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Viewing cable 06SINGAPORE1567, SINGAPORE SCENESETTER FOR EAP A/S HILL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SINGAPORE1567 2006-05-16 05:39 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Singapore
VZCZCXRO5579
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGP #1567/01 1360539
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160539Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9882
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1666
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3876
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5372
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1286
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 001567 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR A/S HILL FROM AMBASSADOR HERBOLD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ETRD PTER PHUM SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE SCENESETTER FOR EAP A/S HILL 
 
REF: SINGAPORE 1486 
 
1. (SBU) We warmly welcome your May 20-22 visit to Singapore. 
 Singapore's leadership will be interested in your views on 
developments in Asia and the U.S. role in the region and can 
be counted on to provide thoughtful views on questions such 
as terrorism in Southeast Asia and the rise of China.  Your 
visit offers the opportunity to: 
 
-- send a public message throughout the region of the United 
States' commitment here; 
-- advance our counter-proliferation and law enforcement 
objectives; and 
-- raise concerns about Singapore's democratic process. 
 
Strategic Partners, not Allies 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Our excellent relationship with Singapore is founded 
on a convergence of views on key strategic issues and 
substantial trade and investment ties.  Singapore views a 
strong U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic presence in 
the region as essential to regional peace and prosperity. 
Singapore is a valuable logistics hub for U.S. forces and 
seeks greater interoperability with us, highlighted by its 
selection late last year of the F-15SG for its Next 
Generation Fighter.  Singapore consistently has supported 
Coalition forces in Iraq and the GOS has indicated it will 
provide trainers for the Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI).  To preserve its autonomy and credibility with its 
neighbors, however, Singapore limits its closeness to us.  It 
specifically does not want to be a treaty ally; our military 
leases facilities from the GOS -- there are no U.S. "bases" 
on the island. 
 
Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Law Enforcement 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3. (SBU) Singapore is a reliable and highly capable partner 
in the Global War on Terrorism.  In 2001, the GOS uncovered a 
plot by Jemaah Islamiya to bomb targets in Singapore, 
including this mission.  The GOS continues to view Singapore 
as a high-profile terrorist target and the GOS regularly 
warns its citizens that a terrorist attack is inevitable. 
Singapore's leaders are concerned about the growth of radical 
Islam in Southeast Asia and the long-term threat to secular 
authority. 
 
4. (SBU) Singapore is an active member in 
counterproliferation programs such as the Proliferation 
Security Initiative and the Container Security Initiative and 
is working with Malaysia and Indonesia to enhance maritime 
security in the Strait of Malacca.  We have been working with 
Singapore -- a major transshipment hub -- to bring its export 
controls up to world class standards.  As an IAEA board 
member, Singapore has supported our efforts to press Iran to 
abandon its nuclear ambitions. 
 
5. (SBU) Law enforcement cooperation is good, but could be 
much better.  We want to conclude a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (MLAT) to raise our cooperation to a level 
commensurate with our close ties and Singapore's status as a 
highly-developed economy and important financial center. 
Singapore is willing to share information quietly through 
intelligence channels, but is much less forthcoming through 
law enforcement channels. 
 
Regional Issues 
--------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Singapore views the Taiwan Strait and the Korean 
Peninsula as the most serious potential flash points in East 
Asia.  GOS leaders still worry that perceived Taiwan moves 
toward independence could spark a conflict with China.  While 
less directly affected by the Korean Peninsula, Singaporean 
leaders will welcome your insights on the Six Party Talks and 
other ways we are trying to modify North Korean behavior. 
This offers an opportunity to highlight the importance of our 
non-proliferation objectives and our efforts to check the 
North Korean government's criminal behavior. 
 
7. (SBU) Singapore encourages outside powers to take an 
interest in Southeast Asia.  It seeks to improve its 
 
SINGAPORE 00001567  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
bilateral and ASEAN's relations with rising powers India and 
China.  Singapore is increasingly frustrated with Burma and 
its negative impact on ASEAN's relations with us and the EU, 
but the GOS will not take any strong action against the 
junta.  The GOS frequently urges us to engage more with 
Indonesia and welcomes our renewed military relationship 
there. 
 
Domestic Politics 
----------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The ruling People's Action Party (PAP) won another 
landslide victory in the May 6 parliamentary elections 
(Reftel).  Most Singaporeans value the peace and prosperity 
the PAP has delivered since the 1950's and it would have won 
handily even without employing its usual hardball tactics to 
cripple the opposition.  With Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew 
clearly in the lead in this regard, however, the PAP 
threatened perennial opponent Dr. Chee Soon Juan and his 
Singapore Democratic Party with another defamation suit and 
harassed a Workers' Party candidate on trivial grounds, 
following up its blast of campaign-period criticism with a 
"criminal" investigation that ended with a warning to the 
defeated oppositionist.  During and after the election, many 
Singaporeans, even among the elite, were visibly 
uncomfortable with the PAP's rough -- and unnecessary -- 
electoral tactics.  Your visit offers the opportunity to 
reinforce our interest in Singapore's continued success, 
which will require lifting constraints on expression and 
allowing the full participation of citizens in the political 
process. 
HERBOLD