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Viewing cable 06BRASILIA918, BRAZIL; LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR THE UPCOMING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BRASILIA918 2006-05-10 19:22 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO0436
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0918/01 1301922
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101922Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5341
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5406
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3727
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3990
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 4556
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 2971
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6224
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1800
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 5481
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0058
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 4739
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 2037
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 6913
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1486
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000918 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
STATE PASS TO USTR MSULLIVAN 
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN 
TREASURY FOR FPARODI 
AID/W FOR AA/LA 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D 
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/SHUPKA 
USDOE FOR GWARD/SLADISLAW 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECIN KSUM PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL;  LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR THE UPCOMING 
LATAM-EU AND EU-MERCOSUL SUMMITS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Brazilian officials admit that their 
game-plan for achieving results at the May 12 EU-Latin 
American summit in Vienna, followed by a May 13 EU-Mercosul 
bilateral in the same locale, is now in question.  While they 
had hoped to use the opportunity of the summits to have 
President Lula press heads-of-state on WTO issues, they worry 
that Bolivia,s nationalization of the oil industry last 
week, and its stated intention to take similar action in 
other areas, will overshadow all else.   Venezuelan leader 
Hugo Chavez, set to attend the event, could well steal the 
show given his penchant for sensationalism, further 
highlighting the divisions between Brasilia and Caracas and 
the wider instability in the region.  Notwithstanding 
Mercosul,s efforts to emulate the EU in terms of true 
regional integration, the southern cone trade bloc looks to 
be more divided than ever, as does the Andean Community.  In 
light of all the region,s internal tensions, EU 
interlocutors will likely find it difficult to achieve 
concrete results at the twin summits.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On May 9, the U.K. Charge made the following points 
to POlCouns about the upcoming EU-Latin American and 
EU-Mercosul summits in Vienna: 
 
--  Lula had pressed hard for private bilaterals with both 
U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair and Germany,s Angela Merkel 
(to the extent that Lula,s foreign affairs advisors told the 
British that if Lula did not get a meeting with Blair, he 
would not even go to Vienna).   Both meetings are now 
scheduled. 
 
--  Based upon its conversations with the GOB, the U.K. 
Embassy, believes that Lula's agenda in Vienna will be 
principally WTO-related.  Lula wants to talk to Blair and 
Merkel about agriculture market access and what it would take 
to get the outlines of a deal before the window of 
opportunity closes on the Doha Round.   As always, Brazil 
would push for the EU to come off its hard EU position on 
agriculture.  Lula,s plan appears to be to use Blair and 
Merkel to leverage the French. 
 
--  As a breakthrough on agricultural issues would enable 
Lula to mute the (increasingly vociferous) critics of his 
foreign policy in one fell swoop, the Brits expect Lula to 
hammer them and the Germans on this at every opportunity, 
from Vienna to the July 15 G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg. 
 
3. (SBU) Also on May 9, Econoff contacted Ministry of 
External Relations (MRE) Economic Department officials to 
inquire about Brazil,s objectives for the upcoming meetings. 
 We were told their expectations for the EU-Latam summit and 
the EU-Mercosul session were now unclear.  While the GOB,s 
primary objective had been to press at the head-of-state 
level for concessions to break the logjam in Doha Round 
talks, the concern now is that inevitable discussion of the 
Bolivian situation will undermine their ability to adequately 
focus leaders, attention on the WTO trade negotiations. 
 
4. (U) As noted in a report in the influential daily &Folha 
de Sao Paulo,8 while it is possible to avoid the Bolivia 
issue in the heads-of-state plenary, this topic will 
inevitably arise in side discussions.  The Folha article 
fretted that Lula will be seen at the summit as a 
&weakened8 leader, in comparison to Chavez and Bolivian 
President Evo Morales, limiting his ability to pursue his own 
agenda. 
 
BRASILIA 00000918  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Comment.  Within the region, Lula must increasingly 
feel hemmed in on all sides.  Mercosul, Brazil,s principal 
trade/political bloc, is plagued by internecine feuds while 
Venezuela appears to be egging Bolivia on in that country,s 
&war8 against Brazilian investment.  On both fronts, the 
situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. 
Meanwhile, domestic criticism of Brazilian foreign policy is 
mounting.  Achieving a breakthrough on Doha Round 
agricultural issues would indeed help Lula stem the critics 
and regain some of the visibility he has lost to Chavez. 
Whether at this late date his WTO arguments -- particularly 
in the absence of any specific Brazilian concessions -- will 
change any minds in Vienna, however, is a different story. 
 
Chicola