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Viewing cable 06LIMA2146, LATEST APOYO POLLING INDICATES GARCIA'S LEAD OVER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA2146 2006-05-30 22:07 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #2146 1502207
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 302207Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0750
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3475
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9544
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY QUITO 0408
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0589
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6804
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4267
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS LIMA 002146 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: LATEST APOYO POLLING INDICATES GARCIA'S LEAD OVER 
HUMALA NARROWING TO FOUR POINTS WITH UNDER A WEEK TO GO 
 
REF: A. LIMA 2096 
 
     B. LIMA 1887 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
1.  (U)  SUMMARY:  According to a simulated secret vote 
carried out by the Apoyo consultancy, APRA's Alan Garcia's 
lead over Union por el Peru's (UPP) Ollanta Humala in the 
presidential race is down to four points (52-48 percent). 
Simultaneous polling based on face-to-face interviews found 
the difference to be 10 points (55-45 percent), which tends 
to confirm our suspicions that Humala has a large "hidden" 
vote that has not/not been reflected in the polls. 
Consequently, the outcome of the presidential elections 
remains uncertain as the campaign enters its final week.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U)  Apoyo carried out its simulated vote and poll from 
5/24-26 in 175 districts located in 77 different provinces 
nationwide.  Apoyo's surveys do not/not claim to represent 
approximately 19 percent of the population that lives in 
isolated rural areas. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The results of the simulated vote, in which 
eligible voters cast secret ballots, differed markedly from 
the responses to the normal face-to-face interviews in 
several respects: 
 
--  The percentage of blank/null/no response votes was only 
13 percent in the simulation, as opposed to 20 percent in the 
face-to-face poll, demonstrating that at least seven percent 
of respondents had determined who they will vote for, but 
were reluctant to identify their preferences to a pollster. 
 
--  In the face-to-face poll, Garcia posted a slim 51-49 
percent lead in Arequipa and the southern coast, an area in 
which he lost heavily to Humala in the 4/9 first round.  In 
the simulated vote, however, Humala trounced the APRA 
candidate by 56-44 percent (COMMENT:  a much more believable 
result given the first round figures - also see Ref B for our 
prior doubts about polling results from this region.  END 
COMMENT). 
 
--  In the simulated vote, Humala posted large leads in the 
central sierra (57-43 percent) and the Amazonian region 
(56-44 percent), whereas in the face-to-face poll Humala's 
advantage was just eight percent in the central sierra and 
Amazonian region.  (COMMENT:  Again, the simulated vote is 
more in line with first round voting patterns.  END COMMENT.) 
 
4.  (SBU)  Garcia's lead in the face-to-face poll fell from 
12 to 10 percent in the "valid vote" count (excluding 
blank/spoiled/no preference responses) over the past week. 
Nonetheless, he and his APRA followers can take heart from 
the poll's finding that his total support rose during this 
period, from 41 percent to 44 percent of those polled. 
Humala's total support also rose by three percent (from 33 to 
36 percent).  Consequently, the reduction in the level of 
Garcia's "valid vote" lead did not represent a gain in 
Humala's vote count, but rather reflected a roughly equal 
shift of formerly undecided voters to the two candidates that 
had a larger statistical impact on Humala's totals.  Garcia 
should also be pleased that 50 percent of respondents said 
that they "definitively would not" vote for Humala, while 40 
percent had a similar negative view of the APRA candidate (up 
from a questionable six percent last week - Ref A) . 
 
5.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  Apoyo's simulated vote tends to confirm 
our suspicions that there is a sizable "hidden" vote for 
Humala in his Arequipan, Andean and Amazonian strongholds, 
which has not/not been reflected in the normal face-to-face 
polls (some of which have Garcia ahead by nearly 20 points or 
more!).  Consequently, the presidential contest appears to 
remain tight going into the final days of campaigning. 
Garcia's chances of holding off Humala in the race to the 
wire are bolstered by Apoyo's finding that he is benefiting 
equally with Humala from the shift in undecided voters, as 
well as by the UPP candidate's continued higher negative 
rating.  END COMMENT. 
STRUBLE