Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06SEOUL1789, ROK GENERALLY UPBEAT ON STRONGER TIES WITH NATO,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SEOUL1789.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SEOUL1789 2006-05-26 08:10 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1789/01 1460810
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260810Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8151
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0700
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 8198
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7325
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0775
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0450
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0181
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
CIA FOR HAGEN, NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS AS JA NZ KN KS
SUBJECT: ROK GENERALLY UPBEAT ON STRONGER TIES WITH NATO, 
BUT SENSITIVE TO DPRK'S PERCEPTION 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun.  Reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) According to officials from South Korea's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), the ROK was generally 
positive toward strengthened cooperation with NATO and eager 
to participate in global efforts to maintain peace and 
stability.  The underlying concern for Seoul in assessing 
areas for cooperation with NATO was whether North Korea would 
react negatively to stronger NATO-ROK ties.  Hence, South 
Korea would decide on NATO issues on a case-by-case basis. 
"Horizontal" cooperation with fellow U.S. allies in East Asia 
(Australia, Japan, New Zealand) was predicated on whether 
doing so was consistent with the U.S.-ROK alliance and the 
state of Korea's bilateral relations with those countries. 
(COMMENT: We believe our contacts' views on future NATO-ROK 
cooperation are fully consistent with the ROK's history of 
approaching multilateral security arrangements, and that 
South Korea will cooperate with NATO in most areas except 
those that directly involve the DPRK.  END SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT.) 
 
2.  (C) Poloff met on May 25 with Kang Jeong-sik, Director, 
Security Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MOFAT), and Assistant Director Nam Ki-wook, Security 
Policy Division, to discuss the ROKG's position on its 
relations with NATO.  According to Kang, South Korea 
generally supported stronger relations between NATO and East 
Asian countries, recognizing that NATO would naturally become 
more interested in regions outside Europe in the post-Cold 
War environment.  As demonstrated by Foreign Minister Ban 
Ki-moon's December visit to NATO headquarters, Seoul was 
ready -- in the global context -- to cooperate with NATO to 
help maintain peace and stability at "any time and any 
place." 
 
DPRK'S SUSPICION TOWARD ROK-NATO THE BIGGEST CONCERN 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3.  (C) For South Korea, having a bigger role in maintaining 
global security commensurate with its current economic and 
military prowess was, by itself, a positive incentive for 
strengthening its ties with NATO, said Kang.  The concern for 
Seoul, he noted, was that many East Asian countries -- 
particularly the DPRK -- continued to have Cold War-era 
prejudices against multilateral security arrangements and 
would regard overt diplomatic outreach by NATO as part of a 
broader conspiracy for containment.  As a matter of policy, 
Seoul had to consider carefully whether increased cooperation 
with NATO would drive Pyongyang further away from 
reconciliation with South Korea and opening itself to the 
outside world.  The ROKG would, therefore, approach its 
relations with NATO in a way that would neither arouse 
suspicion from Pyongyang nor complicate other sensitivities 
in the region.  Kang declined to speculate on the extent to 
which the ROK was willing to expand cooperation with NATO 
without first knowing NATO's own ideas.  Seoul would, 
however, cooperate in such areas as peacekeeping in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, natural disasters, et cetera. 
 
ROK MORE UPBEAT ON GLOBAL COOP THAN ON BILATERAL/REGIONAL 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
4.  (C) On the issue of whether the ROK would cooperate with 
Australia, Japan, and New Zealand on NATO initiatives, Kang 
said South Korea's cooperation with those countries depended 
largely on whether doing so was consistent with the U.S.-ROK 
alliance, and whether Korea's bilateral relations with those 
countries made it awkward to have "horizontal" cooperation. 
Citing the current difficulties in the ROK-Japan bilateral 
relationship, Kang said it was unrealistic to expect Seoul 
and Tokyo to engage in any NATO-driven partnership involving 
only Korea and Japan.  If part of a global initiative, 
however, the ROK would have no problem cooperating with any 
of those countries, including Japan.  Kang predicted that a 
 
strengthened relationship between NATO and U.S. allies in 
East Asia would prompt a variety of reactions from Southeast 
Asian countries, ranging from resentment to suspicion.  The 
suspicion among Southeast Asian countries would not, however, 
measure up to that of China and North Korea. 
VERSHBOW