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Viewing cable 06BOGOTA4001, POLICE REESTABLISHMENT PROGRAM: STEADY PROGRESS IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BOGOTA4001 2006-05-05 19:56 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR INL/LP AND INL/RM 
DEPT FOR WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR SENV KCRM PTER CO
SUBJECT: POLICE REESTABLISHMENT PROGRAM: STEADY PROGRESS IN 
BRINGING LAW AND ORDER TO RURAL COLOMBIA 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The Reestablishment of Police Presence in 
Conflictive Zones program, which the Uribe Administration 
initiated with U.S. assistance in 2002, is making 
significant and steady progress in extending law and order 
to formerly abandoned municipalities of rural Colombia.  The 
program's major components are reestablishing police 
stations in these municipalities, providing security 
enhancements to newly occupied police bases, and deploying 
mobile Carabinero Squadrons to provide additional 
operational security capabilities.  These initiatives have 
reduced violent crime and increased public confidence in the 
government and its police forces in these areas.  This is a 
true partnership, with Colombian financial investment 
surpassing that of the USG by over 40 percent.  The 
Colombian National Police (CNP) leadership is expanding the 
program to focus on areas of recent paramilitary 
demobilization, which will likely lead to future requests 
for additional USG assistance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
POLICE NOW ON DUTY IN ALL 1,099 MUNICIPALITIES 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2. (SBU) The Government of Colombia (GOC) has successfully 
reestablished a police presence in the 165 previously vacant 
municipalities (equivalents of U.S. counties) of rural 
Colombia, resulting in a permanent CNP presence in all 1,099 
municipalities of the country.  The GOC has also deployed a 
permanent CNP presence to 35 previously abandoned sub- 
municipality level locations.  Each of these newly 
established municipal police forces consists of between 46- 
169 personnel, depending on the size of the municipality and 
local threat level. 
 
3. (SBU) In addition to the police already assigned to these 
reestablished municipal bases, an initiative is currently 
underway to train an additional 5,000 municipal patrol 
police who will base in existing police stations and operate 
beyond the towns' limits.  The first contingent of 1,000 is 
currently training at the police rural operations training 
center in Espinal/Piajos, Tolima Department.  Upon 
graduation, these police will be deployed in 50-person units 
to locations where police planners say demobilized 
paramilitary units recently operated, and where the GOC 
fears that other illegal armed groups may try to establish 
themselves. (NOTE: CNP officials responsible for this 
training reported to Emboff that significant 
weapon/equipment shortages exist with the first training 
contingent, and that subsequent training for the remaining 
4,000 police may suffer even more severe equipment and 
ammunition shortages without additional GOC and/or USG 
assistance. END NOTE.) 
 
POLICE BASE SECURITY PROGRAM: ENSURING LONG-TERM PRESENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
4. (SBU) The CNP, with significant USG support, has enhanced 
municipal police base security by means of both physical 
improvements and security training initiatives.  In terms of 
physical improvements, the USG has spent thus far 
approximately USD $50,000 for equipment and security 
upgrades to each of the reestablished police bases. 
Additionally, the USG has provided 10,000 M-16A1 rifles and 
over 300 M-60 machine guns to better arm these rural police. 
NAS Interdiction has also donated communications, weapons, 
and physical upgrades to these facilities. 
 
5.  (SBU) Training is the other important element of the 
municipal police security program.  The training includes a 
newly-established police base security course in Yuto, Choco 
Department.  This course employs the "train-the-trainer" 
principle, and since January 2006 has trained 28 police 
trainers.  Five additional courses are scheduled for 
2006,which will result in a cadre of trainers deployed 
throughout the country.  The course emphasizes patrolling 
and security operations beyond the actual limitations of the 
base proper to deter enemy attacks and enhance the 
confidence and cooperation of local citizens.  Mobile 
training teams travel to individual police bases to provide 
specialized instruction and tailor base security instruction 
to the actual threat. 
 
MOBILE CARABINERO SQUADRONS PROVIDE INCREASED FLEXIBILITY 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
6. (SBU) Since its inception in 2002, the GOC-initiated 
Mobile Carabinero program trained 54 of 62 Carabinero 
Squadrons.  Each squadron consists of 150 persons to conduct 
rural missions against illegal armed groups in 28 of 
Colombia's departments.  The average USG investment in each 
squadron has been approximately USD $1.5 million, and U.S. 
Army Special Forces and NAS Project Advisers providing on- 
the-ground training assistance and tactical advice.  The 
U.S. advisers have also created a 40-person Carabinero cadre 
responsible for training.  The cadre is critical to 
production of a highly-trained Carabinero force.  In 
addition to the in-country training, NAS has sponsored the 
attendance of hundreds of Carabineros at specialized 
training at the U.S. Military's Spanish language training 
centers (the Army's Western Hemisphere Institute for 
Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), the Naval Small Craft 
Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS), and 
the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA).  According to 
CNP Operations Director General Alberto Ruiz Garcia, these 
mobile Carabinero forces "now allow police departmental 
commanders to take the initiative, and not just react like 
before." 
 
7. (SBU) The Carabinero Squadrons excel at a wide variety of 
missions, such as rural security.  For instance, on several 
occasions, several squadrons have been task-organized and 
deployed to go after high-value targets outside their 
immediate areas of responsibility.  Since January 2006, 
approximately 1200 Carabineros have been deployed to La 
Macarena National Park to provide security for the GOC's 
very challenging manual coca eradication initiative. 
 
8. (SBU) In 2005, the CNP purchased a ranch (1740 hectares) 
located near the police training facility of Espinal for USD 
$3.5 million to allow sufficient training area for the seven- 
week Carabinero field skills course.  CNP leadership has 
also instituted a mandatory two-week Carabinero 
Familiarization Course for incoming police departmental 
leaders and has added a Carabinero-specific block of officer 
instruction in an effort to better familiarize CNP 
commanders with the capabilities, limitations, and most 
effective utilization of these new squadrons. 
 
RURAL CRIME DOWN, POLICE SUCCESSES UP, GOOD PUBLIC SUPPORT 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
9. (SBU) The effectiveness of GOC efforts to enhance the 
security of rural municipalities is evident in reduced 
violent crime levels, increased operational successes by 
police forces and solid public support for the renewed 
police presence.  According to CNP statistics, vehicle 
hijackings declined by 73 percent, terrorist attacks by 61 
percent, kidnappings by 52 percent, and murders by 7 percent 
in the period 2003-2005.  Enhanced effectiveness of rural 
police operations during the same period resulted in an 
almost three-fold increase in arrests and weapon seizures in 
rural areas.  Finally, a recent GOC-commissioned poll 
demonstrated a high degree of public support for the renewed 
rural police presence: over 77 percent of citizens polled in 
these municipalities expressed their approval of the return 
of the police to their communities. 
 
10. (SBU) In recent years, desertions from the various 
guerrilla and narco-terrorist groups have increased.  A 
recently demobilized mid-level FARC guerrilla currently in 
the NAS-supported GOC deserter program claimed to Emboff 
that a primary contributing factor to his and other 
desertions was the significantly greater security force 
presence in the countryside.  This former guerrilla stated 
that logistical support from nearby towns was increasingly 
restricted due both to the police presence in the towns and 
tighter GOC roadway controls, which had made guerrilla 
movement much more difficult and dangerous. (NOTE: The 
number of guerrilla deserters  has increased from 327 in 
2001 to a yearly average of over 2,300 during the period 
2002-2005.  Additionally, the percentage of guerrillas who 
turned themselves in to security forces -- as opposed to 
other governmental and non-governmental organizations --rose 
from just 50 percent in 2001 to over 80 percent in 2005. END 
NOTE.) 
 
11. (SBU) GOC security gains have been costly in both 
material and human lives.  Twenty-two Carabineros were 
killed in action in 2004, and Carabinero losses jumped to 61 
in 2005 based largely on an increased activity level in high- 
threat rural areas.  This year, in just a few months of 
operations supporting the manual coca eradication effort in 
La Macarena, 12 Carabineros have been killed in action.  The 
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other 
illegal armed groups have launched a total of 291 attacks 
against these reestablished police stations since 2002, and 
a total of 73 municipal police lost their lives as a result. 
Nevertheless, none of these newly-secured towns have been 
lost, and only two were temporarily seized by terrorist 
forces before being recaptured within hours. 
 
GOC COSTS OF REESTABLISHMENT PROGRAM EXCEED THOSE OF USG 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
12. (U) The GOC has invested heavily in gaining greater 
control of rural Colombia.  Total expenditures on CNP 
Reestablishment initiatives have exceeded USD $115 million 
since 2002.  USG assistance amounted to USD $79 million 
during that same period.  In addition, this program is 
essentially nationalized, in that the CNP provides all 
operations and maintenance funding for the equipment donated 
by the USG.  As the CNP  Field Training Center at Pijaos 
comes on line, most training courses will also be 
nationalized.  USG support to infrastructure development at 
Pijaos will be essential to ensure that the CNP can train 
its rural police units in the future. 
 
SECURING FORMER PARAMILITARY AREAS; RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
13. (SBU) Beyond the current initiatives associated with the 
reestablishment of a police presence in rural 
municipalities, the GOC and CNP leadership are increasing 
manpower in recently demobilized paramilitary areas.  These 
initiatives, which include the ongoing training and 
equipping of the 5,000 municipal patrol police and the 
potential expansion of Carabinero Squadrons to a total of 
100 (38 more than currently resourced), will likely require 
additional USG support to be successful.  While no formal 
GOC requests for support have yet been made, additional 
requests for USG support are likely, given both close USG 
support for these and similar programs in the past and the 
fact that no GOC funding is yet earmarked for these new 
programs. 
 
14. (SBU) COMMENT. The Reestablishment of Police Presence in 
Conflictive Zones that is bearing fruit throughout rural 
Colombia.  The partnership of the GOC and USG in sharing the 
burden of training, equipping, and advising these police 
forces has led to a more secure, stable rural environment 
and a steady reduction in freedom of action of the various 
narco-terrorist groups in these areas. 
 
WOOD