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Viewing cable 06MONTEVIDEO418, VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MONTEVIDEO418 2006-05-11 15:01 2011-07-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Montevideo
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMN #0418/01 1311501
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111501Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5754
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY SANTIAGO 2848
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
,C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000418 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 	
 	
DEPT FOR WHA/AS SHANNON AND EB/AS WAYNE 	
DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, CROFT AND MURRAY 	
DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR 	
TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DOUGLAS 	
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC BASTIAN 	
NSC FOR FISK AND CRONIN 	
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 	
 	
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 	
TAGS: ETRD ECON PREL UY
SUBJECT: VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S.	 WORKING GROUPS FORMED 	
 	
 	
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James D. Nealon 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  President Vazquez appears to have wasted no 
time in pushing his trade agenda.  At the May 8 Cabinet 
meeting, he recounted the results of his ten-day trip to the 
U.S. and Mexico, and of his meeting with POTUS on May 4.  He 
advocated for expanded trade talks with the U.S., which he 
said could eventually lead to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 
His Cabinet strongly supported Vazquez in this endeavor, with 
11 ministers in favor and only two against (ForMin Gargano 
and Communist Minister for Social Development Arismendi). 
Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra, who had 
accompanied Vazquez on the trip, to get a first-hand account 
of the GOU's next steps.  Lepra confirmed the overwhelming 
Cabinet support and requested that we provide some 
information on specific benefits of trade agreements for 
public consumption.  He confirmed that the GOU was looking at 
its FTA with Mexico as a model to start talks (Note:  Post is 
translating this agreement for USTR.  End Note.)  He added 
that he would lead a committee of five ministers to oversee 
the trade talks, and he provided the names of the members of 
the technical negotiating team.  When reminded of the 
importance of a clear leader to head this technical team, 
Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call Economy 
Minister Astori.  After the conversation with Astori, he told 
Charge that they had decided upon EconMin Director of Trade 
Sarachaga as the team leader.  This would be confirmed after 
discussing the issue with Vazquez at the next Cabinet meeting 
on May 15.  It appears that Vazquez and his economic team 
have found more support for an FTA than they may have thought 
possible so early after their return and are capitalizing on 
the momentum.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On Monday May 8, shortly after his return, President 
Vazquez called a Cabinet meeting to inform his ministers 
about his ten-day trip to the U.S. and Mexico.  Vazquez is 
reported to have explained his vision of an increased trade 
relationship with the U.S., leading to a possible FTA by 
October.  According to Vice-President Novoa and Industry 
Minister Lepra, 11 out of 13 ministers expressed their 
support for Vazquez's vision, with only Foreign Minister 
Gargano (Socialist) and Social Development Minister Arismendi 
(Communist) dissenting.  According to the reports, Astori led 
a strong, well-founded defense of the advantages of an FTA, 
while Gargano threatened to resign if an FTA was ever signed 
with the U.S.  It appears that the level of support that 
Vazquez garnered in this first Cabinet meeting was stronger 
than expected.  On the public front, the left-leaning daily 
La Republica was unusually supportive, with overall favorable 
reporting under a headline claiming that "The Government 
pressed on the accelerator to make good on commercial 
agreement with the U.S."  A poll conducted by El Pais 
indicated a strong majority of public support for a trade 
agreement with the U.S. 
 
3. (C) Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra to 
get a better understanding of the GOU's plans and to 
coordinate actions.  Lepra was very upbeat about the trip and 
about the prospects for an FTA.  He relished in the increased 
isolation in which ForMin Gargano was finding himself.  Lepra 
and Charge agreed to coordinate public stance regarding the 
ongoing negotiations, to ensure that the Embassy not move 
ahead of President Vazquez.  Lepra confirmed that the model 
FTA that the GOU favored was the Uruguay-Mexico FTA, ""for 
political reasons"".  This agreement was supported by the 
entire political spectrum, he explained, and by Uruguay's 
Mercosur partners.  In addition, Lepra noted that the 
Uruguay-Mexico FTA, signed in 2004, is a third-generation 
agreement based on an improved NAFTA model.  Charge confirmed 
that post was in the process of translating this document so 
that USTR may compare it with our latest FTA.  Lepra then 
requested our assistance in providing him with information 
about our FTA with Vietnam, not because it is a particularly 
good FTA, he noted, but rather to counter opposition from the 
Communist Party.  "If Communist Vietnam, after fighting a 
brutal war against the U.S., can turn around and sign an 
FTA," he explained, "how can our Communists be against it?" 
Lepra also requested information on job creation, investment 
and poverty reduction brought about by FTAs, again for the 
GOU's campaign to build up public support.  Charge pledged to 
provide the information.  Post would appreciate any and all 
such information to be shared with the GOU. 
 
4. (C) Lepra said he would lead a political committee of five 
ministers (Industry, Economy, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs 
and Tourism), responsible for the trade talks.  He also had a 
technical negotiating team in mind, but was still unclear as 
to who would lead this team.  Charge noted the importance of 
a solid negotiating team, with clear lines of authority, 
given the short time frame in which negotiations were to be 
conducted.  Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call 
EconMin Astori, with whom he agreed to have EconMin Trade 
Director Sarachaga lead the negotiating team.  He and Astori 
would confirm their choice after the next Cabinet meeting on 
May 15, he said. 
 
5. (C) Comment:  Clearly, Vazquez has returned from the U.S. 
in a strengthened position to initiate trade talks and is 
making the best out of the momentum he has encountered.  The 
GOU appears to be keenly aware of the tight timeframe to 
negotiate an agreement and determined to make the most of 
this opportunity.  Embassy will continue to be the 
interagency coordinator" for the GOU to ensure that no time 
is lost due to lack of focus on organizational details.  End 
Comment. 
Nealon