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Viewing cable 06SEOUL1643, AMERICAN ACADEMIC SKEPTICAL ABOUT KIM DAE-JUNG'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SEOUL1643 2006-05-17 00:06 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1643/01 1370006
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170006Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7933
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0658
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7309
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0737
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1222
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SEOUL 001643 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MNUC EAID KN KS
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC SKEPTICAL ABOUT KIM DAE-JUNG'S 
DPRK VISIT GIVEN NEGATIVE PORTRAYAL IN NORTH KOREAN MEDIA 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) In a May 12 meeting with poloff, Dr. Brian Myers, 
Professor of Korean Studies at Inje University, expressed 
skepticism that a June visit to North Korea by former 
President Kim Dae-jung would result in any substantial 
changes in the North's behavior or its return to the Six 
Party Talks.  On refugees, Myers asserted that U.S. 
acceptance of North Korean refugees would not affect regime 
stability in the North due to Pyongyang's view of the 
majority of refugees as "undesirables."  Based on testimony 
by refugees and other sources, Myers said the DPRK-PRC border 
appeared to be porous, and many North Koreans were able to 
bribe their way around domestic travel restrictions.  He 
charged that it would be disingenuous for Washington to 
criticize the ROK's policies on the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex (KIC) and other forms of inter-Korean economic 
cooperation after being cognizant of, and supporting the same 
policies, since the 1990s, even though the ROK's 
justification for them were flawed.  Myers thought Seoul's 
fears of Chinese dominance over North Korea were unfounded, 
given China's own problems, and noted that the DPRK's 
"military first" had lasted far beyond what was normal for 
most agitative propaganda.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) On May 12, poloff met with Brian Myers, Professor of 
Korean Studies, Inje University, to discuss general North 
Korean issues.  An occasional contributor to the Atlantic 
Monthly and the New York Times, Myers teaches courses on 
North Korean propaganda, media, and culture.  His work on 
North Korea focuses on studying Pyongyang's ideology and 
worldview through analysis of its internal propaganda.  An 
American, Myers received his Ph.D. in Korean Studies from the 
University of Tuebingen in Germany, and his M.A. in Slavic 
Studies and Korean Studies from the Freie Universitaet 
Berlin, Ruhr University. 
 
DPRK'S PATHETIC PORTRAYAL OF KDJ, JUNE 2000 SUMMIT 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3.  (SBU) Myers stated that a June visit to North Korea by 
former President Kim Dae-jung was unlikely to result in any 
substantial changes in the North's behavior, given the 
negative depiction of both Kim and the June 2000 inter-Korean 
summit in North Korean popular culture.  Citing as example 
the North Korean book "Mannam" (encounter), a fictional work 
devoted largely to the June 2000 summit, Myers said North 
Koreans portrayed Kim Dae-jung as a frail old man who visited 
the DPRK intent on making the North renounce socialism, only 
to be outsmarted and outcharmed by Kim Jong-il.  Kim Jong-il, 
portrayed by the authors as having initiated "true" 
inter-Korean dialogue, subsequently duped Kim Dae-jung into 
accepting his demands for inter-Korean cooperation, resulting 
in an outpouring of South Korean support for the North Korean 
leader's vision of North-South relations that effectively 
prevented Kim Dae-jung from reneging on the June 15 
North-South Joint Declaration.  Such a portrayal of the 
principals of the June 2000 summit, said Myers, effectively 
demonstrated how the DPRK regarded former President Kim 
Dae-jung vis-a-vis Kim Jong-il. 
 
KDJ'S VISIT UNLIKELY TO RESULT IN CHANGE OR RETURN TO 6PT 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) Myers asserted that, absent monetary or other 
concessions from South Korea, the DPRK would have little to 
gain from Kim's visit.  The ROK, on the other hand, would 
find it difficult to bring anything to the DPRK in light of: 
(1) lingering negative sentiment among the South Korean 
public and the political right from revelations that Seoul 
had paid hard currency to Pyongyang in return for agreeing to 
the June 2000 summit; (2) Washington's aversion to outside 
money getting in the hands of North Koreans, as demonstrated 
by the recent financial actions against Banco Delta Asia 
(BDA); and (3) recent criticism by Special Envoy for North 
Korean Human Rights (SENK) Jay Lefkowitz that the ROK's and 
China's economic policies toward the DPRK helped prop up the 
Kim Jong-il regime.  This meant that "concessions" from the 
ROK would necessarily be less conspicuous than in the past. 
 
The North would likely make a pro forma attempt to portray 
itself as a reasonable party, agreeing to vague language in a 
joint statement indicating that it remained committed to 
denuclearization.  More importantly, Myers noted, the DPRK 
might announce it would return to the Six Party Talks, but 
its decision clearly would not be based on Kim Dae-jung's 
visit. 
 
ACCEPTING REFUGEES WON'T DESTABILIZE REGIME 
------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) On the issue of North Korean refugees, Myers said 
the acceptance of large numbers of North Korean refugees by 
the United States would not destabilize the Kim Jong-il 
regime.  Pyongyang would not care if a million refugees 
attempted to leave the DPRK, as the vast majority of those 
fleeing the DPRK were, from Pyongyang's perspective, 
"undesirables" to the regime; i.e., former political 
prisoners, criminals, and non-essential laborers from the 
outer fringes of North Korea.  In fact, added Myers, the 
regime might even be grateful to Washington for taking away 
"problem children who no longer needed to be fed."  He 
cautioned against taking information provided by North Korean 
refugees at face value, as many of them had realized that 
exaggerating or lying about their experiences often provided 
them with opportunities for speaking engagements with 
"certain interest groups."  Recalling a former refugee's 
lengthy discussion on the lack of freedom of movement in the 
DPRK at a recent academic conference, Myers pointed out that 
the same individual had also described his current activities 
in North Korea and how easy it was for him to move between 
the DPRK-PRC border. 
 
TRAVEL RESTRICTION EASY TO GET AROUND THROUGH BRIBERY 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The former refugee's credibility notwithstanding, 
Myers said many North Koreans appeared to be able to travel 
in and out of the DPRK at the Chinese border with relative 
ease.  Bribery involving hard currency was apparently so 
pervasive that North Koreans could get circumvent travel 
restrictions within the DPRK.  Since state scrutiny of 
bribery and corruption was heaviest at the top of the 
socio-economic pyramid, the DPRK's ruling elite might, 
someday, find itself isolated from the dynamic traffic of 
goods and cash across the Chinese border, while lower-ranking 
officials and ordinary citizens reaped the benefits, Myers 
predicted. 
 
ROK REASONING FOR KAESONG FLAWED 
-------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Myers argued that the ROKG's justification for the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) -- to expose more North 
Koreans to South Korean-style market economy in the hopes of 
stimulating the North to change its economic policies -- was 
unpersuasive.  The current arrangement for the KIC left open 
too many questions for the outside world, thus making it easy 
for critics to regard the project as a money funnel for the 
regime.  From Myers' perspective, it was clear that Seoul's 
primary purpose for inter-Korean economic engagement was to 
prevent a sudden, unwanted Korean reunification, which 
necessitated propping up the Kim Jong-il regime.  He also 
argued, however, that while objections from the United States 
were not problematic by themselves, it was disingenuous for 
Washington to raise them now, after it had known about, 
tolerated, and publicly supported the ROK's engagement policy 
since the 1990s. 
 
FEARS OF CHINESE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE IN DPRK MISPLACED 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
8.  (SBU) On the issue of South Korean fears of increasing 
Chinese economic influence in the DPRK, Myers dismissed the 
notion that China was intentionally, systematically sowing 
the seeds of eventual economic -- and perhaps political -- 
dominance over North Korea.  China had neither the frame of 
mind nor the wherewithal to form and implement such an 
ambitious strategy, as it was going through its own "identify 
crisis" of grappling with rapid economic development while 
 
maintaining its party-dominated socialist system.  Rather, 
Myers assessed, the South Korean concerns stemmed mainly from 
decades-old Korea-centric paranoia among South Korean 
conspiracy theorists who believed China wanted to take over 
the Korean Peninsula, using North Korea as a springboard. 
The truth, Myers argued, was that China wanted to deal less 
and less with both North Korea and the millions of ethnic 
Koreans in the Chinese northeast.  This fear among the South 
Koreans was, however, a useful tool for North Korea to 
exploit as it played the ROK off against the PRC, the same 
way that Pyongyang had played Beijing off against Moscow 
during the Cold War. 
 
MILITARY-FIRST POLICY'S SURPRISING LONGEVITY 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Myers said he was surprised that the DPRK had 
maintained its "military-first" policy in its official 
propaganda for so long, pointing out that agitative 
propaganda such as North Korea's, which vilified the United 
States as the main enemy, would normally lose its potency 
after a protracted period of time.  This was dangerous in 
terms of regime stability, Myers opined, because Kim Jong-il 
obviously could not go back to the propaganda tactic of 
presenting himself and his government as providers of 
necessities given the DPRK's current inability to provide for 
its citizens.  Myers argued that the regime was bound to 
collapse if the main focus of the "threat" to the DPRK 
disappeared.  In other words, because the DPRK regime's 
derived its legitimacy solely from protecting its citizens 
from American imperialism, its raison d'etre would disappear 
if USFK pulled out of South Korea. 
MINTON