Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KUALALUMPUR809, THE MALAYSIA-NEW ZEALAND FTA TAKES A DETOUR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KUALALUMPUR809.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KUALALUMPUR809 2006-05-04 09:59 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kuala Lumpur
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKL #0809/01 1240959
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 040959Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6555
INFO RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0504
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 000809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR FOR B. WEISEL AND J. JENSEN 
USDOC FOR 4430/MAC/EAP/J. BAKER 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2016 
TAGS: ETRD EINV MY NZ
SUBJECT: THE MALAYSIA-NEW ZEALAND FTA TAKES A DETOUR 
 
REF: KUALA LUMPUR 0570 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Colin Helmer for reasons 1.5 B & D. 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  New Zealand negotiators made progress in 
some areas in their latest FTA round with Malaysia, but 
encountered Malaysian stonewalling and even backtracking in 
others.  Problem areas included services, government 
procurement, environment and labor.  An NZ High Commission 
officer said the poor results came as a disappointment, as 
both sides planned for it to be the concluding round.  NZ 
officials speculate that Minister Rafidah may have instructed 
Malaysian negotiators to take a tougher line following a 
rough session in parliament, where she was forced to defend 
the government's plan to negotiate an FTA with the U.S.  We 
caution against drawing too close a parallel between the New 
Zealand experience and our upcoming FTA negotiations, but we 
may see more Malaysian posturing than we previously 
anticipated.  End summary. 
 
Advancing to the "Red Lines" 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  New Zealand and Malaysian negotiators held what was 
supposed to be their final FTA round the week of April 24, 
but failed to conclude an agreement.  According to an NZ High 
Commission officer, negotiators managed to complete ad 
referendum text regarding rules of origin, customs, 
intellectual property, sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(SPS), economic cooperation, technical barriers to trade 
(TBT), and competition policy.  Text for the goods chapter is 
very near completion.  In other areas, however, Malaysian 
negotiators offered no flexibility and in some cases even 
backtracked on previous positions.  The NZ officer said 
Malaysian negotiators declared "red lines" so frequently that 
it became a joke within the New Zealand delegation that there 
would soon be a shortage of red ink in Malaysia. 
 
3.  (C)  In services, which New Zealand considers a key 
"offensive" area, Malaysian negotiators have been reluctant 
to accord most favored nation (MFN) status.  Malaysian 
officials insisted on a positive list approach and carved out 
all but a few areas that are not of interest to New Zealand. 
Malaysia's lead services negotiator only appeared for one of 
the five days of the round, leaving matters to less senior 
officers who proved unwilling to discuss alternatives. 
(Comment:  NZ negotiators wonder if her absence might have 
been intentional, as this Malaysian negotiator is known to be 
a "straight shooter."  We share their suspicion.) 
 
Backtracking to Nowhere 
----------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  The Malaysian team did not even bring a government 
procurement negotiator to the table this round, after having 
discussed procurement in previous rounds.  Similarly, 
Malaysia's lead negotiator announced that environment and 
labor could not be part of the agreement, after having 
negotiated text on these issues previously.  New Zealand 
officials who had traveled from Wellington with the 
expectation that they would be engaging on these matters, 
were left with nothing to do.  In the area of investment, 
Malaysian officials withdrew previous concessions, leaving a 
narrow package with "zero benefits" for New Zealand. 
 
5.  (C)  Overall, the NZ officer characterized the New 
Zealand team as "frustrated, disappointed and bruised" by the 
Malaysian approach to this round.  He said that there was a 
"dramatic change in the atmosphere" in this session, with 
Malaysian negotiators becoming increasingly wary of giving 
any ground.  He speculated that the change was due to a 
recent difficult session that MITI Minister Rafidah had in 
parliament.  With backbenchers and opposition members 
questioning the government's plan to negotiate an FTA with 
the U.S., Rafidah was forced to take a strong defensive 
stance that Malaysian interests would be protected.  NZ 
officials suspect that Rafidah gave instructions to the 
Malaysian team to take a tougher line in their negotiations 
to avoid concessions that could be seen as openings for the 
U.S. 
 
Where to Now? 
------------- 
 
6.  (C)  There has been no discussion of when the next 
Malaysian-NZ round might be held.  The NZ officer said that 
on his side the decision on where to go from here would be 
made at the political level in Wellington.  He thought it 
very unlikely that his government would agree to an FTA 
without greater access on services and some mention of 
environment and labor.  He observed that working level 
negotiators had taken the process a long way.  There is a 
significant amount of agreed text.  But he felt that further 
progress would require political level decisions:  either for 
New Zealand to settle for much less than it wanted, or for 
Malaysia to accord greater benefits than it currently appears 
willing to offer. 
 
Your Mileage May Vary 
--------------------- 
 
7. (C)  Comment:  New Zealand is facing the same difficulties 
as Australia (see reftel) in negotiating chapters on 
financial services and government procurement with Malaysia. 
Both countries recent experiences indicate that these will be 
challenging sectors for U.S. negotiators as well.  However, 
we would caution against drawing too close a parallel between 
what happened in the New Zealand-Malaysia negotiations and 
what might happen in our first FTA round.  As the NZ officer 
himself noted, Malaysia will respond differently to its 
largest trading partner and largest source of FDI, than it 
does to a small country like New Zealand.  That said we still 
may encounter more Malaysian posturing than we previously 
anticipated, should Rafidah feel the need to instruct her 
troops to be seen as standing up to the U.S. 
LAFLEUR