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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1282, SITREP 12: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1282 2006-05-31 09:57 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2716
OO RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1282/01 1510957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 310957Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2969
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001282 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D AND AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU MOPS KPKO AU
SUBJECT: SITREP 12:  DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT UPDATE 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1262 
     B. KHARTOUM 1254 
 
1.  (U) Summary: The following cable outlines current 
activities and events relating to the implementation of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA): 
 
-- Kiir,s Mini-Summit: June 2 
-- Minawi Tours North Darfur 
-- AU Describes Needs for Peace Secretariat 
-- UNMIS Outlines Thinking on Transition 
-- DLO Discusses CONOPS/Advisors with AMIS Force Commander 
 
-------------------------- 
Kiir,s Mini-Summit: June 2 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Roger Winter and Kate Almquist report from Darfur 
that VP Salva Kiir,s meeting with Minni Minawi and Abdul 
Wahid al-Nur (ref A) has been moved to June 2 in Yei due to 
scheduling conflicts.  Sam Ibok, head of the AU DPA 
Implementation Team, will also attend.  Minawi has placed a 
high priority on this meeting, recognizing the significance 
of a political alliance for the SLM with the SPLM and with 
Kiir. 
 
3.  (SBU) AMIS Senior Political Officer Ahmed Rufai Abubakar 
reports that the May 31 deadline will be extended to 
accommodate this change, and the Peace and Security Council 
in Addis Ababa will be rescheduled.  Poloff cautioned 
Abubakar that moving the deadline too often only emboldens 
Abdul Wahid and could jeopardize the credibility of the DPA 
if Abdul Wahid does not sign.  Abubakar responded that the AU 
is trying to achieve a balance between giving Abdul Wahid the 
opportunity to join the agreement and not giving him the 
impression that he can veto the DPA. 
 
------------------------- 
Minawi Tours North Darfur 
------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) On May 30, Minni Minawi returned to areas north of 
Kutum to explain his decision to sign the DPA to his 
commanders.  Winter and Almquist accompanied him and also 
spoke of the support and interest of the United States in 
Darfur and the transformation of Sudan.   Minawi explained 
that the DPA was not perfect, but it was a chance for 
security and peace, especially with the support of friends 
like the United States, and he asked the commanders to give 
it a chance.  Minawi was very warmly received and clearly in 
command and at ease in his element. 
 
5.  (SBU) During the trip, Winter and Almquist asked about 
the reports that Minawi had arrested Suleiman Jamoos.  SLA 
Political Aide Ali Trayo explained that they had not arrested 
Jamoos, but did take away his satellite phone because he was 
using it to rally supporters against Minawi and the DPA. 
USDEL urged that Jamoos be allowed to signal to the outside 
world that he is alright, because rumors were circulating 
that Jamoos had been arrested and tortured. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
AU Describes Needs for Peace Secretariat 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) As a follow-up to Charge Hume,s meeting with AMIS 
Head of Mission Kingibe (ref B), Acting POL Chief and 
USAID/OTI Officer met with AMIS Deputy Head of Mission 
Monique Mukaruliza and Senior Political Affairs Officer Ahmed 
Rufai Abubakar to discuss the details of a Peace Secretariat 
to support the DPA.  OTI officer showed photos of a building 
identified for use by the signatories in El Fasher and laid 
out its program, including 3-4 offices and meeting space for 
50.  The AMIS representatives thought it seemed appropriate 
but will study the proposal more carefully.  Mukaruliza 
explained that the DPA Implementation Team would be given 
offices at the current AMIS headquarters in el-Fasher, so 
office space for the signatories is all that is needed. 
However, there is some concern over where these 
Implementation Team members will stay. 
 
7.  (SBU) For Khartoum, the AU requested an office building 
that could support a range of implementation activities: 
 
-- The DPA Implementation Team, a minimum 10 person group now 
working out of the office of a person on leave; 
 
-- The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation Preparatory 
Committee, which will have at least 25 people; 
 
-- The media outreach office, with a minimum of three people 
 
KHARTOUM 00001282  002 OF 002 
 
 
provided by the UK and arriving next week; 
 
-- Office space for the signatory rebel groups to use while 
in Khartoum; and 
 
-- A large conference room/small auditorium where the AU 
could give presentations and have larger meetings with 
partners and stakeholders. 
 
8.  (SBU) Mukaruliza asked how quickly the contractor could 
be sent to secure and furnish a building.  She said that AMIS 
had already run out of office space, so the need for another 
facility was immediate and acute. 
 
------------------------------------- 
UNMIS Outlines Thinking on Transition 
------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Acting POL Chief met with UNMIS Darfur Team Leader 
Ava Rogers to discuss current UNMIS planning on the 
transition from an AU force.  Charge Hume had previously 
suggested that UNMIS take over non-security aspects of DPA 
implementation before the security forces were set to deploy. 
 This would relieve pressure from AMIS and take advantage of 
the UN,s larger capacity for organizing commissions, 
delivering humanitarian aid, and providing development 
assistance.  Rogers recognized that there was eagerness for a 
quick transition, but explained that UNMIS planners were 
currently divided over the feasibility of this plan.  It 
could only be done with a clear division of responsibility 
and a strong mandate, and must be done in a way that does not 
embarrass the AU.  While some in UNMIS agree that an early 
turnover of non-security responsibilities would help secure 
faster DPA implementation, others feel it is better to wait 
until the peace keeping forces are ready and take over the 
entire mission at one time.  All planners feel that any sort 
of phased transition of individual responsibilities would be 
extremely difficult, so Rogers reiterated that the mandate 
would have to be strong and well-defined. 
STEINFELD