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Viewing cable 06SANTIAGO1172, MEDIA REACTION - VENEZUELA'S UNSC CANDIDACY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SANTIAGO1172 2006-05-30 12:08 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Santiago
VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #1172/01 1501208
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301208Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9305
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1036
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0957
UNCLAS SANTIAGO 001172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IIP/G/WHA, INR/R/MR, WHA/BSC, WHA/PDA, INR/IAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO CI MX
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION - VENEZUELA'S UNSC CANDIDACY 
 
 
On May 28, La Tercera (conservative, independent, circ. 102,000) 
printed an article by political analyst Ascanio Cavallo entitled, 
"The List with which the White House Awaits the President." 
 
"For her visit to the U.S. President Michelle Bachelet has been 
invited to stay at Blair House, adjacent to the White House and will 
have a working lunch with President George Bush followed by a 
high-level reunion in the Oval Office.  Both are courtesies reserved 
for those the U.S. government considers illustrious guests and are 
thus considered signs of friendship.  But it is possible they will 
be the only ones, and depending on the evolution of the bilateral 
dialogue, may become the final ones... 
 
The State Department looked askance at Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez' affectionate gestures and jokes with President Bachelet 
(which they evaluated as an effort at public "patronization," a 
vitriolic observation for a government so dedicated to restoring the 
dignity of women).  And the State Department likes even less the 
policy of neutrality and silence that Bachelet announced concerning 
Chile's South American neighbors. 
 
The U.S. believes that Chile's success in terms of political and 
economic stability and openness to the world means Chile has a "soft 
power" it should actively employ as a stabilizing factor in the 
region. The fact that Santiago has expressly refused to do so 
signifies for Washington that "irresponsible" governments lack a 
counterbalance and that its own containment efforts become 
increasingly difficult. 
 
The Chilean Foreign Ministry apparently believed the explanation 
that Chile needed to be very prudent because it is situated between 
sensitive and unstable neighbors who are sometimes jealous of 
Chile's "success" would be easy to install in Washington, and that 
the U.S. was over dramatizing the Venezuelan theme. 
 
If that were the case, Foreign Minister Alejandro Foxley would have 
received the first surprise during his three April meetings with 
high-ranking officials, when he found that Venezuela has become the 
central theme on the U.S.-Chile bilateral agenda. 
 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dedicated an overwhelming 
 
SIPDIS 
majority of her meeting with Foxley to only one point: Venezuela's 
candidacy for the United Nations Security Council.  She 
differentiated the case from any other regional or multilateral 
decision to the point that she said that its singularity "pointed at 
the heart of U.S. interests." 
 
According to versions from the Foreign Ministry, Foxley attempted to 
explain that Chile had to consider its neighbors' opinions and that, 
in any case, Chile had as yet not made a decision (as Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay--which will vote for Venezuela--seem to have 
done, with the apparent objective of retaining the energy supply 
that Chavez provides). 
 
But the secretary of State was categorical: the U.S. "simply will 
not understand" a Chilean vote favoring Venezuela for the Security 
Council.  She added that if that were to occur, Chile could end up 
in a group of losers, against the sentiments of the U.S., Mexico, 
part of Central America and almost all of Europe. 
 
Rice referred to the decisions that the Security Council may have to 
take with respect to Iran and underscored the "provocative" 
friendship that Chavez has developed with Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad... 
 
The secretary of State did not even pay much attention to other 
topics on Foxley's list, such as Chile's favorable position toward 
the International Criminal Court, which for other countries has 
signified a restriction in U.S. military cooperation, and an area in 
which the U.S. could make an exception if Chile were declared a 
"non-NATO ally"... She also gave short shrift to (talk of) deepening 
the bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). 
 
The message was that the entire bilateral agenda would be easy if 
Chile did not vote for Venezuela and very difficult if it did. 
 
The meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick was much 
worse.  Zoellick openly displayed his skepticism with the prudence 
policy and with what he called--in a mildly ironic tone--the "naive 
idea" of South American solidarity. 
 
According to the senior official, Chile's silence (which some might 
interpret as a kind of "shame over its own success," he added) would 
ultimately distance Chile from the global actors with which it 
interacts, such as Asia and Europe while paying few dividends among 
neighbors that are more involved with their internal situations than 
with international diplomacy. 
 
Zoellick noted that, when he was the U.S. trade representative, he 
personally urged U.S. President George Bush to move forward on the 
FTA with Chile despite the fact that Chilean President Ricardo Lagos 
had recently announced Chile's negative vote on the invasion of 
Iraq.  Bush, with the support of some "hawks" in his administration, 
had decided to freeze the FTA and Zoellick intervened to illustrate 
that the damage to the hemisphere would be greater than the 
punishment to the Chilean government.  "This time (the Venezuela 
case) I would not do the same thing," Zoellick said to Foxley. 
 
The harshest portion of Zoellick's speech came when 
Foxley told him that the U.S. had to understand that 
Chile needed to evaluate its Security Council vote by 
looking at its immediate surroundings.  The deputy secretary of 
State replied that if that reflection led to a vote for Venezuela 
that the bilateral relationship would be "decisively damaged," that 
bestowing "non-NATO ally" status would be unviable and that the 
costs to Chile in terms of security and commercial exchange would be 
exceedingly high. 
 
Thus, the "broad bilateral agenda" the Chilean government has 
described to justify President Bachelet's trip could be 
circumscribed to one point: the ambiguity La Moneda wants to confer 
upon its relationship with Chavez, to preserve both its autonomy and 
its regional ties.  As tends to occur, the polarization the two 
principal interested parties--Washington and Caracas--are making 
that ambiguity increasingly tense. 
 
In the private lunch at the White House, Ministers Foxley and Andres 
Velasco will accompany President Bachelet.  Bush will be surrounded 
by Secretary Rice, Deputy Secretary Zoellick, Assistant Secretary 
for the Western Hemisphere Tom Shannon (who was in the 
Zoellick-Foxley meeting) and the National Security Council's 
Presidential Advisor Stephen Hadley, who also hosted Foxley in 
April. 
 
If those in attendance apply even half the pressure Foxley received 
during his preparatory visit it is a good bet that it will not be a 
peaceful lunch." 
 
In its May 29 edition, La Tercera published an article entitled, 
"Government Says it will Not Allow the U.S. to 
Pressure It on the UN Vote" 
 
In the days before the first meeting between Presidents Michelle 
Bachelet and George Bush...Chilean government Spokesman Ricardo 
Lagos Weber said that La Moneda would not be pressured by the United 
States to distance itself from Venezuela, saying "Chile is an 
honorable country that will not allow itself to be pressured and a 
country that pursues diplomacy...  We are not about pressure.  We 
are about building consensus..." 
 
A month ago during his trip to Washington, Foreign Minister 
Alejandro Foxley received a direct message from Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick...who said 
that if Santiago were to support Caracas in the vote for a spot on 
the United Nations Security Council the costs to the relationship 
 
with the U.S. would be "exceedingly high."  For her part, Rice was 
unequivocal in signaling to Foxley that the U.S. government "simply 
would not understand" a Chilean vote in favor of Hugo Chavez' 
government. 
 
Chile's support in that vote, which will take place in October, is 
still undefined.  Nevertheless, Minister Lagos Weber signaled 
yesterday that the government "would always seek a consensus 
position within Latin America."  That could favor Venezuela, 
considering that various countries in the southern cone have the 
apparent objective of maintaining the energy supply that Chavez 
promises. 
 
Foreign Ministry sources admitted the Bush administration was 
concerned with Chavez' recent signs of closeness with Bachelet at 
the EU-Latin America Summit in Vienna... 
 
Legislators on the foreign relations committees of both houses 
shared the posture taken by La Moneda.  While Christian Democrat 
(DC) Senator Jorge Pizarro said that, "U.S. pressure should be of 
little importance to us," his National Renovation (RN) colleague 
Sergio Romero added that, "in international relations that type of 
threat is not used so it surprises me that a foreign minister would 
say such a thing." 
 
On the other hand, Party for Democracy (PPD) Deputy Jorge Tarud 
said, "It is natural that countries talk and seek support, thus if 
Rice asked for support for a candidate, that's fine, she has a right 
to do so; and Chile is within its rights not to respond." 
 
At the same time, the legislator added that in order to avoid future 
consequences for the U.S.-Chile relationship "a consensus candidate 
should be sought." Tarud also defended the secret nature of the vote 
since it is he noted, "to protect smaller nations from the pressure 
larger ones apply." 
 
Senator Romero did not share that opinion, saying, "Chile needs to 
clarify its position, because transparency is necessary in this 
area, as (the vote) should have been public at the time of the vote 
in the Commission of Human Rights" of the U.N. 
 
In any case, the RN parliamentarian maintained, "I find it hard to 
believe Chile would declare itself for Venezuela.  I think the more 
clear line of support is for Brazil, with whom we have a strong ties 
and a renewed alliance, as Foreign Minister Foxley has noted." 
KELLY