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Viewing cable 06HANOI1338, VIETNAMESE DISSIDENTS ANNOUNCE NEW PARTY; GVN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI1338 2006-05-31 10:55 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO4388
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #1338/01 1511055
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311055Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2223
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY PRIORITY 1277
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 001338 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: HUMANR PREL PGOV PHUM VM
SUBJECT:  VIETNAMESE DISSIDENTS ANNOUNCE NEW PARTY; GVN 
CALLS IN WESTERN MISSIONS 
 
REF: HANOI 1320 
 
HANOI 00001338  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The DPV made the public announcement 
today of the reestablishment of the long-defunct DPV, and 
there was no overt reaction by the GVN.  The MFA did, 
however, call in representatives of the Embassies who met 
with the DPV leadership on May 30 to protest foreign 
involvement in "illegal and destabilizing" activities.  In a 
meeting at the MFA, GVN officials asked the DCM not to 
support "negative elements" who are trying to take advantage 
of the current situation in U.S.-Vietnam relations.  They 
said they, too, are working to avert an "overreaction" to 
the DPV within the GVN.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Per reftel, Chinh and Khue announced on June 1 via 
recorded message posted on Vietnamese websites in California 
that the Democracy Party of Vietnam (DPV) is re-established. 
Vietnamese transcripts of the announcement are available on 
the "Voice of Democracy" website for the Vietnamese 
Democratic Movement (www.ptdcvn.org). 
 
3. (SBU) Also on June 1, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) called in (separately) the Australian, European 
Commission (EC), and U.S. diplomatic missions to complain 
about each mission's participation in the May 30 reftel 
meeting with members of the DPV.  Deputy DG for the Americas 
Nguyen Hoang Nam summoned the DCM to express Vietnam's 
appreciation for the recent signing of the bilateral U.S.- 
Vietnam WTO agreement and to warn the United States that 
"some dissidents and political opportunists have taken 
action to destabilize Vietnam's security and society and 
prevent the development of further momentum in Vietnam's 
relations with other countries, including the United 
States."  Nam said the GVN "has evidence" that some 
Embassies, including the United States, met with the 
"opportunists" and encouraged their "illegal behavior."  The 
U.S. Embassy should not be involved in this activity, Nam 
said, and should not support these dissidents. 
 
4. (SBU) The DCM responded that U.S. Embassy personnel 
engage with individuals from all parts of Vietnamese 
society, and it is important to hear a range of opinions. 
The U.S. Embassy does not encourage law-breaking, but we 
have also said many times that Vietnam should support the 
expansion of legally protected political space.  Discretion 
is important in these matters, the DCM said, but the U.S. 
Embassy has an obligation to listen to opinions, including 
and especially those that others do not agree with. 
 
5. (SBU) Nam said the GVN appreciates the USG position, and 
recognizes that the Ambassador and other officials have 
repeatedly expressed the U.S. Embassy's respect for 
Vietnam's sovereignty and territorial integrity.  However, 
the GVN cannot accept actions that destabilize the society. 
"If something happens," Nam said elliptically, "it may tie 
the MFA's hands regarding our recommendations to avoid 
actions that could damage relations."  The DCM noted that 
the best way for a group of individuals agitating for 
political change to express their message, build credibility 
and gain attention is for them to be arrested.  "We want to 
avoid overreactions by our government as well," Nam said. 
 
6. (SBU) In a later meeting on Iran, Deputy FM Le Van Bang 
raised the same issue with the DCM.  "We have a lot going 
on," VFM Bang said, "such as the WTO signing, PNTR, the 
visit of the Secretary of Defense, a possible visit by the 
Secretary of State, and the President's visit."  It is 
 
SIPDIS 
inevitable, he continued, that some people will try to take 
advantage of the pace of relations and the interest of both 
governments in "avoiding agitation" to carry out "some 
actions."  VFM Bang said he is "under a great deal of 
pressure about that."  DDG Nam told Poloff after that 
meeting that VFM Bang has been criticized by security 
hardliners in the GVN who feel that they are constrained 
from "responding appropriately" to the "opportunists" 
because of the GVN's desire - personified by VFM Bang - to 
maintain smooth relations with pro-human rights western 
countries. 
 
7. (SBU) EC and Australian poloffs report the MFA presented 
similar complaints to their missions.  The EC ambassador 
replied that the GVN was not the EU's only interlocutor in 
Vietnam and that EC poloffs have a duty to keep track of 
 
HANOI 00001338  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
domestic developments in the country, and will continue to 
meet with DPV representatives.  The EU doesn't support the 
DPV, however, if the GVN infringes upon the rights of DPV 
members the EC will take up cases on an individual basis and 
from a human rights perspective.  He concluded by noting 
that intrusive surveillance of the activities of Vietnamese 
citizens (and EU and other diplomats) is not civilized 
behavior.  EC poloffs report that their MFA interlocutors 
concluded the meeting almost apologetically by saying that 
meetings like those they had called with the EC ambassador 
"were part of our job". 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) The MFA was discomfited by the message it had to 
deliver on this, which was clearly imposed from outside. 
Their biggest problem with the May 30 meeting seems to have 
been its public nature, and other public contacts we have 
had with Vietnamese dissidents (such as the invitation of 
several of them to the HCMC Fourth of July celebration last 
year) have generated similar scoldings.  The MFA appears to 
understand that we cannot cease and desist from meeting with 
dissidents and democracy activists, and instead want us to 
understand that doing so too publicly might end up forcing 
the hands of those who favor a harsher response to the DPV 
and its members.  We may be able to thread the needle of 
keeping contact with the DPV without letting them martyr 
themselves by reducing the profile of our meetings with 
them.  It may also be out of our hands; the DPV's public 
relations strategy envisions "bombarding" Vietnamese and 
international news outlets with announcements and 
declarations, which alone may be enough to trigger a crack 
down. 
 
MARINE