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Viewing cable 06MONTEVIDEO448, GOU CRITICAL OF MERCOSUR BUT STILL INTENDS TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MONTEVIDEO448 2006-05-19 14:00 2011-07-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Montevideo
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMN #0448/01 1391400
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191400Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5785
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0405
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2851
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
,C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND EB/TPP 
DEPT PASS USTR 
NSC FOR CRONIN 
TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DOUGLASS 
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/WBASTIAN 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016 
TAGS: ETRD ECON PREL UY
SUBJECT: GOU CRITICAL OF MERCOSUR BUT STILL INTENDS TO 
REMAIN MEMBER AND NEGOTIATE WAIVER FOR FTA WITH U.S. 
 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires James D. Nealon 
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Harsh criticism of Mercosur continues 
unabated in Uruguay, fueled by a worsening dispute with 
Argentina, Brazil's distraction with regional events, and 
an increased marginalization of Mercosur's smaller members 
in the decision-making.  The trade bloc could tilt towards 
a more political entity if Mercosur accepts Venezuela's 
proposal to become a full member without having to adhere 
to the Common External Tariff (CET) and implement intra- 
zone free trade as pre-conditions.  For its part, the GOU 
is pushing Mexico's long-standing request for associate 
membership to balance out Brazil's influence. 
 
2.(C) Meanwhile, public discussion of a possible Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S. continues to be widely 
debated and support for the initiative is gathering strong 
momentum.  There is broad consensus that the best option 
is for Uruguay to negotiate a waiver with its Mercosur 
partners.  The Paraguayan and Argentine presidents have 
publicly stated they would agree to this waiver.  An 
unusual mea culpa from the Brazilian Foreign Minister 
about his country's lack of attention to Mercosur's 
smaller members may be a prelude to a similar gesture from 
Brazil.  President Vazquez recently stated that he wants 
Uruguay to open up to the world the way Chile has.  He 
plans over the next couple of years to start FTA 
negotiations with other major markets, such as the EU, 
China and India.  The following assessment is based on 
recent discussions with Mercosur Secretariat and 
GOU officials dealing with Mercosur issues.  End Summary. 
 
Continued criticism of Mercosur 
------------------------------- 

3. (U) Politicians, editorialists and business leaders 
continue to vent steady criticism about Mercosur's 
failures and to question its relevance for Uruguay. 
The widening debate was exacerbated lately by a 
worsening of the dispute with Argentina over pulp 
mills, Argentina's refusal to call a special meeting of 
Mercosur Common Council to address the issue, and 
Brazil's hands-off posture in the conflict.  Economy 
Minister Astori commented that Mercosur is undergoing 
its most severe crisis and is working ""against 
Uruguay's economic interests"".  Among the bloc's 
shortcomings, he highlighted the passage of the 
Argentine/Brazilian safeguard mechanism and Mercosur's 
failure to conclude trade agreements with any 
significant partners.  In an unusual move for Uruguay's 
traditionally quiet private sector, the four largest 
and most influential business chambers issued a joint 
statement very critical of the trade bloc. 
 
4. (C) The increasing marginalization of Uruguay by 
Mercosur's larger countries is taking a toll even within 
sectors traditionally favorable to regional integration, 
such as the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  MFA 
officials told us they are incensed by a proposal floated 
by Venezuela and allegedly supported by Brazil, which 
would grant it special treatment to facilitate its entry 
into Mercosur.  According to this proposal, to be outlined 
next week at a Mercosur meeting, Venezuela would not have 
to adhere to the Common External Tariff nor implement 
intra-zone free trade prior to admission, but would 
utilize an ALADI agreement (ACE #59) instead.  Venezuela 
would gain full membership by subscribing to the 
Declaration of Asuncion and a series of Mercosur norms. 
In the view of these officials, what they perceived as a 
blatant double-standard confirmed once more that 
Mercosur's obligations apply only to smaller members, 
while larger countries bend the rules at will for their 
own benefit (Note:  President Vazquez has repeatedly 
complained about a Mercosur with ""first-class"" and 
second-class"" members.  End Note.) 
 
5. (C) If Venezuela were to be admitted as a full member 
under these conditions, it could signal a trend towards a 
more political entity and a shift from an imperfect 
customs union to more of a political bloc.  Still, high- 
level officials at the Mercosur Secretariat doubted that 
the Venezuelan proposal would go very far and be approved 
by all members.  They saw it as a sign of the GOV's 
inexperience in international trade negotiations and were 
quite dismissive of the technical capacity of the 
Venezuelan delegations to Mercosur meetings: "They love to 
talk but are totally useless." 
 
6. (C) Mercosur did not put up a good show at the recent 
Latin American-European Summit in Vienna, as little or no 
progress on trade issues emerged from the Mercosur/EU 
talks.  The meeting was plagued by conflicts and tensions 
among several South American leaders.  The local press 
relayed the image of a deeply divided continent, split 
between ""serious"" governments and populists, in an 
encounter with EU governments more concerned about 
safeguarding their respective investments in Latin America 
than building up relationships.  As with other Mercosur 
trade negotiations, talks with the EU have historically 
been led and managed by the GOB.  According to GOU 
officials, part of the failure of these latest talks lay 
squarely with Brazil's current state of distraction with 
regional events (the nationalization of gas in Bolivia and 
Chavez's push for regional leadership) and its resulting 
lack of focus on Mercosur's trade issues. 
 
A Brazilian mea culpa 
--------------------- 

7. (U) On May 9, Brazil's Foreign Affairs Minister Celso 
Amorim reportedly admitted before his Senate's Foreign 
Affairs Commission that the GOB "has not done enough for 
Paraguay and Uruguay" and "especially for Uruguay that is 
now uncomfortable with Mercosur".  Calling for a more 
generous" policy towards its neighbors --one that 
includes credit and increased purchases of goods-- Amorim 
concluded that the GOB "has talked a lot but delivered 
little."  In an interview with the respected Uruguayan 
weekly Busqueda, President Lula's Special Advisor Marco 
Aurelio Garcia said that the possibility of Uruguay 
leaving Mercosur is a "fundamental concern" for President 
Lula.  It would be a "large loss" for the bloc and would 
signify a "resounding failure of Mercosur" in dealing with 
smaller partners. 
 
A growing lobby for bilateral trade agreements... 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

8. (U) The discontent in Uruguay with Mercosur has led to 
renewed calls for an opening to outside trade partners 
through bilateral trade agreements.  Astori, one of the 
most active proponents of an FTA with the U.S., stated 
that the GOU needs "more than ever, to improve its 
international position outside the region".  This vision 
is shared by the four major Uruguayan business chambers, 
which recently published a study entitled "Joint Position 
on the Convenience of Negotiating Trade Agreements with 
Extra-Zone Countries".  Vazquez has stated repeatedly that 
he wants Uruguay to open up to the outside world in the 
same way as Chile has done.  He has outlined plans to open 
negotiations over the next couple of years on an ambitious 
series of FTAs with other major markets besides the U.S., 
such as the EU (if Mercosur-EU talks continue to show no 
progress), China and India.  On May 19, Astori confirmed 
that initial contacts with the governments of China and 
India had been positive. 
 
...but a commitment to remain within Mercosur 
--------------------------------------------- 

9. (U) Still, despite strong repeated criticism of 
Mercosur, broad consensus remains that the GOU's first- 
best alternative for bilateral free trade talks is to 
negotiate a waiver from its Mercosur partners.  Astori 
openly rejected the idea of leaving Mercosur or turning 
into an associate partner, which he considered would be an 
extremely grave mistake".  As for Vazquez, he has 
maintained pressure through a barrage of criticism of 
Mercosur's weaknesses and failures, but has made clear 
that Uruguay's future remains within the trading bloc. 
We want a stronger and better Mercosur"", is his mantra. 
Following his trip to Mexico, Vazquez said that Uruguay 
would advocate for Mexico's long-standing request for 
associate membership into Mercosur as a counterweight to 
Brazil. 
 
Comment:  Good prospects of Mercosur waiver for FTAs 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 

10. (C) Vazquez's vision is that of an opening to the 
outside world, and Chile is clearly his model: "Uruguay is 
seen as a very serious and responsible country, as is 
Chile."  The GOU appears confident it will obtain the 
necessary waiver from its Mercosur partners to move 
forward with bilateral trade talks.  Initial signals are 
positive.  On May 10, Paraguayan President Duarte 
supported the GOU's initiative to negotiate a waiver and 
less than a week later, Argentine President Kirchner 
declared upon returning from Vienna that "one must be 
flexible (with Uruguay) and let them sign a free trade 
agreement with the U.S."  While Brazil's Lula has not yet 
opined on the matter, the signals from the Brazilian MFA 
about the importance of maintaining Uruguay within 
Mercosur may point the way to a positive reply.  End 
Comment. 
Nealon