Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06NDJAMENA747, EQUIVOCAL MESSAGES ON DARFUR PEACE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06NDJAMENA747.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NDJAMENA747 2006-05-25 13:45 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO7808
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0747/01 1451345
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251345Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3812
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000747 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: EQUIVOCAL MESSAGES ON DARFUR PEACE 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary. Key Darfur interlocutors in N'djamena 
explained their reasons for dissatisfaction with the recently 
signed Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in meetings with 
Ambassador Wall May 24 and 25.  JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim 
poured venom on SLM leader Minni Minawi, whom he described as 
"dead to the people of Darfur."  He claimed that his own 
popularity was rising with Darfurians as a result of not 
having signed the Darfur Peace Agreement.   For his part, 
"first half-brother" Daoussa Deby said that unless Darfur 
could be placed under a UN mandate, the DPA was not the 
answer to Darfur's problems.  Daoussa reaffirmed that 
President Deby has asked all parties to sign the DPA and that 
JEM leader Khalil would have no reason to be in N'djamena 
after the 31st. In a meeting with SLM breakaway members Dr. 
Sharif Harir and Adam Shogar, Sharif and Shogar said that 
Minni's self-appointed role as "policeman for Darfur" had 
alienated Darfurians and that his support was rapidly 
diminishing.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Ambassador and DCM (notetaker) met with Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) President Khali Ibrahim, President 
Deby's brother Daoussa Deby and with SLM leaders Sharif Harir 
and Adam Shogar on May 24 and 25 in N'djamena to discuss the 
DPA and conflicting reports of inter-SLM clashes in Birzamma, 
Sudan on May 24 (discussed septel). 
 
3.  (SBU)  Meeting with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, Ambassador 
Wall stressed that it was in JEM's interest to sign the DPA. 
It might not be perfect, but it provided a basis for 
security, compensation and representation.  Without an 
agreement, there would be no peace, and the people of Darfur 
would suffer. He encouraged Khalil to consider the fact that 
the DPA was only the beginning of the process.  The United 
States was serious about ensuring its success; we would work 
with all of those parties that wished to make it work.  The 
agreement itself was not the end of the process; putting it 
in place was the process by which Darfur leaders would have a 
chance to make a difference.  Parties that didn't play the 
game would be marginalized. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Khalil countered that the majority of Darfurians 
did not support the peace agreement.  Darfur had a distinct 
historical and cultural identity.  This identity needed to be 
recognized, and Darfurians needed to fully control their 
destiny.  Khalil explained that now, more than ever he 
realized that he had made the right decision in refusing to 
sign.  He noted that Abdel Wahid's popularity "had soared" 
after his refusal.  Minni Minawi had only signed because he 
was "finished on the ground."  Minni, in fact, had accepted a 
proposal from Khartoum that was only a "first draft" that was 
very far from Khartoum's bottom line.  The Government of 
Sudan, in fact, couldn't believe its good fortune that the 
agreement had been accepted.  Minni, according to Khalil, was 
now "dead" to the people of Darfur.  Those who had gained the 
confidence of the international community, had lost the 
confidence of their people.  The reverse was also true. 
Khalil reported that tribal leaders were spontaneously coming 
to him and telling him that he was right not to sign. 
 
5.  (SBU) Turning to the details of the agreement, Khalil 
explained that a referendum would never work in Darfur. The 
results would be manipulated by Khartoum.  On the question of 
disarming the janjaweed, the Darfurians knew that the 
Government of Sudan (GOS) would never disarm them.  And then 
there was the question of compensation. Darfurians wanted 
compensation for their burned huts and other losses.  The DPA 
was not the bible -- clearly it could be amended if 
necessary.  Asked why he had not sought these amendments 
during the negotiations, Khalil responded that he had -- but 
they had not been accepted.  On relations with Chad, Khalil 
stated that they were "normal."  He reiterated that President 
Deby had told him to sign.  However, he also expected 
President Deby to "kick him out" and he was "ready to be 
kicked out." 
 
6.  (SBU) Khalil expressed his disappointment that Minni had 
been favored because international partners thought that only 
Minni could maintain security.  But just looking at 
"security" would not solve the problems of Darfur -- the root 
causes of Darfur's economic, social and political root crisis 
needed to be examined as well.  Minni may have been powerful 
once, but other groups would be powerful in the future. 
Minni might have troops on the ground, but JEM was 
"politically smart." People had faith that JEM would do the 
right thing.  And finally, Minni was only a "self-declared" 
leader -- he had never even been to Khartoum. No one believes 
in Minni, and he had cheated the other movements. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Looking ahead, Khalil stated that "many things 
would change -- and change fast" as Darfurians realized that 
the DPA was not in their best interests.   President Deby was 
also encouraging him to sign -- but signing, according to 
 
NDJAMENA 00000747  002 OF 002 
 
 
Khalil, would be suicide.  JEM's first priority was to make 
amendments - achieve Darfur as a single region, and have a 
Vice President.  He explained why the current arrangements in 
the DPA were not satisfactory.  The Senior Assistant position 
was not a real job -- and if Darfur was not a region, there 
was no way that Darfurians could control the territory and 
ensure security. 
 
8.  (SBU)  As far as options, Khalil was ambivalent on 
whether they could stand by and watch and "be observers."  He 
opined that much depended on what happened on May 31st. 
Khalil stated that he was waiting to see what the AU Peace 
and Security Commission would decide.  Would the treaty truly 
close on the 31st?  Would amendments be offered?  Khalil 
asked the United States to help the JEM sign by agreeing to 
amendments. 
 
9.  (SBU)  Khalil was interested to know whether the United 
States would then consider JEM an "illegitimate group" after 
May 31st.  Asked point blank by the Ambassador whether JEM 
would fight, Khalil responded "If I don't have anything -- 
what do you advise me?" Asked whether he would fight Minni, 
Khalil stated "I will never attack Minni -- unless Minni 
attacks me -- then I must fight in self-defense."  Ambassador 
Wall asked that Khalil at least not be a "spoiler."  Khalil 
took umbrage at this, saying that one could not call a 
legitimate confrontation with the government spoiling. 
 
10.  (SBU) In a separate meeting, Daoussa Deby (half-brother 
to the President) said that Chad's position vis-a-vis Sudan 
was clear.  They did not consider the GOS to be serious in 
its approach to peace.  Abuja was not the answer -- Darfur's 
problems would not be solved by the DPA.  According to 
Daoussa Darfur needed to be placed under a UN mandate and 
with UN-held elections.  That being said, President Deby had 
indeed told the rebel movements to sign. Daoussa vehemently 
denied that the GOC was assisting the non-signatory rebel 
movements. 
 
11.  (SBU)  Daoussa said that that he thought that Minni was 
sincere, but the Government of Sudan was certainly not; it 
would try to occupy as much land as possible before the 
arrival of the UN force.   The DPA could be seen as a minimum 
step, but already it was dividing the rebel movements as they 
jockeyed for posts.  Minni needed to understand that he could 
not militarily defeat the other rebels -- if he continued to 
act in this way, the situation would be radicalized quickly. 
In closing, Ambassador Wall emphasized that the United States 
was very serious about supporting the process; we will 
support those who  sign.  There will be consequence for those 
who do not sign. 
 
12.  (SBU)  SLM breakaway members Adam Shogar and Dr. Sharif 
Harir called Minni an obstacle to peace who had developed an 
inflated notion of his self-worth during the negotiations and 
who was surrounded by paid agents of the Sudanese 
intelligence chief.  They argued that a debate was necessary 
on the DPA -- something as important as peace in Darfur 
required a serious give and take.  They said that they would 
never recognize the agreement in its current form as it went 
against the will of the Darfur people.  They did not advocate 
violence, but at the same time could not accept aggression by 
other movements.  They criticized Minni's "assumption of 
responsibility" for peace and security in Darfur  and 
complained that he had threatened to kill all those who 
didn't agree with the DPA.  Dr. Sharif told the Ambassador 
that "someone needs to tell Minni that he is not the police 
of the region."  Meanwhile, they believed that his support on 
the ground was diminishing every day.  Like Khalil, they 
stated that they were not encouraging opponents of the peace 
agreement to fight, but that if threatened, they would defend 
themselves. 
 
WALL