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Viewing cable 06PHNOMPENH818, U.K., AUSTRALIA HOST COUNTER-TERRORISM CONFERENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PHNOMPENH818 2006-05-02 09:47 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO0475
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0818 1220947
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 020947Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6557
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2207
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0380
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1418
RUEAHIC/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS PHNOM PENH 000818 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT AND EAP/MLS; GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL CB
SUBJECT: U.K., AUSTRALIA HOST COUNTER-TERRORISM CONFERENCE 
 
1.  (U) The U.K. and Australian governments sponsored a 
seminar on counter-terrorism for Cambodian government (RGC) 
officials April 27-28.  Intended to exchange information on 
strategies, arrangements and capabilities for meeting the 
terrorist threat in Cambodia, the seminar received high-level 
support from the RGC.  DPM/Minister of Interior Sar Kheng 
opened the seminar and PM Hun Sen closed it.  Virtually the 
entire senior cadre of the Cambodian National Police 
attended, as did senior members of the government and 
military involved in CT work.  Officers and experts from the 
Australian Federal Police and U.K. CT Command led 
discussions.  Among the topics covered were the July 2005 
London bombings, lessons learned from Cambodia's 2005 Siem 
Reap hostage incident, the roles of police and military in CT 
and the planning of a CT exercise. 
 
2.  (U) DPM Sar Kheng's opening remarks stressed the numerous 
areas in which Cambodia needed to increase its capabilities, 
including the quality and effectiveness of law enforcement, 
passage of a comprehensive law on CT, financial management, 
and strengthening religious institutions so that they will be 
more resistant to outside influence.  He noted that while 
Cambodia has not figured as a terrorist target to date, it 
does not mean that Cambodia can afford to be complacent and 
not prepare in the event of an attack.  The DPM warned that 
terrorists use technology well and pay attention to 
information collection; terrorist operations are 
sophisticated in their planning and execution, and law 
enforcement must pay heed.  He ordered officers to attend all 
of the seminar sessions in order to derive maximum benefit. 
 
3.  (U) Scheduled to speak for 30 minutes, PM Hun Sen broke 
from his text to address attendees for one and half hours. 
Noting that he had personally drafted Cambodia's strategic CT 
plan, Hun Sen stressed the importance of not underestimating 
terrorists' capabilities.  He commented that it was necessary 
to draft planning documents and protect potential targets. 
Bemoaning the fact that terrorists can learn of government 
operations from the media and adjust their plans accordingly, 
he stressed the importance of intelligence collection.  He 
went on at length about the successes of the armed forces of 
the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) against the Khmer 
Rouge and non-Communist resistance in the 1980's, often 
calling out to members of Qe audience who had served as 
colleagues in that war.  He took particular pride in the 
disinformation fed to FUNCINPEC through a double agent and 
claimed that the PRK had infiltrated all of the main 
resistance bases, including Site B (FUNCINPEC), Site 2 
(KPNLF), and Site 8 (Khmer Rouge). 
 
4.  (SBU) Comment:  As Australian Ambassador Lisa Filipetto 
noted in her closing remarks, the seminar was useful in 
establishing links among the CT organizations of Australia, 
the U.K. and Cambodia.  It demonstrated also the strong need 
for RGC capacity-building and trust/cooperation between 
police and military officials involved in CT issues.  The 
presentations by the UK police investigator in charge of the 
July 2005 London bombings and the Cambodian MOI on the Siem 
Reap hostage were in stark contrast to one another.  Douglas 
McKenna outlined the strong cooperation within the UK 
government and among European counterparts in addressing the 
London bombings, and frankly explained what worked well and 
what areas of improvement remained.  The Cambodian Ministry 
of Interior official showed a carefully edited film of the 
Siem Reap incident that had removed any reference to the 
Cambodian military and only showed the police.  In addition, 
he offered no lessons learned and no comment on how the 
operation could have proceeded more effectively.  Western 
officials in attendance agreed that their Cambodian 
counterparts would need continued exercises and step-by-step 
operational training for some time to come.  End Comment. 
STORELLA