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Viewing cable 06DILI214, AMBASSADOR GUTERRES ON POLITICAL/SECURITY SITUATION AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DILI214 2006-05-06 14:17 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO6169
OO RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0214/01 1261417
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 061417Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2490
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0440
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0378
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0367
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0224
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0238
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0309
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0110
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1811
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000214 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR KDEM TT
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GUTERRES ON POLITICAL/SECURITY SITUATION AND 
FRETILIN CONGRESS 
 
REF: A) Turnbull-Huang email 5/6/2006; B) DILI 213; C) DILI 167 
 
DILI 00000214  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Emboff met with East Timor's Ambassador to the U.S. and 
the United Nations, Jose Luis Guterres, on May 6.  Guterres is 
running against Prime Minister Alkatiri for Secretary General of 
the ruling Fretilin Party in the party congress scheduled for 
May 17-20.  Ambassador Guterres conveyed strong optimism that 
the current security situation would soon stabilize, although 
some issues --- especially those of the dismissed soldiers whose 
demonstration led to the April 28 riot --- would remain 
outstanding for a while. However, Guterres arrived in country 
three days ago and remains unfamiliar with some important 
aspects of developments over the last week.  For instance, he 
was unaware of the widespread (and correct) perception that 
Alkatiri's decision to use the armed forces (F-FDTL) to quell 
the April 28 riot was unconstitutional.  Guterres predicted that 
the Fretilin Congress might be delayed for a month or two if the 
security situation deteriorates in the next few days.  He 
expressed confidence that he will defeat Prime Minister Alkatiri 
in the contest for control of the party (and therefore of the 
Government), stating that Alkatiri has lost the confidence of 
the population as well as many within Fretilin. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) During a meeting with Emboff on May 6, Ambassador 
Guterres expressed optimism that East Timor is recovering from 
its current political and security crisis and that further 
violence is unlikely.  He said he had been deeply concerned 
prior to his arrival but has been reassured by his experience on 
the ground during the last few days.  In particular, he said he 
spoke today with General Tuar Matan Ruak, commander of F-FDTL. 
General Matan Ruak discussed the group of Military Police (MPs) 
and civilian police who left their posts May 3 with their 
weapons and have established a base in the neighboring district 
of Aileu.  See Refs A&B.  General Matan Ruak informed Guterres 
that he is in touch with the group's leader and confident that 
they will not initiate any violence.  In addition, Matan Ruak 
told Guterres that three of the MPs had departed Aileu and 
returned to their barracks. 
 
3. (SBU) Regarding the group of dismissed F-FDTL soldiers or 
"petitioners", Guterres said that the Government must find a way 
to address their short-term concerns (mostly relating to their 
own safety) immediately so that they can come out of hiding and 
return to normal lives.  Then the investigation into their 
complaints can take place without an environment of crisis.  He 
expressed his opinion that the petitioners, the group in Aileu, 
and any other groups that might threaten conflict would not be 
able to sustain such conflict for very long.  Guerrilla warfare, 
he opined, is not easy and requires a fundamental and 
existential reason to be sustained for more than a month or two. 
 When asked about his opinion of Colonel Lere of the F-FDTL, who 
the Embassy has identified as a possible initiator of violence 
if the situation deteriorates, he remarked that Lere is a person 
who is "very ready to use force, but only if ordered." 
 
4. (SBU) When asked about the F-FDTL intervention to quell the 
April 28 riots and their subsequent actions especially in the 
Tasitolu area, Ambassador Guterres indicated that he did not yet 
have complete information on these events.  He said that based 
on his current information he believes the F-FDTL's involvement 
to have been legitimate as it was based on the Government's 
request and expressed confidence in General Matan Ruak's account 
of the number of deaths (five).  He was not aware that that 
President Xanana Gusmao had not been consulted regarding the 
F-FDTL intervention, as required by the Constitution.  However, 
he said he was still gathering information on how the decision 
was made and had not yet had a chance to discuss it with the 
President. 
 
5. (SBU) On the upcoming Fretilin Congress, Ambassador Guterres 
noted that the immediate affect of the political and security 
situation is that people close to Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri 
may push for the Congress to be delayed.  He observed that such 
a decision might cause some to conclude that Alkatiri 
orchestrated recent unrest in order to buy more time, although 
he did not say that he believed this himself.  In fact, he said 
that some delay may be necessary if the situation deteriorates, 
but emphasized that the Congress should not be delayed more than 
a month or two.  The decision on whether to delay the Congress 
 
DILI 00000214  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
will most likely be taken at a Fretilin Central Committee (CCF) 
meeting originally scheduled for today but now postponed until 
May 13.  If the Congress is delayed, Guterres will return to New 
York to resume his ambassadorial duties and return to East Timor 
three or four weeks before the rescheduled Congress to resume 
his campaign for Secretary General of the party. 
 
6. (SBU) When asked what political effects the current crisis 
would have on the outcome of the Congress, Guterres said he 
believes that the people blame Alkatiri more than any other 
single individual for recent events.  Alkatiri, he stated, has 
lost the trust even of many Fretilin loyalists by not 
effectively handling known problems in their early stages. 
Moreover, he said, Alkatiri is proving ineffective and 
insensitive in addressing the fears of the population and the 
current internally displaced persons (IDP) crisis.  Guterres 
believes that a change in Fretilin leadership at the upcoming 
Congress could contribute to a diffusion of tensions, as it 
would likely result in a caretaker government that could begin 
to regain the public trust.  He mentioned Foreign Minister Jose 
Ramos Horta as the likeliest candidate for Prime Minister if 
Alkatiri is defeated in the Congress. 
 
7. (SBU)  Comment: Alkatiri has stated that he would immediately 
resign from the Prime Minister position if not reelected as 
Secretary General.  Even if he did not resign, the Constitution 
 
SIPDIS 
provides several procedures by which a party that holds a 
majority in Parliament can bring about the dismissal of a Prime 
Minister who has lost their confidence.  These constitutional 
provisions would require action by President Xanana Gusmao, but 
if Fretilin were to elect new leadership and then seek to 
replace Prime Minister Alkatiri with Ramos Horta, Ambassador 
Guterres, or someone else by constitutional means, President 
Gusmao would be likely to grant the request with alacrity.  End 
comment. 
REES