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Viewing cable 06LIMA2096, LATEST (PRE-DEBATE) POLLS SHOW GARCIA MAINTAINING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA2096 2006-05-26 15:09 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #2096/01 1461509
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261509Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0699
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3444
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9506
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY QUITO 0379
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0560
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6775
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4264
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS LIMA 002096 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: LATEST (PRE-DEBATE) POLLS SHOW GARCIA MAINTAINING 
HIS LEAD OVER HUMALA 
 
REF: LIMA 2039 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  The most recent (albeit pre-presidential 
debate) nationwide polls by the Apoyo and DATUM organizations 
continue to show APRA candidate Alan Garcia holding a 12-14 
point lead over Union por el Peru's (UPP) Ollanta Humala. 
The polls differ on trends, however, with Apoyo reporting 
Humala slightly closing the gap between the two, while DATUM 
found that Garcia's vote totals are increasing at Humala's 
expense.  While most voters do not/not appear to be 
enthusiastic about either candidate, Apoyo concluded that 
many more would never vote for Humala (47 percent) than for 
Garcia (six percent).  The last published polls will be 
issued on 5/28, and it will be enlightening to see the extent 
to which voters' attitudes have been affected by the 5/21 
debate and subsequent campaigning.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U)  The Apoyo poll was conducted 5/17-19 in 175 
districts representing 81 percent of the population.  It 
found the following: 
 
--  Only 74 percent of those polled cast "valid votes," while 
16 percent cast blank/null ballots and 10 percent were 
undecided/did not respond. 
 
--  Out of the total number of those polled, Garcia received 
41 percent and Humala 33 percent of the votes. 
 
--  In terms of "valid votes" (those that will be counted by 
the electoral authorities), Garcia received 56 percent and 
Humala 44 percent. 
 
--  Garcia's total vote numbers have fallen steadily since 
Apoyo's 5/4 poll, when he received 44 percent, and 5/11 when 
he received 43 percent, while his "valid vote" totals have 
slipped less, from 57 percent on 5/4 to 56 percent on 5/11 
and in the latest poll. 
 
--  Humala's total vote numbers have also slipped (from 34 
percent on 5/4 and 5/11 to 33 percent now), but by less than 
Garcia's, while his "valid vote" total has risen from 43 
percent on 5/4, to 44 percent in the two latest surveys. 
 
--  Geographically, Garcia continues to score over 60 percent 
in Lima and on the northern coast, while winning in all other 
areas except Arequipa/southern coast (a tie), and the 
southern Altiplano and jungle regions, where Humala scored 63 
percent and 58 percent, respectively. 
 
--  With respect to economic classes, Garcia comes out on top 
in the A-D sectors (over 70 percent in the A-B groups, and 
over 50 percent in the C-D classes), with Humala taking only 
the poorest E sector (55-45 percent). 
 
--  Garcia also was the leader amongst both sexes, although 
his support was strongest amongst females (61-39 percent) 
than males (51-49 percent). 
 
--  As for age groups, Garcia held his widet lead among 
18-24 years olds (62-38 percent), with modest leads among 
25-39 year-olds (54-46 percent) and 40-70 year-olds (55-45 
percent). 
 
--  When asked who they thought would win the election, 63 
percent of respondents said Garcia while only 26 percent 
sided with Humala. 
 
--  When asked if they would "definitely" vote for their 
preferred candidate, 39 percent said they would do so for 
Garcia, while 31 percent had the same answer regarding Humala. 
 
--  When asked which candidate they would "definitely not 
vote for," only six percent said Garcia, while 47 percent 
said Humala. 
 
3.  (U)  The DATUM poll carried out 5/18-19 in areas 
representing 79.9 percent of the voting population, came up 
with the following results: 
 
--  82 percent of respondents cast "valid votes," with the 
other 18 percent submitting blank or spoiled ballots. 
 
--  Garcia won the "valid vote" contest by 57-43 percent. 
 
--  Garcia's "valid vote" totals have been increasing since 
4/19-21, when they totaled 54 percent, and 4/29-5/1 when they 
stood at 56 percent. 
 
--  Humala's "valid vote" totals have been falling during the 
same period, from 46 percent in the April poll to 44 percent 
in the April-May survey. 
 
4.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  Apoyo and DATUM's polling has found 
Garcia to hold a 12-14 point lead over Humala since the two 
were confirmed as second-round finalists.  Neither poll has 
shown significant shifts in support for either candidate, 
though the two differ on the slight trends they have 
detected, with Apoyo detecting a slight shift to Humala (due 
to his total support falling by less than Garcia's), while 
DATUM has seen Garcia inching up against his opponent. 
Perhaps the most telling statistic is Apoyo's finding that 
Garcia's absolute negatives have fallen to six percent (it 
was close to 50 percent a year ago), while 47 percent state 
that they "definitely will not vote" for Humala.  This 
indicates that the UPP candidate will have a difficult task 
in convincing voters to switch their votes to him during the 
last two weeks of the campaign.  The final published polls 
will be released on 5/28 (the Organic Law of Elections 
prohibits the domestic publication of polls during the week 
before election day) and will provide a snapshot as to how 
the voting public reacted to the 5/21 debate as the campaign 
heads into the home stretch.  END COMMENT. 
STRUBLE