Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1062, Sudan's Strategic Commodity Reserve Authority

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KHARTOUM1062.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1062 2006-05-04 14:46 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4253
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1062/01 1241446
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041446Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2625
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
ABUJA PLEASE PASS C. HUME 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: Sudan's Strategic Commodity Reserve Authority 
 
Ref: Khartoum 0939 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
1.  On April 19, 2006, a USAID food security 
representative met with Badawi El Khair, Director General 
of Sudan's Strategic Commodity Reserve Authority (SCRA), 
and Ahmed Mardas, head of the SCRA marketing section, to 
discuss the agency's ongoing efforts to maintain food 
security in Sudan.  The SCRA, which was established in 
late 2000, is a Government of National Unity (GNU) 
mechanism to stabilize grain prices over the annual 
agricultural production cycle by maintaining a national 
cereal reserve in order to implement a floor price policy 
of market intervention. 
 
2.  In 2005, the SCRA claims to have distributed 270,000 
metric tons (MT) of grain throughout Sudan.  (Note: 
USAID food security analyst can neither confirm nor deny 
the accuracy of this claim.  End note.)  The SCRA does 
not currently coordinate its grain distribution 
operations with donors, the U.N. World Food Program 
(WFP), or international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) providing food assistance in Sudan.  The 
international humanitarian community should open a 
dialogue with the SCRA to gain visibility on SCRA's 
regional food distributions in order to improve food 
security for the people of Sudan.  End summary and 
comment. 
 
-------------------- 
SCRA Grain Purchases 
-------------------- 
 
3.  The role of the Strategic Grain Reserve is to serve 
as a price stabilization mechanism for the country.  Each 
year the reserve enters the marketplace and buys sorghum 
after the harvest.  The sorghum is then held and released 
into selected markets, or even distributed at times for 
free, at the discretion of the government.  The 
international community consistently has questioned why 
this mechanism is not used for to fill gaps in 
international food aid pipelines or contribute to 
humanitarian programs in Sudan. 
 
4.  This year, the SCRA plans to procure 500,000 metric 
tons (MT) of sorghum at a floor price of Sudanese Dinars 
(SD) 5,000 per 90 kilogram (kg) sack for a total cost of 
SD 25 billion, or USD 11 million.  Of the 500,000 MT 
total, SCRA will purchase only 150,000 MT of sorghum 
directly from producers.  SCRA will buy the remaining 
350,000 MT of sorghum through a consortium of banks 
(150,000 MT) and private investors (200,000 MT) who will 
each retain a margin of profit from their grain sales to 
the strategic grain reserve. 
 
5.  According to an SCRA official, the office recently 
received funding from the GNU Ministry of Finance and has 
deployed purchasing teams to six of Sudan's large 
mechanized farming areas to begin the procurement 
process:  Gedarif, Ed Damazine, Sennar, Habila in 
Southern Kordofan State, Er Renk in Upper Nile State, and 
Kosti.  SCRA officials have clearly stated that they 
cannot afford to buy sorghum at a price above SD 5,000 
per 90 kg sack.  Though recent grain prices in Sudan have 
fluctuated from SD 4,600 to SD 5,100, SCRA is expecting 
sorghum prices to decline as a result of decreasing 
demand created by the culling of birds in response to 
Sudan's recent outbreak of avian influenza.  Sorghum is 
used as an ingredient of chicken feed by many large 
producers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Use of Strategic Reserve in Humanitarian Crisis Areas 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6.  Darfur:  According to the SCRA, Darfur currently has 
the lowest cereal prices in Sudan due to local 
humanitarian aid distributions by the international 
 
KHARTOUM 00001062  002 OF 002 
 
 
community.  The average price of a 90 kg sack of sorghum 
in Darfur is SD 4,000, 20 percent lower than the country- 
wide average of SD 5,000.  Given these low prices, it is 
unlikely that the SCRA will distribute food in Darfur. 
 
7.  Kassala and Red Sea States:  Each month, the SCRA 
contributes 1,800 MT of sorghum to Kassala State and 
2,250 MT to Red Sea State.  In March, as the hunger 
season advanced, SCRA contributed 6,840 MT to Kassala 
State and 9,000 MT to Red Sea State, according to the 
SCRA official.  It is unclear how this food is actually 
distributed.  When a USAID team visited Kassala from 
April 20 to 23 (septel), local humanitarian workers said 
that SCRA food distributions are often used as a 
political, rather than a humanitarian, tool.  WFP's food 
distribution system in eastern Sudan targets over 190,000 
people with 17,000 MT of food. 
 
---------- 
Commentary 
---------- 
 
8.  Constraints/Limitations:  SCRA's ability to moderate 
grain floor prices across Sudan is limited by low state 
government capacity to fund and coordinate the regional 
distribution of food, (and by interference of politics in 
the destination and use of the food).  Under current SCRA 
policy guidelines, state governments are responsible for 
transporting grain reserves from SCRA's storage 
warehouses to their local market.  Since many of Sudan's 
state governments lack fiscal resources, this policy 
often delays the shipment of food commodities to their 
intended destination.  In some cases, food commodities 
have been monetized to pay for transportation costs, thus 
reducing the quantity of food available to local 
beneficiaries. 
 
9.  Potential for Collaboration:  The establishment of a 
transparent information-sharing network between SCRA and 
the international humanitarian community has the 
potential to facilitate market surveillance and improve 
efficiency of food assistance activities throughout 
Sudan.  To date, SCRA's operations have not been 
disclosed to the international community.  Thus, SCRA 
food distributions do not enter into discussions 
surrounding food assistance operations in Sudan.  Given 
its poor reputation for controlling and limiting NGO 
activities in Sudan, the Humanitarian Aid Commission 
(HAC) surprisingly employs several technical experts who 
could be encouraged to assist in building these linkages. 
Given WFP's impending ration cuts which will likely 
result in rising food prices in areas like Darfur, the 
role of the SCRA in stabilizing market prices becomes 
more important.  Opening a dialogue with SCRA, 
potentially through technical experts working for the 
HAC, might be one way to move this dialogue forward. 
 
STEINFELD