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Viewing cable 06TOKYO2604, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/12/06
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06TOKYO2604 | 2006-05-12 08:36 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO2351
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2604/01 1320836
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120836Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1949
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8773
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6149
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 9355
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 6117
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 7313
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2202
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8384
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0214
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 002604
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/12/06
INDEX:
(1) Inamine changes stance on Futenma relocation in view of
reality; accepts government's plan after searching for common
ground with gubernatorial race in mind
(2) Futenma relocation; Realistic move by Okinawa Prefecture
deserves praise
(3) Editorial - Futenma relocation: Okinawa governor's anguished
decision
(4) Editorial: Governor Inamine's change welcome
(5) Editorial - Futenma relocation: Problems facing Okinawa yet
to be resolved
(6) Suggestions to Prime Minister Koizumi: Japan should stop
being a protected country
ARTICLES:
(1) Inamine changes stance on Futenma relocation in view of
reality; accepts government's plan after searching for common
ground with gubernatorial race in mind
ASAHI (Page 2) (Abridged)
May 12, 2006
Reversing his previous stance of adamantly opposing the
relocation of Futenma Air Station from Ginowan to Cape Henoko in
Nago, Okinawa Gov. Keiichi Inamine has finally agreed to accept
the government's plan. What prompted the governor to change his
stance in the wake of Nago's acceptance of the Futenma relocation
and the final agreement between Tokyo and Washington? Although
the relocation plan took a step forward, many hurdles still
remain.
Before signing the agreement with Defense Agency Director General
Fukushiro Nukaga at his agency yesterday morning, Inamine said,
"Since we are going to cooperate with the central government, we
would like you to understand Okinawa's position."
He could not say that he would accept the Henoko relocation plan.
But given the government's final decision, all he could do was to
respond to it pragmatically to extract the government's special
consideration for Okinawa. That was Inamine's true intention.
A week ago, Inamine announced Okinawa's position rejecting the
Henoko relocation plan. At the same time, he called for a
temporary heliport.
Apparently, he had the upcoming Okinawa gubernatorial election in
mind.
A senior Okinawa official noted:
"Is there any chance for a candidate supportive of the V-shaped
runway plan to win the race? Change in administration in Okinawa
would push the prefecture away from the Japan-US security setup."
Okinawa also attempted to find common ground with the central
government.
TOKYO 00002604 002 OF 010
On May 9, Inamine's close aide held talks with Administrative
Vice Defense Minister Takemasa Moriya in Tokyo. The aide
complained about a lack of steps for continued talks with Okinawa
prior to a cabinet decision. This was followed by full-fledged
administrative-level negotiations for drafting an agreement.
Okinawa insisted on including two factors -- elimination of risks
of Futenma Air Station and continued talks -- in the envisaged
agreement with the government to reflect Okinawa's standpoint.
The Defense Agency, too, engineered the expression "based on the
government's plan" in an effort to elicit compromise from
Inamine.
Moriya explained in a press conference yesterday that the
government has avoided direct expressions, such as implementing
the government's plan, to highlight Tokyo's flexible posture.
Okinawa was eager to find a settlement line with the central
government for the sake of the gubernatorial election.
The Liberal Democratic Party's cooperation was essential, but the
deadlocked Futenma issue was blocking the conservative camp's
efforts to pick a prospective successor to Inamine. Ruling party
members and business leaders in Okinawa were simmering with
dissatisfaction with Inamine's lack of effort to find common
ground with the government.
The Inamine aide noted yesterday, "The governor has set the base
camp for the next governor and next prime minister to climb the
mountain."
Government not optimistic
Prime Minister Koizumi met with Inamine at his office yesterday
in which he thanked the governor for his cooperation.
It has been 10 years since Tokyo and Washington agreed to
relocate Futenma Air Station, and during that period, the
original Henoko offshore plan fell through. That is why the
government cannot be overly optimistic.
Making a cabinet decision before the end of this month is the
government's immediate goal. The government is also making
coordination to include the following in the cabinet decision:
(1) effective revocation of the 1999 cabinet decision on the
Futenma relocation; and (2) legitimate ground for the relocation
of US Marines to Guam.
Responding to Okinawa's call for economic stimulus measures is
another challenge. Inamine specifically asked for the
government's extra efforts for using vacated US bases and
creating jobs for Japanese base workers.
US Deputy Defense Under Secretary Richard Lawless indicated that
US force realignment would cost Japan 3 trillion yen. The
government has yet to present even a rough estimate for the
entire project, including economic stimulus packages.
Koizumi announced that the government would not submit
realignment-related bills to the current Diet session. A further
delay in submitting bills is bound to draw a call for a detailed
TOKYO 00002604 003 OF 010
explanation from Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) and other
parties.
Whether the project would proceed in the next several years, as
scheduled, is a big question.
The plan is to conduct environmental assessment over the next
three years to start construction in fiscal 2009 to complete the
alternative facility by 2014. The new facility cannot be build
without the governor's permission to reclaim land, and that
decision is likely to be made by Inamine's successor.
"Anything could happen in Okinawa," a person connected with the
government said yesterday.
Secret meeting on night of May 10 to finalize agreement; Inamine
SIPDIS
insisted on adding SOFA-related item
Defense chief Inamine met secretly with Inamine in Tokyo on the
night of May 10 to nail down their broad agreement for the
following day.
They decided to include four items in the agreement.
In the following morning, Inamine called for an additional item
connected with the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
The SOFA falls in the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry.
Inamine suggested writing a paragraph with the Defense Agency as
the subject, but Inamine insisted on replacing the Defense Agency
with the "government." As a result, Nukaga called Foreign
Minister Taro Aso and obtained his concurrence.
Subsequently, Inamine and Nukaga complete the agreement including
the fifth item reading "to consider measures, including improved
operation of the SOFA and so on." Inamine highly evaluated the
item that included "and so on" as a broad and penetrating
expression.
The deadline was approaching.
On May 8, Koizumi ordered Nukaga to settle the matter for a
cabinet decision before the May 26-27 Pacific Islands Summit in
Okinawa.
Koizumi and Inamine are scheduled to attend the summit. The order
apparently reflected Koizumi's desire to avoid exchanging verbal
jabs with Inamine over the base issue on the sidelines of the
summit that would bring together foreign leaders.
(2) Futenma relocation; Realistic move by Okinawa Prefecture
deserves praise
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full)
May 12, 2006
Okinawa Prefecture, which had been opposed to the government plan
to relocate the US forces' Futenma Air Station in Ginowan City,
has at long last made a realistic move.
Okinawa Governor Keiichi Inamine yesterday met with Defense
Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga. During the meeting,
they agreed to transfer Futenma's functions, basically based on
the Camp Schwab (Nago City) coastal plan as incorporated in the
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final USFJ realignment report. They then exchanged a confirmation
document.
Meeting the press afterward, Inamine said that his signing the
document does not mean that he had agreed to the coastal plan,
but he added; "Now we have taken a step forward for an early
settlement of the issue."
Though there still remain unfinished tasks, such as the
implementation of the confirmation document, which listed such
factors as the elimination of the danger of Futenma Air Station,
the relocation issue that has damaged bilateral relations for the
past decade, has moved greatly forward toward a final settlement.
It has been said that coordination of views with affected local
municipalities, a factor that has hindered progress in USFJ
realignment, was subject to the moves of Okinawa Prefecture.
Because of this circumstance, the impact of the agreement on
concerned municipalities, which had been opposed to the
government plan, cannot be disregarded. If the government can
share the realistic judgment made by the prefecture with those
municipalities, it would strengthen the Japan-US alliance,
whereby improving Japan's security environment.
The prime minister categorically told the governor, "I will
implement the relocation plan in a sincere manner." The
government should do its utmost in order to obtain cooperation
and understanding from Okinawa residents.
It must have been agonizing for the governor to agree on the
government plan, because he had taken a stance of approving only
the original plan to relocate Futenma functions to offshore of
Henoko.
As a result of the agreement yesterday, the Henoko offshore plan
will be scrapped. However, the final USFJ realignment report has
incorporated the relocation of 8,000 US Marines to Guam. Sticking
to the offshore plan cannot change the situation concerning
Futenma Air Station. The danger will simply increase. We give
high marks to the governor's de facto policy change made in a bid
to reduce the danger as well as burden on Okinawa.
However, it would have been better if he made such a realistic
decision much earlier. The cabinet adopted the Henoko offshore
relocation plan, based on the final report compiled by the Japan-
US Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which the
governments of Japan and the US had agreed to. However, that plan
was derailed by Inamine's seeking a 15-year limit on the US' use
of the base.
China is building up its military power. North Korea is engaging
in a nuclear development program. A threat of international
terrorism is also mounting. Japan and the US cannot protect peace
and security unless they deal with those issues in cooperation.
The two countries must not repeat the error of undermining their
alliance ties by creating discord.
(3) Editorial - Futenma relocation: Okinawa governor's anguished
decision
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)
May 12, 2006
TOKYO 00002604 005 OF 010
It must have been a painful, anguished decision for Okinawa Gov.
Keiichi Inamine.
Until just recently the governor had been opposed to the central
government's plan for relocating the US Marine Corps Futenma Air
Station to the cape of Henoko in Nago City. But he reached
agreement all of sudden with the central government on dealing
with the relocation of the airfield, based on the central
government's plan.
At a press conference, Inamine was asked whether he now concurs
with the government's plan, to which he retorted: "Thinking that
way is completely wrong." He explained: "What I have agreed on is
to hold consultations on the relocation site, based on the
central government's plan."
But his answer is hard to understand. Naturally, some local
people are wondering whether (the governor) has actually accepted
the central government's plan.
Inamine's honest feeling would be that he simply is unable to say
he approves the central government's plan, nor can he oppose it.
What is felt from his wo-DzNjTQQlelocation of such facilities to somewhere
outside the prefecture, the rest of Japan remains unwilling to
listen to Okinawa's call.
What if Okinawa stuck to opposing the Henoko relocation plan? The
Futenma airfield would remain a dangerous base in the middle of
the urban area. In addition, the transferal of some 8000 Marines
from Okinawa to Guam and the return of the base site in the
central and southern part of the Okinawa mainland - both agreed
on by the Japanese and US governments - would be put on the
backburner.
Even so, for the governor, seeing the base being transferred from
here to there within the prefecture is unacceptable. In addition,
the Henoko relocation plan lacks the two relocation conditions
the governor has insisted on: a 15-year time limit on the use of
an alternative facility and a joint military and civilian use (of
an alternative facility). Without them, the governor would have
no means to get back the control of the facility in the hands of
the Okinawa people in the future.
Following this thinking, options available to the governor were
limited.
In his talks with the central government, Inamine again proposed
constructing a temporary helipad on the cape of Henoko. The idea
is to use it temporarily until the Futenma airfield is relocated
to somewhere outside the prefecture. This proposal had already
met with a rejection from the central government. But Inamine
again presented it perhaps because of his desire to act to the
last moment in accordance with his principles.
With the agreement this time in mind, Tokyo and Washington must
believe that the relocation plan will now be implemented. But
whether things will go as they expect is an open question.
The initial Henoko plan was to construct an alternative facility
in waters off Henoko. This plan was later foiled by opposition
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from residents and others unwilling to keep silent and endorse
(the current Henoko plan or the central government's plan). Under
the current Henoko plan, it may be easy to start the work of
construction because it can be started on land, but when the
process moves on to the stage of reclamation, the work of
reclamation would face obstructions at sea.
Polls conducted in Okinawa always show that an overwhelming
majority seek to relocate the bases to somewhere outside the
prefecture. In the gubernatorial election this fall following the
expiration of Governor Inamine's term of office, what judgment
will the Okinawa people make about the Henoko relocation plan?
The central government must not misread Inamine's anguish behind
his recent decision made to reach agreement with the central
government. Tokyo's failure to fully understand the pain of the
Okinawa people and listen to their voices with sincerity would
only lead to suffering a backlash.
(4) Editorial: Governor Inamine's change welcome
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)
May 12, 2006
Okinawa Governor Keiichi Inamine yesterday met with Defense
Agency (JDA) Director General Fukushiro Nukaga. During the
meeting he agreed to negotiate with the government on the Futenma
Air Station relocation issue, based on the government plan to
construct a heliport near the coast of Camp Schwab in Nago City.
He reaffirmed this stance during a meeting with Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi, as well. In reducing the burden of US military
bases on Okinawa, it is important to relocate Futenma Air Station
from downtown Ginowan at an early date. If the agreement marks a
positive change in Mr. Inamine's policy stance, then we welcome
his decision.
In 1996, Tokyo and Washington agreed to relocate Futenma
functions within 5-7 years under the condition that a replacement
facility be constructed within Okinawa. Then Governor Masahide
Ota objected to the government plan to construct a replacement
facility off Henoko, Nago City, calling for transferring such
functions outside Okinawa. Inamine, who was elected in 1998,
pledged to make a replacement facility off Henoko an airport for
joint military-civilian use and attach a 15-year limit to its
use. Since then 10 years have passed without any prospects of the
construction of the facility, because the US has refused to
approve the 15-year limit.
In response to mounting US dissatisfaction, Japan and the US in
October 2005 reached a new agreement on a ground-based heliport
plan using part of Camp Schwab and reclaimed land. The Security
Consultative Committee (SCC) consisting of foreign and defense
policy officials reaffirmed this plan in its final USFJ
realignment report mapped out on May 1, after revising part of
that agreement, complying with requests from Nago in April 2006.
However, Mr. Inamine had insisted that he would maintain his old
position toward the agreements between the central government and
Nago, and between Japan and the US, based on this commitment to
making a replacement facility an airport for joint military-
civilian use.
We have called on Mr. Inamine to make a realistic decision in
order to eliminate the dangers of Futenma Air Station as soon as
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possible. After exchanging the confirmation document with JDA
Director General Nukaga, Mr. Inamine told reporters: "The
agreement does not mean I have agreed on the government plan. It
means that we will negotiate, based on this agreement." It may
have been an indication that while he does not completely agree
with the government plan, he will not oppose it.
A gubernatorial election is to take place in Okinawa in November.
Mr. Inamine noted: "I cannot serve in the post any longer. I want
to leave conservative prefectural politics to my successor."
Candidates to replace him have yet to come forward. The Futenma
relocation issue is bound to become a campaign issue.
Coordination of views between the government and Okinawa over the
Futenma relocation is expected to face some more setbacks.
(5) Editorial - Futenma relocation: Problems facing Okinawa yet
to be resolved
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 5) (Full)
May 12, 2006
The central government and Okinawa Prefecture have agreed on
continuing consultations on the relocation of the US Marine Corps
Futenma Air Station, based on the central government's plan. But
the problems facing Okinawa have yet to be resolved. The central
government is responsible for doing its utmost to settle
remaining issues.
After the talks with Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro
Nukaga, Okinawa Gov. Keiichi Inamine stressed it was incorrect to
say that Okinawa has now given the nod to the central
government's plan. Nukaga and Inamine shook hands (at a press
conference after their meeting), but Inamine turned his face away
from Nukaga in doing so. This attitude implies his discontent
with the central government for not having settled anything yet.
Inamine's position until recently was "not to accept" the central
government's plan, namely, relocating the US airfield to the
coastal portion of Camp Schwab. Now, however, he has reached
agreement with the central government on the plan. This move can
be taken as a policy change. He now aims to follow a pragmatic
line of extracting as many favorable terms as possible from Tokyo
in return for his acceptance of the plan, otherwise Tokyo would
eventually brush aside Okinawa's objections.
But the situation is not so easy as one senior official in Tokyo
elatedly stated, "We've taken this as the governor's de facto
approval for our plan."
In the process of reaching an agreement, Nukaga and Inamine
confirmed they would work to 1) remove the danger of the Futenma
airfield, 2) ensure the safety of residents in the vicinity; 3)
conserve the natural surroundings; and 4) gauge the feasibility
of relocation work. Clearing all these hurdles will not be easy.
The first hurdle to clear its to remove the danger. Okinawa
intends to press Tokyo for constructing a temporary helipad at
the relocation site, but Tokyo is unlikely to accept Okinawa's
proposal. Securing the safety of residents in the vicinity of the
relocation site and protecting the marine environment would be
both difficult without making changes to the central government's
plan.
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Following Nukaga, Inamine met with Prime Minister Koizumi and
asked him for assistance, including new legislation, as to the
use of vacated land after the return of US military facilities
and the employment of workers at such military facilities. The
prime minister told Inamine, "The government as a whole will make
every possible effort to respond to your request." The government
is not allowed to make empty promises.
Most Okinawan people are still opposed to the central
government's plan. If Tokyo remains reluctant to make clear the
terms for the relocation, there would surely be an impact on the
gubernatorial race in Okinawa set for the fall. Depending on the
outcome of the election, the agreement this time between Tokyo
and Okinawa would be scrapped. High-handedness by the central
government would end up essentially cutting its own throat.
Each House of the Diet in its plenary session yesterday had a
question-and-answer session on the final report on the US force
realignment released by the Japanese and US governments.
On that occasion, when asked how he would explain to locals
(about the final report), Koizumi gave only this remark: "I will
continue efforts to do so with sincerity." He noted Japan will
pay about 700 billion yen of the relocation cost of US troops in
Japan to Guam, and that no countries other than Japan have paid
such a huge amount of money, but he was unwilling to indicate any
ground in specific terms for Japan's share.
On the question of Japan's total payment - estimated at 3
trillion yen - concerning the US force realignment, Koizumi only
said: "It's difficult to indicate how the cost will actually run
up at this point." He did not reveal anything the public wants to
know.
As it stands, even the move by the government not to submit
relevant bills to the current Diet session gives the impression
that it is trying to dodge Diet debates. We urge the government
to fulfill its accountability; otherwise, it cannot obtain
understanding from either Okinawa or the rest of Japan.
(6) Suggestions to Prime Minister Koizumi: Japan should stop
being a protected country
SANKEI (Page 3) (Full)
May 11, 2006
By Yoshiko Sakurai, journalist
US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless stated on
April 25 that Japan's share of the costs for the relocation of
the US forces in Japan would total at least 26 billion dollars
(approximately 2.28 trillion yen). I wonder what he really meant.
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said, "He must have given
consideration to US public opinion." I don't think Lawless made a
statement that was totally different from his real intention just
for domestic consumption.
It is well known that there are the two views of Japan in the
United States: One is that Japan should become an independent
country, abolishing the restrictions in Article 9 of the
Constitution, and the other is that Japan should tenaciously hold
on to the pacifist principles in Article 9.
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One person advocating for the former view has been former Deputy
Secretary of Sate Richard Armitage, who released the Armitage
SIPDIS
Report in the fall of 2000. His view is that Japan-US relations
should become similar to the relationship between the US and
Britain, and that it is only natural for Japan to revise Article
9 so that Japan and the US will be on equal terms.
A representative of those advocating the latter view is Zbigniew
Brzezinski, a scholar familiar with Japan who once served as
national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter. He
repeatedly wrote in one of his books, The Grand Chessboard, that
Japan is a country protected by the United States since it
entrusts its security to the Security Treaty with that country.
He stressed that since it is impossible for Japan to become a
major Asian power or a global superpower, it should strive to
actively participate in international peacekeeping activities and
assist the economic development of other countries in the future.
He asserts that it would be in the best national interests of the
US to urge Japan to walk this path, which will be in the national
interests of the United States.
Brzezinski predicted that China would continue to grow into major
power, eventually swallowing up Taiwan. It will not only become
the chief power in East Asia, it also will become a world
superpower.
According to his outlook, Japan will continue to be a country
protected by the US, having no desire to become an independent
nation. Japan will say crouched between the US and China forever.
Japan will have to pursue economic growth and return its profits
to the international community. It means that the United States
and the world will use Japan's funds as they did so during the
Gulf War in 1991.
Such a view exists also in Japan. It stems from the thinking that
Japan, reflecting its past acts of aggression as the country that
caused the war in the Pacific, must not possess a military power
that ordinary countries have. Japan therefore should put its
energies into economic development.
This thinking lies behind the set of proposals on future Japan-
China relations released on May 9 by the Japan Association of
Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai). President Kakutaro
Kitashiro told a news conference that China and South Korea's
understanding of Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni
Shrine can never be obtained, and that it was indispensable not
to create distrust of Japan in China by further visits to the
shrine.
But Prime Minister Koizumi rejected the business lobby's advice,
saying, "That issue is different from politics." If I may go one
step further, we also must correct the argument that Japan should
be protected by the US and the view that Japan should be a
handicapped country.
Various democratic countries have stared disclosing much
information this year marking the 60th anniversary of the end of
the war. Taking advantage of some of the disclosed information,
the book Mao: The Unknown Story was written by Jung Chang and Jon
Halliday. The book reveals that the 1928 bombing and killing of
Zhang Zuolin, the warlord of Manchuria, was the work of Russia.
The book also reveals that it was not Kwantung Army, a unit of
the Imperial Japanese Army, that was responsible for the 1937
TOKYO 00002604 010 OF 010
Marco Polo Bridge Incident spreading to become the Second Sino-
Japanese War. It was the work of Zhang Zhizhong, a Chinese
Communist Party agent, whom Zhou Enlai sent to spy on Jiang
Jieshi. The book makes it clear that it was not "evil Japan" and
the "evil Kwantung Army" alone that triggered the Second Sino-
Japanese War and thus World War II. Therefore, Japan should not
have to stay a handicapped country. The prime minister's visits
to Yasukuni Shrine should not evoke the distrust (of Asian
countries).
The role of politicians is to assume leadership in revising such
(incorrect) history and to let Japan become a normal country. If
politicians can do that, Japan as a democratic state will be able
to gain strength in the security area, as well. Breaking away
from its dependence on the United States, Japan will be able to
change the Japan-US alliance from the unilateral treaty it is now
into a bilateral one.
There are signs of such a development now in Japan. However, it
took more than 10 years to move ahead with a plan to relocate the
US Marine Corps Futenma Air Station. During that time, people
wondered if Japan was really serious. They wondered if it really
wanted to become independent.
That is probably why Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Lawless
made his statement about the cost of realignment. He might have
meant that the USFJ realignment would cost 3 trillion yen if
Japan would place importance on economic development, as
Brzezinski defined. The prime minister bears responsibility for
making the public understand the real US intention. It is a shame
that the prime minister said that Lawless had mentioned the 26
billion dollars out of consideration for the US domestic
situation.
SCHIEFFER