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Viewing cable 06HOCHIMINHCITY503, VIETNAM PARTY CONGRESS: HCMC REACTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HOCHIMINHCITY503 2006-05-17 03:18 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
VZCZCXRO7097
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHM #0503/01 1370318
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170318Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0835
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 0608
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0874
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 000503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL ECON SOCI PGOV VM
SUBJECT: VIETNAM PARTY CONGRESS: HCMC REACTIONS 
 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000503  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  HCMC-based businessmen, bureaucrats and 
journalists are disappointed, but realistic about the results of 
the Party Congress.  Despite the strong push from the reform 
wing, in their view, conservatives and supporters of the status 
quo prevailed.  They are uncertain about the orientation of 
Prime Minister-select Nguyen Tan Dzung.  While decisive, they 
fret that he draws his strength from Mekong Delta conservatives 
and the security establishment.  Our contacts report that the 
Party has begun to close ranks after intense pre-Party Congress 
maneuvering.  The Party has made it clear to HCMC-newspaper 
editors that it wants a "soft landing" on the PMU-18 corruption 
scandal.  While unenthusiastic about the results of the 
Congress, our contacts see little prospect of significant 
backsliding in areas where there has been progress.  They look 
to Vietnam's WTO accession as the external push that the Party 
needs to catalyze further socio-economic reform.  End Summary. 
 
Early Views Of The Party Congress 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, ConGenOffs have pulsed 
journalists, key businessmen and city bureaucrats on their views 
of the Party Congress, leadership changes and the role of the 
media post-Congress as an agent of change and corruption 
watchdog.  All these contacts generally self-identified as being 
associated with the reform wing of the Party.  They were 
disappointed:  status quo at best, perhaps one step back, one 
journalist told us.  HCMC business leaders didn't see anything 
coming out of the Congress that would accelerate economic 
growth.  The reform camp was particularly disappointed that the 
Party Congress political report didn't push for an overhaul of 
the state-owned sector.  Despite strong reform entreaties, the 
State Owned Enterprises remain the "leading force" in the 
economy. 
 
Inside Baseball 
--------------- 
 
3. (SBU) A leading HCMC-based journalist posted to Hanoi for the 
Party Congress said that the outcome of the Party's personnel 
debate was in doubt until the last possible moment.  A number of 
senior Party leaders continued to oppose Nong Duc Manh's 
reselection as General Secretary.  The Saturday immediately 
before the Party Congress, Party elders, including former Party 
Secretary Le Kha Phieu, launched a drive to draft outgoing 
 
SIPDIS 
National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Van An as an alternative to 
Manh.  Our contact told us that An came under intense pressure 
not to accept the challenger mantle.  Reporters who were 
covering the story were warned by security services to be 
"extremely careful" about how and what they reported on the An 
story.  Within 24 hours, An formally declared that he was 
retiring.  Two other well-placed HCMC business contacts told us 
that HCMC's Party Secretary Nguyen Minh Triet also decided not 
to challenge Manh for the top Party slot, despite internal 
balloting in which Triet reportedly placed higher than Manh. 
 
4. (SBU) This press contact said that the Politburo was focused 
purely on internal politics when it made the decision (which it 
later reversed) not to install new GVN leaders until after the 
APEC leaders meeting.  Party leaders did not consider the optics 
of lame duck leaders meeting the President and other world 
leaders a few weeks before they left office.  Our contact did 
not know what led the Politburo to reverse that decision. 
However, Vo Viet Thanh, Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister for 
the South told the Consul General on May 8 that the Central 
Committee will meet shortly to put forward formally a new 
leadership slate to the National Assembly for confirmation. 
According to Thanh, the National Assembly will vote on the slate 
in mid-June. 
 
5. (SBU) Our press contact confirmed that Central Vietnam got 
short shrift in key personnel decisions; the Party did not 
consider leaders from the Center such as Danang Party Secretary 
Ba Thanh sufficiently talented to be promoted.  Reemphasizing 
political control over the military was also a preoccupation at 
the Party Congress.  This, our contact said, helps explain why 
the political report called for reinvigoration of the political 
commissar system in the military.  Our contact added that the 
Party decided not to promote Nong Duc Manh's son to the Central 
Committee because of concerns that it would signal that dynastic 
politics was a factor in personnel selection. 
 
HCMC Bureaucrats and Businessmen 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) In separate discussions, two HCMC business leaders 
fretted that HCMC Party Secretary Nguyen Minh Triet's probable 
elevation to State President effectively sidelines a reformer 
from his powerbase.  HCMC People's Committee Chairman Le Thanh 
Hai, Triet's likely replacement, is seen as a more pragmatic, 
political lightweight.  One city bureaucrat noted that Vietnam 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000503  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
needs a "rejuvenating," new generation of leaders, but such 
figures cannot be found.  Although disappointed, the two city 
administrators we spoke with went on to say that "there will be 
no turning back," but progress will be gradual.  The two 
officials made it clear that they looked to Vietnam's entry into 
the WTO to drive further change. 
 
7. (SBU) Our HCMC contacts are undecided about Nguyen Tan Dzung. 
 They acknowledge that he has a reputation for being decisive 
and note that he sent his children to the U.S. for higher 
education.  (As a result they say, one married a 
Vietnamese-American and the other now works for VinaCapital, one 
of Vietnam's largest investment funds.)  That said, they see 
Dzung drawing his strength from more conservative elements deep 
in the Mekong Delta and from Hanoi-based security services. 
They also see him as more pro-China in his orientation, although 
Vo Viet Thanh insisted that this was a reflection of the 
specific role that he played as Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
The Media and Corruption 
------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) A number of press contacts in HCMC confirmed that the 
leak of the multi-million dollar PMU-18 corruption scandal 
(which embroiled inter-alia the Minister of Transportation) was 
the result of the pre-Congress infighting between General 
Secretary Manh and DPM Dzung.  One press contact said that, 
 
SIPDIS 
while the two leaders do not trust each other, they will be able 
to work together post-Congress. 
 
9. (SBU) Now that leadership decisions have been made, our press 
contacts report that the Party is closing ranks quickly.  Beyond 
those already implicated in the PMU-18 scandal, other lines of 
inquiry on corruption would be closed.  Highlighting how this 
process is already underway, on May 8, Vo Viet Thanh told us 
that the media "misconstrued" the relationship of a Ministry of 
Public Security General Cao Ngoc Oanh to central figures in the 
PMU-18 scandal.  (Note: UN contacts in Hanoi report that the 
rehabilitation of General Oanh is underway.  He was approved 
last week to represent Vietnam at an international law 
enforcement conference in Singapore, a decision made personally 
by Minister of Public Security Le Hong Anh.  End note.)   On May 
11, Prime Minister Khai issued a public warning to the media, 
asking the Ministry of Culture and Information to "take measures 
to seriously sanction press agencies and people involved in 
writing and publishing untrue information" about the corruption 
scandal. 
 
10. (SBU) Various contacts in Tuoi Tre (Youth) and Phap Luat 
(The Law) newspapers, two of the HCMC-based newspapers that 
spearheaded debate on reform and on PMU-18 before the Party 
Congress, told us that the Party now has tightened up access to 
information in the Congress' aftermath.  They say that Vietnam's 
reform-oriented press will not press the reform and 
anti-corruption agenda further at this point.  One media contact 
explained that senior editors of Tuoi Tre, Phap Luat, and the 
web-based VietnamNet are under intense scrutiny due to their 
pre-Congress pushing on reform.  They have no appetite for 
further confrontation with Party ideologues at this point.  When 
one Hanoi-based editor known to have pushed the envelope of 
reporting on Party reform pre-Congress was asked if he was 
concerned about possible post-Congress pressure, he laughingly 
replied, "oh, I bought my plane tickets for the United States 
even before the Party Congress.  I was expecting pressure." 
 
11. (SBU) Comment:  While disappointed that the Party chose 
control and the status quo over accelerated reform, our contacts 
outside the Party are realists and survivors.  Those inside the 
Party know when they need to go back "on message."  All 
understand that the relatively greater openness and debate that 
characterized the pre-Congress period is over and that they need 
to hunker down until the next opportunity presents itself.  End 
Comment. 
WINNICK