. 
 
3. (SBU) Noting the 'interesting timing' of its dispatch, 
U/SYG Guehenno went on to describe a letter he had received 
less than an hour before the commencement of consultations 
from EEBC Commissioner Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, informing that 
the GSE, through a letter from its U.S. attorney, had 
indicated it was prepared to lift restrictions on UNMEE on 
two conditions: one, if the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) 
unambiguously accepted the 13 April 2002 decision and two, if 
the GOE 'did what was required of it to facilitate 
demarcation in accordance with the Algiers Agreement and the 
Commission's orders.'  Guehenno added that Sir Elihu thought 
demarcation was foreseeable if UNMEE's mandate were extended 
and if its force size were not reduced.  Guehenno advised 
that if the UNSC were to proceed with downsizing, it should 
take care not to undermine the Algiers Agreements or to 
impair UNMEE's ability to carry out its other mandated tasks, 
as well as to maintain the basic principles of peacekeeping, 
including assurance of peacekeepers' freedom of movement. 
Guehenno would not offer specific information on what a 
downsized UNMEE would look like, saying only that it was the 
dilemma of the Council to determine how to reconfigure UNMEE 
to provide for monitoring of the TSZ while simultaneously 
supporting demarcation. 
 
4. (SBU) In a nearly complete reversal in tone from past UNSC 
discussions of UNMEE's mandate, Members were almost unanimous 
in their determination to downsize UNMEE, with some urging 
caution to avoid jeopardizing the ongoing peace process. 
Ambassador Bolton explained that in our estimation, the 
diplomatic initiative currently underway to resolve the 
border impasse would not be affected by downsizing UNMEE, and 
he stressed, given the lack of progress on May 17, the 
importance of Council recognition of the reality that UNMEE 
had become part of the problem.  We would be prepared, 
Ambassador Bolton added, to support a force of 1,500 but not 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001039  002 OF 002 
 
 
to maintain the current UNMEE level.  Most other P-5 members 
followed suit.  In a stark departure from his May 8 
intervention, UK Permanent Representative (PR) Jones Parry 
expressed openness to the idea of downsizing and inquired 
about the minimum number of troops needed to monitor the TSZ 
and to conduct demarcation-related tasks.  He also asked if a 
revised SOFA with Ethiopia would be required in such a case, 
which Guehenno did not see as necessary.  Agreeing that a 
reconfigured UNMEE must nonetheless retain capacities to 
monitor the TSZ and to assist the EEBC, the Chinese 
representative said his delegation would be open to 
discussions of options for a reduced force.  The French 
representative played down the GSE's letter, charging that it 
incorrectly tried to divert attention away from the 
responsibilities of the parties for resolution of the border 
crisis.  Other delegations that added their voices to the 
need to downsize included Japan and Denmark. 
 
5. (SBU) Those delegations more guarded in their support for 
downsizing (Argentina, Greece, Peru, Ghana) pointed to the 
need to study the letter just submitted by the GSE and urged 
caution in balancing troop level reduction against the 
ongoing peace initiative/EEBC process.  The Ghanaian rep 
called for bilateral measures to accompany any downsizing, 
and the Peruvian rep recommended a gradual process of 
disengagement and downsizing.  The Tanzanian rep reminded of 
the need for UNMEE to retain a capacity to respond to changes 
to the situation on the ground.  Russian PR Churkin urged 
that in contemplating downsizing UNMEE, the UNSC must 
consider the potential impact on UNMEE's effectiveness, 
particularly in the area of command; the warning from Sir 
Elihu that the time might not be right to reduce force 
strength; and the implication that the Council was opting for 
a non-political solution to the stand-off.  Greek PR 
Vassilakis announced the intention of his delegation to 
circulate a draft resolution to renew UNMEE's mandate that 
would incorporate Members' comments and to convene the first 
Experts Meeting on the text on May 25. 
 
6. (SBU) COMMENT. While the May 17 EEBC meeting may have 
failed to move the demarcation process forward, it succeeded 
in illustrating the UN's 'hostage' status in the crisis and 
accordingly in turning the tide of Members' opinions toward 
reducing UNMEE's force size, even in the absence of explicit 
endorsement by DPKO.  Further, the GSE's transparent ploy 
with the timing of its letter seemed only to add to Members' 
stalemate weariness and embolden them to consider taking a 
stronger stance on countering the impasse.  END COMMENT. 
BOLTON