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Viewing cable 06KINSHASA796, CONGO'S MARITIME PORTS: NEGLECTED TRANSPORT LINK?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KINSHASA796 2006-05-21 13:34 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO2002
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR
DE RUEHKI #0796/01 1411334
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211334Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3911
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000796 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY PASS TO USCG-ROTTERDAM (GCZERWONKA) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT ECON PREL PTER PINS CG
SUBJECT: CONGO'S MARITIME PORTS: NEGLECTED TRANSPORT LINK? 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 391 
     B. KINSHASA 182 
 
1. (SBU) Summary. The DRC is likely to remain off the U.S. 
Coast Guard's "blacklist," following the second USCG visit to 
Congolese international maritime ports. Two USCG officers 
visited three of the DRC's eight listed international 
maritime ports May 1 and 2 to review security conditions and 
commercial capacity.  Overall, the port security upgrades and 
the Congolese officials' commitment to continuing upgrades 
impressed the USCG.  However, the serious overcrowding at 
Matadi Port and the GDRC's seeming lack of attention to this 
problem was of concern. Further, EconOff's observations and 
information indicate that Matadi is not as secure as GDRC 
officials would have the USG believe.  All three ports are 
operating below commercial capacity; space management and 
infrastructure deficiencies and a lack of political interest 
are the key factors preventing improvements. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Two officials from the USCG Rotterdam Liaison Office 
visited the DRC April 30 through May 3 to evaluate the 
progress the GDRC has made in securing its international 
maritime ports.  EconOff and an Embassy Shipping Section LES 
accompanied them to three ports - Matadi, SEP-Congo and Boma. 
 EconOff also met with the port security officer and manager 
of SOCOPE, a privately-owned-and-operated port near Matadi. 
The USCG did not visit the five other listed ports because it 
was determined on the previous USCG visit that three were 
largely in compliance with the International Maritime 
Organization's International Ship and Port Facility Security 
code (ISPS), one did not qualify as an international port, 
and another had negligible shipping traffic. 
 
MATADI - NOT WHAT IT COULD BE 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Matadi remains the DRC's key maritime port, and its 
most problematic. Access and container overcrowding are the 
greatest concerns, caused primarily by management and 
infrastructural deficiencies. Access control remains 
questionable. EconOff and the USCG officers saw many persons 
in the secure zone without required access badges.  Port 
security officials claim that all persons in this area have 
badges but have not developed a culture of wearing them, 
despite a port police force that in theory has enough 
personnel to enforce this policy. (Note: EconOff continues to 
receive reports from contacts that port officials generally 
do very little to limit access to secure areas. End note.) 
 
4. (U) The ongoing container overcrowding was even more of a 
concern for the USCG (reftel A). 5000-6000 containers stacked 
three and four high create canyons through which vehicles and 
personnel must navigate. Reference to hand-written records is 
the only way to determine the contents of each container. 
Because empty containers are often atop each stack, removing 
a full container can be like trying to solve the Rubic cube, 
with several moves required to get to the one needed. 
Indicative of the problem, the PFSO did not really know how 
many containers are in the port or whether any plan exists to 
reduce their numbers.  Typical of the GDRC, ONATRA officials, 
including the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO), said 
that the customs' agency (OFIDA) is responsible for the 
container management, while OFIDA pointed to ONATRA.  Given 
that ONATRA charges a storage fee (albeit small) for full 
containers remaining more than four days in port, it clearly 
assumes at least some responsibility. (Note: Perhaps the 
revenue generating potential of storing the containers 
outweighs the incentive to have them removed. End note.) 
Finally, the fact that several different services involve 
themselves in port security and management certainly leads to 
some of Matadi's difficulties. 
5. (U) Matadi still meet the commercial demands placed on it. 
It has ten piers, six of which are in service, although the 
World Bank reportedly agreed over a year ago to fund the 
rehabilitation of the other four piers.  As with Boma, it 
handles more imports than exports. According to the PFSO, 
chief exports include rubber and wood, although dozens of 
large logs are lingering in the port. Imports include 
consumer goods, construction materials and consumables.  It 
can take as much as a week to unload and process all 
formalities at port, and EconOff has seen dozens of trucks 
waiting in long lines both inside and outside the port's 
gates. 
 
6. (U) Funding for Matadi's rehabilitation is slow to arrive. 
It has received some funds from ONATRA for its upgrades, and 
Antwerp, its partner port, is funding the renovation of one 
pier. The Belgian Technical Cooperation Ministry continues to 
lobby the GDRC to install private management in the port. 
 
KINSHASA 00000796  002 OF 003 
 
 
Rail service from Matadi to Kinshasa operates at about ten 
percent of capacity due to the disrepair of the lines and 
locomotives. The PFSO claims that service occurs as often as 
everyday, and that some locomotives can haul up to 100 
containers.  (Note: Passenger service is unprofitable and is 
therefore only once per week. End note.) Recently, a Chinese 
company reportedly signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 
connection with its proposal to rehabilitate the 
Kinshasa-Matadi railway. 
 
BOMA - AN ALTERNATIVE TO MATADI? 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Boma, 75 miles downriver from Matadi, is 
better-known as the Congo's first colonial capital than it is 
for any modern-day activity. The USCG found Boma to be 
generally in compliance with the ISPS. Security improvements 
include new signage, lighting, and the ongoing construction 
of visitor holding areas.  However, a well-organized plan 
does not yet exist to keep the public outside of secure 
areas. Pedestrian ingress and egress routes for ferry 
passengers and customs' clients are not clearly delineated. 
The PFSO said that the port has funded all upgrades with its 
own revenues. (Note: The PFSO said that the Minister of 
Transport has never visited Boma and displays no interest in 
supporting its rehabilitation. End note.) 
 
8. (U) Increased port traffic has certainly increased the 
port's revenue. In September 2005, during the last USCG 
visit, Boma reported receiving as few as one to two ships per 
month. The PFSO said that now three to four per week dock 
there, each spending about three days in the port.  He also 
said that each boat that unloads at Boma pays ONATRA about 
USD 40,000 in fees. It is unclear whether the traffic 
increase is the result of real economic growth or merely 
captains' decisions to avoid the overcrowded Matadi Port. For 
example, EconOff saw two ships anchored in the Congo River at 
Boma, waiting for an available pier upriver at Matadi. 
 
9. (U) Boma has promising but limited expansion capacity. It 
is easily accessible from the main road, has four piers 
(three of which are currently serviceable), and the capacity 
for at least 1000 vehicles in transit, although it did not 
appear that those in a holding area were moving very quickly 
out of the port. It also has some warehouse space and a 1500 
container capacity, with 600 currently in the port.  As at 
most official Congolese border crossings, imports - mainly 
vehicles, basic food stuffs (sugar, salt, mayonnaise, mineral 
water) and general consumer goods - exceed exports (mainly 
coffee and wood). However, Boma's potential as a final 
unloading point remains limited because it has no rail line, 
and the road toward Kinshasa cannot safely and efficiently 
accommodate container trucks. Further, Boma does not yet have 
a one-stop customs window ("guichet unique"). Despite a 
December 2005 presidential decree that OFIDA be the revenue 
collector at customs points, shippers must go to the port to 
obtain the documents for all fees and taxes due and to pay 
ONATRA's fees, and then, at a nearby bank, pay the amounts 
due to other state services (reftel B). 
 
ANGO-ANGO: PIPELINE TO WESTERN CONGO 
------------------------------------ 
 
10. (U) Security arrangements at Ango-Ango also satisfied the 
USCG officers.  SEP-Congo, the petroleum distribution 
parastatal, operates this port.  SEP-Congo's manager said 
that the GDRC has approved its security plan since the 2005 
USCG visit. With just 160 employees and one gate into the 
facility, secured access is easier to control. All petroleum 
for the western DRC passes either through this port or the 
SOCIR facility in Banana, at the Congo's mouth.  Because the 
port is shallow, large tankers must transfer petroleum to 
smaller ships near Banana before completing the journey 
upriver to Ango-Ango. According to the port manager, about 
three to four ships per week dock at Ango-Ango. Tanker trucks 
and rail cars carry diesel fuel to Kinshasa, whereas jet fuel 
(up to 10 cubic meters per week), kerosene and gasoline (up 
to 15 cubic meters per week) travel through two pipelines. 
 
11. (U) Total Fina Elf owns 44 percent of SEP-Congo, Shell 
has eight percent and Cohydro (the Congolese state-owned 
retail petroleum company) and the GDRC own the balance.  The 
facility has several holding tanks, with a 600 cubic meter 
capacity. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12. (SBU) Insufficient political will continues to hamper the 
 
KINSHASA 00000796  003 OF 003 
 
 
security upgrades and port rehabilitation needed to meet the 
needs of the DRC's growing economy. Because so few U.S. ships 
transit these ports, this problem does not directly harm U.S. 
interests. However, these ports remain a linchpin to the 
recovery of the Congolese economy, and thus we will continue 
to press the GDRC to remain focused on this sector and to 
support credible domestic and donor-funded projects. End 
comment. 
MEECE