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Viewing cable 06DILI220, THE VIEW FROM THE WEST: MEETINGS WITH DISSIDENT MILITARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DILI220 2006-05-10 15:19 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO0039
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0220/01 1301519
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101519Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2503
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0388
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0450
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0377
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0234
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0248
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0319
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0120
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1824
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
PACOM FOR JOC, POLAD, J5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT
SUBJECT: THE VIEW FROM THE WEST: MEETINGS WITH DISSIDENT MILITARY 
LEADERS 
 
REF: DILI 218 
 
DILI 00000220  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In addition to the ex-military "petitioners" 
who led the April demonstration in Dili, there are a number of 
dissident members of the national police (PNTL) and armed forces 
(FDTL) who have gone AWOL and are currently located in 
mountainous areas of western East Timor.  Many, although 
probably not most, of these dissident soldiers and police 
officers are in one of two fairly small but well-organized 
groups. The larger group was formed by Major Alfredo Reinado and 
is located in Aileu.  It is comprised primarily of military 
police (MP) officers, although the MPs appear to be affiliated 
or at least co-operating with PNTL units in Aileu. The smaller 
group is headed by Major Marcos Tilman, a regular FDTL officer. 
Both of these groups believe that Prime Minister Alkatiri lacks 
the capability and credibility to lead the nation out of the 
current crisis and are hoping that the President will resolve 
the situation by dismissing the Prime Minister.   On May 9 
Emboffs met with Reinado and Tilman as well as with some of 
their colleagues and supporters.  This message explains the 
origin and nature of these groups as well as what the groups and 
their leaders told Emboffs about why they left for the mountains 
and under what circumstances they are willing to return.  End 
Summary. 
 
Who's Who Among the Armed Groups 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2. (SBU) The AWOL military and police officers in the western 
part of the country fall into three categories:  Major Reinado's 
group, Major Tilman's group, and miscellaneous others. 
 
--- Reinado's group: Before he left for the mountains a week 
ago, Major Alfredo Reinado was --- and officially he still is 
--- the commander of FDTL's military police.  He is the leader 
of a group of approximately 20 MPs and at least 10 PNTL 
officers.  At least 6 of the PNTL officers are from the Police 
Reserve Unit (PRU), whose original function was to deal with 
armed groups crossing the border from Indonesia, and at least 4 
are from the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR), an "elite" unit 
charged with responding to civil disturbances and serious 
violent crimes.  The group is armed with M16s, FNC assault 
rifles and side arms --- apparently these are military and/or 
police weapons that the individual members carried with them 
when they went to the mountains --- and they have several 
military trucks and motorcycles.  The group's food and fuel 
stocks are limited. Reinado told Emboffs that his mission is to 
protect civilians and that he will not return to Dili until 
there has been a credible accounting of the "crimes" of April 28 
and the criminals have been punished.  (Note:  Although 
references to "crimes" during the weekend of April 28-30 are 
generally construed to mean the mass killings allegedly 
committed that weekend by FDTL soldiers commanded by Colonel 
Lere, the deputy commander of FDTL, it appears that Major 
Reinado has a somewhat different interpretation of this term. 
See paragraph 8.)  Reinado is adamant that his goals are 
separate and distinct from those of the petitioners.  He does 
not fully trust General Taur Matan Ruak, the commander of FDTL, 
although he speaks with him frequently by telephone.  He does 
not believe that the current Government (i.e. Prime Minister 
Mari Alkatiri) has the capacity or intent to solve the current 
crisis, and is placing his hopes on decisive action from the 
President. Reinado's headquarters is in Aileu, in the mountains 
about 90 minutes' drive due south of Dili.  Everyone in Aileu 
with whom Emboffs talked was strongly supportive of Major 
Reinado, characterizing him as "keeping us safe," "protecting us 
from Colonel Lere," and in similar terms. 
 
--- Major Marcos Tilman was the Assistant Operations Officer 
(J3) in FDTL.  He and Major Tara Are leading a small group, 
which includes at least 4 soldiers armed with M16s and sidearms. 
 The group also has strong linkages with several prominent 
"veterans" --- i.e., former pro-independence guerrilla fighters 
who for one reason or another did not become members of the 
reconstituted FDTL after independence --- from Western 
 
DILI 00000220  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
districts.  These include Dequa (Deker), Dudu, and Jili.  While 
Tilman's stated goals are (1) ending discrimination against 
"loromonu" (people from the western part of East Timor), (2) 
resolution of the ex-FDTL petitioners' complaints, and (3) 
bringing to justice those responsible for the crimes allegedly 
committed in Tasitolu, his primary concern appears to be the 
security of his family and the ongoing political crisis. 
Tilman's claims of full independence from the petitioners ring 
hollow when he discusses their activities and objectives. 
Tilman's group is based in Gleno, Ermera District, about 90 
minutes' drive to the southwest of Dili. 
 
--- AWOL Military and Police Officers: It is estimated that 
there are at least 100 police and an unknown number of soldiers 
who have gone AWOL and are staying with their families in the 
districts. Many of these military and police personnel are armed 
and have made contact with Reinado.  In fact, Reinado claims 
that more than twenty have asked to formally join his group but 
he has not allowed them to do so because his "orders do not 
include operations with regular police" (i.e., police officers 
who are not members of the special units that sometimes conduct 
joint operations with MPs). More than a dozen PNTL have returned 
to Dili after being AWOL and have been allowed to return to work 
as usual. Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato has announced that 
there will be an investigation at a later date to determine if 
any PNTL members should be punished.  It is not clear how many 
police officers and soldiers remain AWOL for political reasons 
and how many are motivated by fear of retribution if they return 
to Dili. 
 
Reinado's Description of April 28 
----------------------------------------- 
3. (SBU) Reinado told Emboffs that on April 28, shortly after 
rioting had begun in Dili and Tasitolu,  he accompanied Acting 
FDTL Commander Colonel Lere to the home of Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri.  Reinado waited outside while Lere went in to meet 
privately with the Prime Minister. After the meeting, Lere told 
Reinado that the Prime Minister had ordered him to  "destroy 
them all."  Lere repeated this order over the radio and returned 
to military HQ where he distributed weapons and ammunition to 
FDTL personnel and, Reinado says, to some civilians. When 
Reinado asked Lere for rules of engagement and mission 
objectives, Lere reportedly scoffed at the idea and began to 
speak in Makassae, a language common in the Baucau district of 
eastern East Timor, home to Lere and most of the other FDTL 
members who participated in the operation, but which Reinado and 
others from Western districts could not understand.  In order to 
avoid participating in an operation that he believed was illegal 
and ill-considered, Reinado suggested that the MPs should guard 
the airport.  Lere agreed, and Reinado and the other MPs 
departed. 
 
TMR's Response 
--------------------- 
4. (SBU) Reinado said that after Brigadier General Taur Matan 
Ruak (TMR) returned to Dili, he called a meeting of senior FDTL 
officers. He said that TMR was angry with Colonel Lere and asked 
him pointedly for his written orders to intervene in a matter 
that should have been handled by the police. Lere responded that 
he had received a verbal order.  TMR asked how many were dead 
and who was killed. Lere replied that he did not know and he had 
not yet investigated the matter. Reinado says TMR looked very 
sad when he heard this, and that he paused and then said, "If it 
is already buried, do not dig it up." 
 
Reinado and TMR 
---------------------- 
5. (SBU) Reinado told Emboffs he is in contact with TMR and that 
TMR initially told him that he had improperly taken FDTL weapons 
and trucks. Reinado said that he disagreed with TMR's assessment 
because he was continuing to serve as an MP by "protecting 
victims" from the military and because he has written, open 
ended orders from Colonel Lere to conduct joint operations with 
the police to ensure stability and security. In response, TMR 
 
DILI 00000220  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
reportedly told Reinado to stay calm and control his men.  In a 
subsequent conversation TMR reportedly asked Reinado to return 
to Dili to collect uniforms and fuel. Reinado declined because 
he doubted TMR's sincerity and feared a trap by Colonel Lere. 
TMR, he said, is not aware of everything that is going on in the 
FDTL. 
 
6. (SBU) Reinado claims that when he complained to TMR about 
civilians allegedly armed by Colonel Maunana and reports of 
non-uniformed military personnel carrying weapons, TMR issued a 
written authorization to disarm --- and to kill if necessary --- 
civilians or non-uniformed members of the military found to be 
carrying weapons.  Reinado claims to have this order and 
volunteered to give Emboffs a copy, although he did not produce 
one at the May 9 meeting. 
 
Reinado's relationship with the Petitioners 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
7. (SBU) Reinado was adamant that his cause was completely 
separate from that of the 595 petitioners. The Petitioners' 
cause, he said, was weakened by what he saw as a growing linkage 
to an opposition party intent on politicizing the cause. (Note: 
This is a probable reference to the Democratic Party (PD), East 
Timor's largest opposition party, whose President may indeed be 
co-operating with the petitioners.)  Major Reinado says he has 
received a request from Lieutenant Salsinha, the leader of the 
petitioners, to merge his group with Reinado's MPs.  Reinado 
says he has refused because of the fundamental difference in 
their missions and causes.  That said, Reinado does not deny 
that his group has coordinated with the Petitioners and that at 
least one member of his group has cooperated with a 
representative of the Petitioners to raise money in Maliana. 
 
Reinado's Motivation 
-------------------------- 
8. (SBU) Reinado claims that his primary objective is to protect 
the people in Aileu from the Military and that he is carrying 
out a written order from Colonel Lere to conduct joint patrols 
with the specialized police units (UIR and PRU) to protect 
safety and stability.  He denies being AWOL but says he will not 
return to regular service until there has been accountability 
for the "crimes" committed in Tasitolu. He acknowledges that 
this could take a long time and hopes that a credible 
investigation will be carried out, with international 
participation, if possible.  If such an investigation is carried 
out, he said, he would volunteer to be the first witness. A 
complete investigation is not enough, he added. The perpretators 
must be brought to justice before he can return to regular 
service.  Despite the talk of crimes, Reinado was careful not to 
assert that there were more than a handful of deaths during the 
April 28 riots. The crimes to which he was referring, he 
explained to Emboffs, were the execution of an illegal order for 
the military to intervene in a matter that should have been 
handled by the police and the way in which it was carried out, 
including the distribution by Lere of military weapons to 
civilians. 
 
9. (SBU) Major Reinado told Emboffs he is also motivated by a 
devotion to the military. Implicitly comparing himself to 
President Gusmao and TMR, he said repeatedly that he wants his 
"generation to compare with the generation of 1975" and that 
just as it was the responsibility of the old generation to save 
the nation in 1975, it was his generation's responsibility to 
save the nation now. 
 
Major Tilman's Group 
------------------------- 
10. (SBU) Major Tilman says his group has three primary goals: 
(1) ending discrimination against "loromonu" (East Timorese from 
the western part of the country); (2) resolution of the ex-FDTL 
petitioners' complaints; and (3) bringing to justice those 
responsible for the crimes in Tasitolu. Like Reinado, he claims 
no personal knowledge of widespread atrocities committed by the 
security forces in Tasitolu on April 28 and says that there is 
 
DILI 00000220  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
no confirmation that more people died than the five acknowledged 
by the government. Because of persistent rumors that as many as 
70 people were killed, he believes that a transparent 
investigation should be conducted. 
 
11. (SBU) According to Tilman, the government cannot resolve the 
current crisis because it has a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the real situation.  For example, he said, the government thinks 
that sacking 591 soldiers - more than one-third of the military 
- is a small thing. Until the government can admit that view is 
wrong, he said, it will be incapable of taking the steps needed 
to heal the rift in Timorese society, and the longer the 
government ignores these types of problems the worse they will 
become.  The best hope for quick resolution, he said, was for 
"the President to act decisively." 
 
Potential for Violence 
------------------------- 
12. (SBU) Tilman worries that the current situation could become 
violent. The most important thing in the near term was to 
control the increasingly impatient petitioners. While this group 
does not have arms, he said, they still had the capacity to 
commit violence.  For this reason, he said, he had advised 
Salsinha to divide the petitioners into smaller groups and to 
send them to their home districts where they would be easier to 
control and less likely to become disruptive.  He also claims to 
have persuaded Salsinha to forbid petitioners from joining the 
recent demonstrations in Gleno that resulted in the death of one 
police officer and the injury of several more. 
 
13. (SBU) Comment:  Before the current troubles began, Majors 
Reinado and Tilman were widely regarded by the FDTL leadership 
and by informed international observers as among the best and 
the brightest of East Timor's future military leaders.  Those 
who have talked with them since their recent departure from 
Dili, including Emboffs, believe that --- whatever the 
advisability of their actions --- they are doing what they 
sincerely believe is in the best interests of their country. 
Emboffs also believe that neither Reinado nor Tilman will engage 
in military action against the government unless they are 
attacked or in other extreme circumstances, e.g. an attempted 
coup d'etat by Lere or someone else.  End comment. 
REES