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Viewing cable 06NDJAMENA646, CHAD-BASED SLM LEADERS URGED TO SUPPORT PEACE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NDJAMENA646 2006-05-05 14:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO5650
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0646/01 1251423
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051423Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3688
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000646 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ABUJA FOR DARFUR PEACE TALKS DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU
SUBJECT: CHAD-BASED SLM LEADERS URGED TO SUPPORT PEACE 
PROCESS 
 
REF: N'DJAMENA 618 FITZGIBBON/WALL TELCON AND EMAIL 
 
     5/4/2006 
 
1.  (SBU) In a meeting May 5 with Chad-based SLM leaders Dr. 
Sharif Hariri and Adam Shogar, the Ambassador urged them to 
help keep the peace process on track -- and at a minimum, not 
undermine it.  Shogar and Hariri responded that they had been 
sidelined by the African Union, but were not obstructing the 
process.  They returned to the objections raised in reftel, 
stressing, in particular, that the Senior Special Assistant 
to the President (SSA) needed to be established in the 
Constitution.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Ambassador Wall met with SLM leader Dr. Sharif 
Hariri and spokesman Adam Shogar May 5 to discuss the ongoing 
efforts in Abuja to bring peace to Darfur.  Pol/Econ and DCM 
(notetaker) attended.  The Ambassador stated that the United 
States was very serious about concluding a peace agreement 
and determined to see it happen.  To this end, we had sent 
very high level U.S. Government representatives to Abuja. 
The Ambassador urged Hariri and Shogar to help keep the peace 
process on track, and at the very least, not undermine it. 
He noted that the United States had worked to make the SSA a 
serious, responsible position; that after three years 
Darfurians would be able to vote in a referendum on making 
Darfur a region.  Most importantly, the Peace Agreement would 
open up a political arena for Darfur leaders to have a 
political role in Darfur. 
 
3.  (SBU) Dr. Hariri said that his people had been sidelined 
for too long in Abuja.  For the agreement to be a success, 
they needed to be part of the process.  However, they did not 
seek to undermine the process.  That was why, in fact, they 
were keeping their distance.  He explained that dissent was 
important -- it helped illuminate the pitfalls and problems. 
He stressed again that they did not seek to undermine the 
process.  However, Abuja excluded a large number of 
Darfurians in the field.  If they were not part of the 
process, they would ignore the results.  He expressed deep 
appreciation for U.S. efforts, but noted that there were 
certain essential conditions that needed to be met.  First of 
all, the SSA, to have authority, must be recognized in the 
constitution.  "To have power in Sudan, it has to be anchored 
in the constitution" he stressed. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Concerning integration of forces, Dr. Hariri 
stated that this would require them to abandon the only means 
they had to resolve the situation.  The Movement's armies in 
the field were bigger than people realized -- bigger in fact 
than the national army.  They would need a standing army for 
at least three to four years. He noted that compensation was 
a major issue as well: if it took USD 2 billion, then it 
should be paid.  When Ambassador Wall mentioned that there 
was a donor's conference tentatively scheduled, Hariri was 
dismissive.  The problem with Africa, he stated, was that 
donors paid for everything, and African leaders got to do 
what they wanted. 
 
5. (SBU)  Spokesman Shogar brought up the question of 
janjaweed disarmament.  He noted that although the Government 
of Sudan was already committed to disarming them, they had 
not done so. Furthermore, the proposed Peace Agreement 
referred to 8,000 Government of Sudan soldiers, but these 
weren't soldiers, he explained, they were just militia or 
public defense forces.  The Movements could never join their 
soldiers to these forces.  He called the proposed referendum 
on Darfur a "trick."  The regions had been created by decree 
-- why was there a need now to have a referendum? 
 
6. (SBU)  Ambassador Wall concluded by asking Shogar and 
Hariri to recognize how hard the United States was working to 
achieve a just peace in Darfur and to carefully consider the 
points he had raised.  He highlighted the sustained 
commitment from the United States to achieving progress in 
Abuja.  He expressed hope that the SLM would find ways to 
support that process and engage positively.  Find ways to get 
to Abuja, he urged, and help us reach a good agreement. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Dr. Hariri responded that they could not go to 
Abuja, because the African Union (AU) had set preconditions. 
Salim Salim had said that he needed "guarantees".  Shogar 
added that they had asked the AU to let them come to the 
talks with a mandate, but the AU had never recognized them. 
As a result, "weak leadership by the AU has led us to the 
current situation."  Dr, Hariri reiterated that they were not 
obstructing the talks, nor were they advocating cutting off 
the process.  They expected the deadline to be extended, and 
they would keep talking. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000646  002 OF 002 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
8.  (SBU) The SLM representatives welcomed this exchange, 
though they were hardly responsive to our message.  They did 
not hide their dissatisfaction with the AU, but recognized 
the important role the U.S. has played and continues to play 
in the Darfur peace process.  End Comment. 
WALL