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Viewing cable 06PORTAUPRINCE867, PREVAL'S CHIEF FOREIGN POLICY FORECASTS PRAGMATISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PORTAUPRINCE867 2006-05-15 20:03 2011-06-01 14:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Port Au Prince
Appears in these articles:
http://www.haitiliberte.com
http://bit.ly/mDfYBE
http://bit.ly/mcuO3r
VZCZCXRO5189
RR RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #0867/01 1352003
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 152003Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3036
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1043
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0888
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0285
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC 0466
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0895
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 000867 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV HA
SUBJECT: PREVAL'S CHIEF FOREIGN POLICY FORECASTS PRAGMATISM 
 
REF: PORT-AU-PRINCE 856 
 
Classified By: DCM Griffiths for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  Fritz Longchamp, Rene Garcia Preval's 
foreign policy advisor provided a circumspect review of the 
major foreign policy issues facing the new administration to 
Emboffs May 8.  Longchamp claimed that the Preval team had 
yet to focus on external relations and develop a foreign 
policy agenda.  Despite his initial reservation, he 
eventually noted particular significance of relations with 
Latin America and CARICOM, the PRC/Taiwan conundrum, and the 
need to re-organize the Foreign Ministry and diplomatic 
services.  Longchamp would not speculate on Preval's cabinet. 
 He was particularly ardent in disclaiming the likelihood of 
his assuming the role of Foreign Minister.  End Summary. 
 
Foreign Policy Specialist 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Longchamp is an experienced foreign policy 
specialist with extensive diplomatic credentials.  He served 
as Haiti's Ambassador to the UN 1991-1995, and as Foreign 
Minister 1995-2001, during Jean Bertrand Aristide's and 
Preval's first terms.  Longchamp told emboffs that despite 
Preval's recent international itinerary, a foreign 
relations/policy commission had not been formed to develop an 
international policy agenda.  Preval and his transition team 
have focused on the major domestic issues, recognizing that 
Preval will have a short honeymoon and must deliver 
improvements soon.  Longchamp cautioned not to expect "the 
same names" in Preval's new cabinet.  He seemed particularly 
adamant in reference to himself and a ministerial position, 
although he did say he would remain part of Preval's team as 
an advisor. 
 
DR 
-- 
 
3.  (C)  After overcoming his initial reticence to discuss an 
informal foreign policy agenda, Longchamp began his comments 
with the importance that Preval places on Haiti's relations 
with the Dominican Republic noting that Preval's first trip 
after his election was to the DR.  Haiti's future is 
inextricably linked to the DR and the historical, political 
and economic ties cannot be underestimated.  Preval's public 
comments, including his May 14 inaugural address to the 
nation, maintain Haiti-DR relations as a priority. 
 
Cuba and Venezuela 
------------------ 
 
4. (C)  On Cuba and Venezuela, he said Preval's relations 
with those two countries were practical and not ideological. 
Preval visited Cuba April 12-14 and Venezuela April 24-25. 
Cuba is a special case for Haiti, he said, due to the 
historical ties shared by the two countries.  Longchamp 
claimed that there were 1.5 million Cubans of Haitian descent 
in Cuba.  He contrasted the integration of that Cuban-Haitian 
 population with the lack of integration of Haitians in 
Dominican society, saying that he had met persons of Haitian 
descent throughout all social and political levels in Cuba. 
Diplomatic relations with Cuba were re-established during 
Longchamp's tenure as Foreign Minister.  In one of the last 
acts as President during his first term, in February 1996 
Jean Bertrand Aristide formally restored diplomatic relations 
with the neighboring island nation broken off in 1962.  Two 
years later, Longchamp personally opened the Haitian Embassy 
in Havana. 
 
5.  (C)  Cuban assistance in the health field has particular 
resonance in Haiti.  The doctors Cuba sends to provide basic 
health care in both urban and rural areas enjoy almost mythic 
status among the Haitian population.  Longchamp commented 
that during his trip to Cuba in April, Preval discussed with 
Cuban officials the expansion of the health assistance 
program to provide a doctor in each commune in Haiti. 
Additionally, the assistance program will also provide 
medical training opportunities for Haitians to study medicine 
in Cuba in order to return to Haiti and eventually replace 
the Cuban doctors. 
 
 
PORT AU PR 00000867  002 OF 002 
 
 
6.  (C)  Haiti's power generation capacity is hobbled by 
corruption and mismanagement of Haiti's National Electricity 
Company (EDH) resulting in an inability to provide more than 
a few hours of electricity per day.  Often, neighborhoods, 
poor and wealthy alike, go several days without electricity. 
Preval views Haiti's May 14 accession to Chavez' Petrocaribe 
(reftel) as a deal too good to pass up that offers him the 
chance to answer one of Haiti's most crucial needs almost 
immediately. In addition to Longchamp's claim of 
practicality versus ideology, Préval has publicly claimed his 
ties to both Venezuela and Cuba are a result of necessity, 
not related to ideology.

Taiwan and the PRC 
------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  In comments that seemed to weigh the most heavily on 
him, Longchamp said that very difficult decisions were ahead 
for the Preval foreign policy team with respect to relations 
with the PRC and Taiwan.  Taiwan's active diplomacy is 
readily apparent throughout the Port-au-Prince area. 
Additionally, Preval himself has close links to Taiwan, 
including campaign contributions and funding for the planting 
of the argronomist's favorite bamboo trees throughout his 
hometown of Marmelade.  (Comment:  China's Security Council 
position and its participation in MINUSTAH forces may trump 
Taiwan's relations with Haiti.  China's recent diplomatic 
maneuverings resulting in the demotion of the level of 
Taiwanese representation at the inauguration may be a 
foreshadowing of how this dilemma may play out.  End 
Comment.) 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Longchamp did not dismiss the importance of CARICOM 
but clearly there are some fences to be mended between Haiti 
and the organization.  Preval has publicly said that Haiti 
hopes to take its seat at the CARICOM table in July.  CARICOM 
officials have also said that they will welcome the 
constitutional Haitian government back into the fold. 
However, Haiti's level of engagement with CARICOM remains to 
be determined. 
 
9.  (C)  Longchamp gave a nod to the growing importance in 
Latin America of the "ABC" countries - Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile.  These three countries are especially important to 
Preval given Chilean Juan Gabriel Valdes' role as the UN 
SecGen's Special Representative in Haiti, Brazil's command of 
MINUSTAH forces, and Argentina's important MINUSTAH 
contingent. 
 
Downsizing and Re-organization 
------------------------------ 
 
10.  (C)  On a more technical and administrative note, 
Longchamp said that some difficult decisions are ahead with 
respect to the re-organization of the Foreign Ministry and 
diplomatic service.  He contended that two-thirds of the 
Foreign Ministry positions would have to be phased out.  He 
said that due to costs, positions at the Ministry and 
particularly overseas would have to be rationalized according 
to the Preval administration's foreign policy priorities. 
 
11.  (C)  Comment:  Despite his hectic international travel 
itinerary since his election, Preval has not charted a 
defined foreign policy course.  Much will depend on who he 
names to the Foreign Minister post.  He clearly understands 
the importance and the necessity of continuing political and 
economic ties with the U.S., especially in light of pending 
preferential trade legislation.  Further, he must remain 
constructively engaged with the Dominican Republic.  Despite 
U.S. discomfort with his links to Cuba and Venezuela, Preval 
seems determined to mine those relationships for what he can 
obtain.  Longchamp is clearly Preval's foreign policy guru. 
However, his six years of previous service as Foreign 
Minister may have been enough for him.  End Comment. 
 
SANDERSON 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================