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Viewing cable 06LIMA1799, APOYO POLL GIVES CLEAR SECOND ROUND LEAD TO ALAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA1799 2006-05-09 22:28 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1799/01 1292228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 092228Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0354
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3360
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 6721
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9417
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY 3314
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 0311
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0496
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4240
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS LIMA 001799 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PE
SUBJECT: APOYO POLL GIVES CLEAR SECOND ROUND LEAD TO ALAN 
GARCIA 
 
REF: A. LIMA 1719 
 
     B. LIMA 1681 
     C. LIMA 1653 
     D. LIMA 1637 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified, Please Handle Accordingly 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY.  A new poll by the Apoyo organization shows 
APRA's Alan Garcia ahead of UPP candidate Ollanta Humala by 
57 to 43 percent.  Regionally, Humala leads in the central 
and southern highlands and in the jungle, but Garcia is 
solidly ahead in the north and along the coast, and leads by 
a wide margin in Lima, 64 to 36 percent.  When eligible 
voters were asked in the same poll about their attitudes 
toward Presidents Chavez of Venezuela and Morales of Bolivia 
(who have associated themselves with Humala), both rated 
strong negative perceptions -- so far, Peruvians see these 
outside efforts to favor Humala as blatant interference in 
their country's internal politics.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------- 
GARCIA MOVES STEADILY AHEAD 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Apoyo, Peru's most prestigious public opinion polling 
institute, published on 5/7 the results of a nationwide poll 
it carried out the previous week among 2,000 eligible voters, 
 the first such study done by Apoyo since Ollanta Humala and 
Alan Garcia were certified as the candidates that would face 
each other in the second round of presidential voting. 
Garcia had a clear lead, by a margin of 57 to 43 percent. 
The poll was in line with two earlier surveys carried out by 
the Datum organization, which had shown Garcia leading 54 to 
46 percent in a study carried out 4/19-21, and widening his 
lead to 56-44 in a 4/29-5/1 poll.  In each case, the spread 
refers to the proportion of valid votes for each candidate. 
About 15 percent of voters say they will cast blank or 
spoiled votes for the second round on 6/4, and 7 to 8 percent 
say they have not yet made up their minds about who they will 
vote for. 
 
3. (U) Voter attitudes have shifted markedly since shortly 
before the first round -- a 4/2 Apoyo poll of a hypothetical 
second round between Humala and Garcia showed the former 
barely ahead, 51 to 49.  There has also been a significant 
migration in the important "rejection" index:  50 percent of 
those polled said they would "definitely" not vote for 
Humala, versus 37 percent for Garcia, close to the inverse of 
results early in the year.  Regionally, Garcia is solidly 
ahead in the north and along the coast, while Humala leads in 
the central and southern highlands and in the jungle.  Lima, 
with over a third of Peru's voters, favors Garcia by a 64-36 
margin. 
 
---------------------- 
NO TO OUTSIDE MEDDLING 
---------------------- 
 
4. (U) Voters were also asked about their attitudes toward 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Bolivian President Evo 
Morales, both of whom have associated themselves with the 
Humala campaign.  The negative to positive ratio for Chavez 
was 61 to 17 percent, while the same breakdown for Morales 
was 41 to 23 percent.  Opposition by Peruvians to Chavez and 
Morales has hardened over time.  In a similar Apoyo poll 
conducted in January, Chavez had a negative/positive ratio of 
55 to 25, and Morales a ratio of 20 to 23. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
5. (SBU) Given the traditional volatility of Peruvian 
politics, and the fact that the candidates have now agreed to 
a face-to-face debate, the mood of the electorate could still 
change prior to the final vote.  Garcia seemed to sense this 
in reacting to Apoyo's polling numbers, saying that APRA's 
own private surveys indicate a closer race, and calling on 
his supporters not to be crowing victory too early. 
Apparently hoping to provoke another Chavista outburst, 
Garcia also took the opportunity to once again criticize the 
policies of the Venezuelan President, stating that he seemed 
determined to destroy Venezuela's relationships with most 
other Latin nations, and align himself exclusively with Cuba 
and Bolivia. 
 
6. (SBU) The trend in public opinion since the presidential 
first round indicates that Peruvians are not inclined to seek 
radical solutions to the country's problems.  When a face-off 
between Garcia and Humala was merely a theoretical 
possibility a month ago, there was no clear preference for 
either.  Now that there is a forced choice between Garcia, 
who is tainted by his earlier presidency but clearly 
pro-democracy, and Humala, with his autocratic, anti-system 
proposals, Garcia has moved rapidly ahead.  Analysts here 
have also pointed out that Peruvians resent what they see as 
interference by Presidents Chavez and Morales by coming out 
so strongly in Humala's favor, actions which seem to have 
contributed directly to the latter's decline. 
STRUBLE