Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KABUL2285, OPTIONS FOR US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KABUL2285.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL2285 2006-05-20 07:50 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO1816
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2285/01 1400750
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 200750Z MAY 06 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0324
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1909
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2553
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5963
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1375
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC 0069
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002285 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R E C T E D  C O P Y - TEXT THROUGHOUT 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EB/TRA 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, AMEND 
CJTF-76 FOR POLAD, CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A 
TREASURY FOR PARAMESWARAN 
COMMERCE FOR AADLER 
TRANSPORTATION FOR MODESITT 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAID ELTN AF
SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
ASSISTANCE ON JAPANESE PORTION OF RING ROAD 
 
REF: A) KABUL 0379, (B) TOKYO 2570 
 
KABUL 00002285  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Officials from the Japanese Embassy in Kabul are 
anxious to restart work on their portion of the Ring Road 
between Kandahar and Herat as soon as possible. The Japanese 
Government is considering all options, including recontracting 
the work to a non-Japanese contractor. The US Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) offered to assist as a construction agent for 
the Japanese government, keeping the focus clearly on the 
Japanese assistance to Afghanistan and not on USACE's role in 
the project. Japanese Embassy officials were interested in the 
offer, but noted that Tokyo would make the final decision. 
End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Japanese Considering Three Options 
---------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) On May 18, Japanese Embassy officials discussed 
options for resuming work on their portion of the Ring Road 
between Kandahar and Herat with Embassy, AID, CFC-A and 
USACE officials.  DCM Moto Kato, Japan International Cooperation 
System (JICS) Representative Toru Takagi, and Defense Attache 
LTC Hiroshi Shimohata attended for the Japanese.  Kato 
noted that the project is a commitment between JICS 
and the Afghan Ministry of Public Works (MPW).  Two 
Japanese companies subcontract the work from JICS, one 
for consulting (design) and the other for 
construction.  Kato stated that the Japanese were very 
anxious to move the project forward and that Tokyo is 
currently considering three options. 
 
-- First option: Find a way to continue road work with the 
two contractors already engaged. 
-- Second option: Keep the Japanese consulting company, but 
hire another (non-Japanese) company for the construction. 
-- Third option: Hire outside companies for both aspects of 
the project. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Proposes Solutions 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3.  (SBU) USACE described how they could assist as a 
construction agent for the Japanese government, 
keeping the focus clearly on the Japanese assistance 
to Afghanistan and not on USACE's role in the project. 
USACE noted that they could handle the entire project, 
including contracting the work and providing program 
management and quality control services.  This would 
be the ideal and most efficient method for the Corps, plus 
it would ensure security was an inherent part of the 
contract work from the construction camps outward. 
Alternatively, USACE could play a more limited role, 
for instance providing program management for JICS' 
existing construction contract.  USACE emphasized that 
security services should be included in the 
construction contract(s), but noted that USACE can 
play a crucial role by ensuring that contractors live 
up to their security commitments and by liaising with the 
local PRTs and local Afghan National Army and Police 
units to let them know that they are working in their 
region.  USACE emphasized that they were achieving 
success on other road projects in Afghanistan by 
hiring local firms, and suggested this may be a viable 
course of action for whomever executed the work. 
 
4.  (SBU) Kato asked if USACE could provide security 
services only.  USACE responded that they can provide 
security advisory services, but that they do not 
provide protective services.  USACE noted that their 
program management services include evaluating and 
monitoring contractor-provided security to meet USACE 
standards, and that this would provide more security 
than simply engaging USACE in an advisory role.  USACE 
stressed that no US soldiers would be available for 
assignment as security to this project in any 
scenario.  USACE noted that if they let out a new 
contract for road segment, work could begin as early 
as mid-August.  If USACE were to provide project 
management services for the existing construction 
contract, the timetable for restarting construction 
would largely depend on the existing contractor. 
 
5.  (SBU) Kato was appreciative of USACE's willingness 
to take on the project and committed to pass this 
information back to Tokyo.  USACE, in turn, agreed to 
provide a written proposal to the Japanese Embassy 
 
KABUL 00002285  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
outlining how USACE could work with JICS. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment:  The Japanese are fully aware of 
the strategic importance of moving forward quickly on 
the Kandahar-Herat road (despite the fact they 
halted further work on the project last February) 
and are also anxious to keep a Japanese face on the 
project. The Japanese were pleased with USACE's assurances 
that their involvement would be transparent, keeping 
the focus on Japanese assistance.  The Japanese Embassy 
made it clear that the final decision would be made 
in Tokyo.  End comment. 
 
NORLAND